In re Beaudoin
| Decision Date | 03 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2019-260 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re Ronald A. Beaudoin* |
Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division
Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Petitioner in this post-conviction relief (PCR) action appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the State. We affirm.
In 2007, petitioner was sentenced to serve twenty-five years to life for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. The sentence was based on a habitual offender enhancement under 13 V.S.A. § 11. Without the enhancement, the maximum possible sentence would have been fifteen years. The enhancement was based in part on three prior felony convictions, two of which petitioner challenges in this appeal.
In 1996, petitioner pleaded no contest to a charge of aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1). During the plea colloquy, the court explained to petitioner that the charge included the facts that petitioner struck the victim, causing serious bodily injury, and in so doing was Petitioner denied the allegation but stated that he understood that it was an element of the offense that he was pleading to and that it was part of what the State would have to prove at trial. Defense counsel stated that petitioner was pleading no contest because he believed that if the State were to go to trial, the jury could believe the victim and he could be convicted. The facts the State recited to support the charge included that petitioner struck the victim "in the area of her eye," which caused blurred vision for approximately three days.
In 2001, petitioner pleaded guilty to an amended charge of lewd and lascivious conduct in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2601. The judge conducted a lengthy plea colloquy but failed to specifically ask petitioner whether his plea was voluntary and did not make any finding that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.
Petitioner filed this action in 2017. In a motion for summary judgment, he sought to vacate the 2007 habitual-offender enhancement on the grounds that the 1996 and 2001 convictions were invalid. He claimed his 1996 aggravated-assault conviction was invalid because, in its plea colloquy, the court incorrectly defined the required element of extreme indifference to the value of human life and because petitioner did not acknowledge that the State had evidence to support the facts of the crime charged. He argued that the State had to show, and he had to admit, that there was a very high degree of risk that death would result from his conduct. He further claimed that his 2001 lewd-and-lascivious-conduct conviction was invalid because the court did not ask him whether his plea was voluntary. The State argued that both convictions were valid and sought summary judgment in its favor.
With regard to the 1996 conviction, the PCR court held that a high risk of death was not required to support the charge of aggravated assault, and that a jury could find that hitting someone near the eye so hard that it caused blurred vision for several days rose to the level of extreme indifference to the value of human life. The PCR court further held that the record of the 2001 plea colloquy indicated that petitioner's plea was voluntary, even though the judge did not expressly inquire into voluntariness. The PCR court therefore denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and granted the State's motion.
We review the trial court's summary-judgment decision without deference to its reasoning, using the same standard as the lower court. In re Pinheiro, 2018 VT 50, ¶ 8, 207 Vt. 466. That is, summary judgment is appropriate when the material facts are not genuinely disputed and show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; V.R.C.P. 56(a).
On appeal, petitioner argues that his 1996 plea was involuntary because the court incorrectly defined the mental element of the charge and thus failed to ensure that he understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading. Petitioner pleaded no contest to aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if the person: . . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Petitioner argues that the court incorrectly restated the extreme-indifference element as meaning that petitioner did "something dangerous to [the complainant]," suggesting a lower standard of proof than is required.
To ensure that a plea is knowing and voluntary, the court accepting the plea must explain the elements of the charged offense to the defendant. In re Pinheiro, 2018 VT 50, ¶ 10, 207 Vt. 466. This requirement is incorporated into Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), which requires the court to advise the defendant of "the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered." In the context of Rule 11(c) we have held that "substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 11 is sufficient to withstand a challenge to the sufficiency of a plea hearing." State v. Mutwale, 2013 VT 61, ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 258.
Here, the trial court explained to petitioner twice during the colloquy that he was charged with striking the complainant, causing her serious bodily injury, in a manner that demonstrated extreme indifference to the value of her life. There is no indication from the record that the court's subsequent statement that this meant that petitioner did "something dangerous to" the complainant undermined petitioner's understanding of the charge. Although petitioner argues that his competence has been questioned at various times, his replies during the colloquy do not indicate confusion about the nature of the charge in general or the intent element more specifically. Nor has petitioner alleged or shown that he would not have entered the plea but for the court's statement. See In re Hemingway, 2014 VT 42, ¶ 21, 196 Vt. 384 (). Rather, the record as a whole indicates that petitioner made a knowing and voluntary plea. See In re Thompson, 166 Vt. 471, 475 (1997) (). Whilepetitioner denied that he engaged in the conduct alleged by the State, petitioner's trial counsel explained that he was pleading no contest to the charge because he believed a jury would find the complainant credible. See In re Barber, 2018 VT 78, ¶ 23, 208 Vt. 77 (). Petitioner did not disagree with this assertion. He agreed that the State would have to prove the extreme-indifference element if the case went to trial. He indicated that he wanted to go forward with his plea. The State described the evidence supporting the charge, and petitioner agreed that he was satisfied that the State could present that evidence at trial if the trial were held. Under these circumstances, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his plea was rendered involuntary by the court's statement.
Furthermore, to the extent that petitioner argues that the facts alleged by the State did not support the charge, we disagree. We examined the extreme-indifference element of aggravated assault in State v. Joseph, 157 Vt. 651 (1991) (mem.). In that decision, we rejected the argument that 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1) requires the State to show "a 'probability' of death resulting" from the defendant's act. Id. at 652. Instead, we held that...
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