In re Beck's Estate
| Decision Date | 05 February 1912 |
| Citation | 121 P. 784,44 Mont. 561 |
| Parties | In re BECK'S ESTATE. [d1] v. BARNARD et al. State et al. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Michael Donlan Judge.
Action by the State, for benefit of the State Orphans' Home against Anthony W. Barnard, as executor of Josiah F. Beck and others. From a judgment for defendants, the State and the Orphans' Home appeal, and defendants Agnes Beck and James R. Dickey and another prosecute cross-appeals. Affirmed on all appeals.
Josiah F. Beck died in Silver Bow county on April 28, 1909, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal property of the value approximately of $80,000. He left surviving him a widow, Agnes Beck, several nephews and nieces, and the children of a deceased niece. By his will, dated March 8, 1899, he gave to the widow the family home in the city of Butte, together with the household furniture, and the sum of $10,000, to be paid to her at the discretion of his executors, from time to time, as her necessities might require. Among the other bequests made by the testator are the following: The will was duly admitted to probate by the district court of Silver Bow county, and Anthony W. Barnard, one of the persons named as executors therein, qualified and entered upon the discharge of his duties. Thereafter, on May 12, 1909, the widow renounced the benefit of the testamentary provision made for her, and reserved the right of election to take her dower in the real estate and her share of the personal property under section 3714, Revised Codes, or, in lieu of dower, one-half of the real estate, after the payment of all just debts, under section 3716. Thereupon this proceeding was commenced by the state of Montana, through the Attorney General, representing the Orphans' Home, and also in its own behalf, under the provisions found in sections 7670-7672 of the Revised Codes, to have ascertained and declared the rights of all persons to any part of the estate and all interests therein, and to whom distribution thereof should be made.
The widow and all the next of kin of the testator, as heirs at law, entered their appearance and by answer contested the validity of the residuary clause of the will, on the ground that neither the Orphans' Home nor the state of Montana has legal capacity to take as a legatee. There was also a controversy between the widow and the next of kin as to what share of the estate, if any, they were entitled to in case the legacy to the Orphans' Home should be declared invalid; the former contending that the latter were not entitled to any share whatever. The questions involved were determined upon an agreed statement of facts. It was stipulated therein that the Orphans' Home mentioned in the will is the State Orphans' Home at Twin Bridges, in Madison county, created and established under the provisions found in part 3, c. 4, of article 3 of the Political Code of 1895 (sections 2470-2494), and acts amendatory thereto, brought forward into the Revised Codes as sections 1249-1280, inclusive, and thereafter further amended by the act approved March 4, 1909 (Laws of 1909, c. 73, p. 97). No question was made as to any of the other several bequests, except that it was contended by all the parties in interest, other than those mentioned as special legatees, that under the terms of the will the Dickey brothers were entitled to receive only such balance of the $3,000 bequeathed to them as would remain after deducting the principal sum named in the note, admitted to be still due the estate, together with interest thereon up to the date of the probate of the will. The relationship to the testator of all the persons appearing as next of kin was admitted. It is not stipulated in the statement that the widow had made her election, which she had reserved in the alternative, before the commencement of the proceeding. It was admitted, pending final decision, however, that she had chosen the alternative accorded to her by section 3716, supra. It was also stipulated in open court at the time of final submission that she was, in any event, entitled to a homestead of the value not to exceed $2,500, or, in lieu thereof, $2,500 in money over and above the share of the real estate accorded to her under section 3716.
Upon the agreed facts and these admissions, the court ascertained and decreed: (1) That the residuary bequest to the Orphans' Home is void; (2) that the amounts of the special bequests and debts must be paid out of the real estate; (3) that the Dickey brothers are entitled to receive the sum of $3,000, less the sum of $2,000, with interest thereon to the date of probate of the will; and (4) that the widow is entitled to receive (a) one-half of all the real estate belonging to the estate at the death of the testator, or of the proceeds thereof remaining after the payment of the specific legacies and debts; (b) that out of the remainder or the proceeds thereof she is entitled to a homestead, not exceeding in value $2,500, or, at her option, $2,500 in money; and (c) that she is further entitled to one-third of the personal property remaining in the hands of the executor at the date of distribution after the payment of the costs of administration. It was decreed that the next of kin were entitled to the residue of the estate per stirpes. After the final decision, the widow and the next of kin adjusted their controversies. Those are therefore not now involved in this case. As against the state and the Orphans' Home, the widow made her motion for a new trial. This was overruled. She has appealed from the decree and order overruling her motion. The state and the Orphans' Home have appealed from the decree, as have also the Dickey brothers.
The appeals of the widow and the state and Orphans' Home present two questions, viz.: (1) Is the Orphans' Home a person capable of taking as legatee under the act, and, if not, construing the will as manifesting an intention on the part of the testator to make the state his beneficiary, is the state capable of taking; and (2) to what share is the widow entitled? If the first of these questions is answered in the negative, it will be unnecessary to answer the second, because, as noted in the statement of facts, after the decision by the district court, the widow and next of kin adjusted their controversies by stipulation, and, as stated in the brief of counsel for the widow, her appeals were taken only in order to protect her rights as against the claims made on behalf of the state.
The right to make testamentary disposition of property depends entirely upon the will of the Legislature. It may withhold the right altogether, or impose any limitations or conditions upon it which it chooses. In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 178, 105 P. 1013. A necessary postulate of this proposition is that the Legislature has the exclusive power to designate those whom the testator may make the objects of his bounty. It is the general rule in the United States that, in the absence of some special disability declared by statute, any person may be a legatee or devisee. When the statute of wills, in designating those who are capable of taking, employs the word "persons," without limiting its meaning, it also includes corporations, in the absence of a prohibition in the charter. 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 741; 7 Id. 721.
Our statute declares: "A testamentary disposition may be made to any person capable of taking the property so disposed of, except corporations other than those formed for scientific, literary, or solely educational purposes, cannot take under a will, unless expressly authorized by statute." Rev.
Codes, § 4725. The evident meaning of this awkwardly expressed provision is that natural persons and corporations formed for scientific, literary, or solely educational purposes may take through testamentary disposition, but that no other corporation may, unless expressly authorized by statute to do so. If the term "person" only had been used, the right would have been extended to any corporation capable of taking and holding property; for, though the term "person" ordinarily refers to a living human being--a natural person--the definition given it by other provisions of the Codes includes corporations, as well as natural persons. Rev. Codes, §§ 16, 6224, 8071, 8099. The same definition is given in each of these sections. "A corporation is a creature of the law, having certain powers and duties of a natural person." Section 3805. Section 3806. "Private corporations may be formed by the voluntary association of any three or more persons in the manner prescribed in this article." Article 1, div. 1, pt. 4, tit. 1, c. 1, Civil Code § 392 (Rev. Codes, § 3807).
The State Orphans' Home does not fall within the above definitions, either of a public or private corporation. The purpose of its establishment was that it should be "a home for...
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