In re Banfield's Estate

• Decision Date: 17 March 1931
• Parties: IN RE BANFIELD'S ESTATE. [a1] v. SCHULDERMAN ET AL. BANFIELD
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

296 P. 1066

137 Or. 167

IN RE BANFIELD'S ESTATE. ^[a1]

BANFIELD v. SCHULDERMAN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 17, 1931

Department 2.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; George Tazwell, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Marie Banfield, deceased. From the decree rendered on the petition of Charles C. Banfield to set apart a certain dwelling house as his homestead, opposed by Henry J. Schulderman and another, both petitioner and contestants appeal.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

Charles C. Banfield filed a petition in the probate department of the circuit court for Multnomah county, Or., praying that lot 9 block 5, in Howe's addition to Portland, with the dwelling house thereon and its appurtenances, be set apart as his homestead.

The allegations of the petition are substantially as follows:

On March 26, 1913, the petitioner was intermarried with Marie Banfield, who died on February 2, 1928, an inhabitant of Multnomah county, and possessed of personal and real property, including the property above described, which, at the time of her decease and for ten years prior thereto, was occupied by petitioner and herself as their place of abode and was their homestead. In addition to her widower, the petitioner herein, she left surviving her as heirs and devisees a brother, a sister, two nieces, a nephew, and a cousin, all residing in Portland. She left a will, wherein the petitioner was appointed executor of her estate, and, by an order entered on February 24, 1928, letters testamentary were issued to him. On or about March 28, 1928, an inventory of her property was made and filed, showing the appraised value of the estate to be the sum of $37,881.34, and the indebtedness $1,000. The petitioner alleged that no portion of the homestead property was necessary for the expense of the last sickness or funeral of the deceased, or of the costs and charges of the probate proceedings, and that no homestead had been established or claimed prior or subsequent to the death of decedent, save and except by petitioner.

In answer to the application for homestead, Henry J. Schulderman and Marie Schulderman, brother and niece of decedent, alleged that they were two of the heirs and devisees of the deceased and were seized of an interest in the real property described in the petition, which property was appraised at $5,000; that by the will of deceased a life estate in that property was devised to the petitioner, "and certain interests therein to said Henry J. Schulderman and Marie Schulderman." They denied that that property was, to the extent of $3,000, exempt from seizure and sale under execution in accordance with the laws of Oregon relating to homestead exemptions, and alleged that the homestead so claimed was subject to and chargeable with the expense of the last sickness and the funeral of the decedent and the costs of administration of her estate, and with the taxes assessed thereon. They further alleged that claims for these costs and expenses had been filed with the executor in the amount of $1,463.57, but that of this amount $375 was for expenses in a partition suit not properly chargeable to the estate. They alleged that the inventory was insufficient in a number of particulars not pertinent to the merits of this case. They averred that the petitioner was estopped from claiming the property above described as a homestead. They prayed that the petition of petitioner be dismissed and any and all relief denied him, "and/or that if a portion of said Lot 9 Block 5, Howe's Addition, described in said petition, be set apart as the homestead of the petitioner to the extent of $3,000 in value thereof, that said property to said extent be decreed by this court to be subject to and charged with the sum of $1,397.20 for the expenses of the last sickness and/or for the funeral of the said Marie Banfield, and the costs and charges of administration of her said estate, and with any other sum that may be or become due on account of said last sickness, funeral and costs and charges of administration and with the said sum of $66.37 due for taxes upon said property."

As a result of the hearing, the court ordered that the real property involved herein be set apart to the petitioner as a homestead, "upon the condition that he pay to Charles C Banfield, executor of the estate * * *, the sum of $2,000 (amount found by the court to be the depreciation in value of the property for the alleged failure of petitioner to keep it in repair), said $2,000 to be administered as the other property of said estate."

From this decree, both the petitioner and the contestants appeal.

Albert L. Gordon, of Portland, for appellant.

A. C. Shaw, of Portland, for respondents.

Julius Silvestone, of Portland, amicus curiæ.

BROWN J.

Webster's International Dictionary defines "homestead" as "the land and buildings thereon occupied by the owner as a home for himself and his family, if any, and more or less protected by law from the claims of creditors. The right of exemption is purely statutory and does not exist in Great Britain, but is given by statute in nearly all the states of the United States."

The meaning of "owner," as used above, is set out in 2 A. L. R. 794, note, in the following language: "The owner of a life estate in land, as well as the owner of the fee therein, may be considered as the owner within the meaning of the Homestead Act, providing for the exemption from levy [of the land]."

The courts have often declared that homestead laws are enacted as a matter of public policy, in the interest of humanity. 29 C.J. 782. However, homestead statutes are subject to the established rules of construction applicable to all laws. When the import of words, either ordinary or technical, is obvious, plain, and easily understood, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation. Waples, Homestead and Exemption, p. 2. That author likewise says, at page 109, that the owner of land for a lifetime occupying the premises lawfully is the lord of the manor while he lives.

Marie Banfield devised to her husband, the petitioner herein, a life estate in her real property. It is...