In re Bion

• Decision Date: 05 November 1890
• Citation: 20 A. 662,59 Conn. 372
• Parties: In re BION.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

20 A. 662

59 Conn. 372

In re BION.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 5, 1890.

Habeas corpus.

L. J. Nickerson, for appellant. J. Huntington, W. B. Smith, and A. D. Warner, for appellee.

LOOMIS, J. The questions for review presented by this appeal arise upon the rulings of a judge of the superior court, on the trial of a writ of habeas corpus, issued upon application of Michael Bion, in order to procure his release from the county jail, where he was under commitment for non-compliance with the order of a justice of the peace upon a complaint against him in favor of one Lyman Dunning for sureties of the peace to prevent the execution of threats on the part of Bion to do great bodily harm to Dunning. The applicant claims his release from imprisonment upon two independent grounds: (1) That the justice of the peace who tried the original complaint against him, pursuant to which he was committed to jail, had no jurisdiction; and (2) if the justice had jurisdiction, the evidence before him did not warrant the finding of guilty, or the ordering of sureties of the peace.

1. The first claim is a legitimate one to make, and, if true, must, of course, prevail. The facts upon which the alleged want of jurisdiction is predicated are simply that the original complaint for sureties of the peace was presented to and sworn to before one justice of the peace, viz., Jacob B. Hordenburg, who issued his warrant thereon, directing the arrest of said Bion, and that he be brought before him, (Hordenburg,) "or some other justice of the peace for said county in said town of North Canaan, to answer to the charges alleged against him in the foregoing complaint of Lyman Dunning," etc., and that by virtue of such a warrant he was arrested and brought before another justice, Samuel A. Bennett, of the same town and county, before whom he was tried and convicted upon the plea of not guilty, and bound over to the superior court; and in the mean time to keep the peace. It is conceded that the process and proceedings were regular in form in every respect, and that Justice Bennett, who tried the case, was a duly-qualified justice, and that he would have had rightful jurisdiction of the complaint had it been first addressed to him, and had he issued the warrant of arrest returnable before himself.

The applicant's contention is that section 695 of the General Statutes restricts the jurisdiction in cases of this kind to the one justice of the peace to whom the complaint is first addressed and presented. The section is as follows: "Any justice of the peace, in the county where he resides, may, from his personal knowledge, or upon complaint of another, require sureties of the peace and good behavior from any person who shall threaten to beat or kill another, or who shall abuse any justice of the peace, or resist or abuse any officer in the execution of his office, or contend with angry words, or by any unlawful act terrify and disturb the good people of this state; and when any person shall complain on oath to a justice of the peace that he has just cause to fear that another will imprison, beat, or kill the complainant, or procure others to do so, and that he is under fear of bodily harm, such justice of the peace may, if he believe such person has just cause for such fear, require sureties of the peace and good behavior from the person complained of, and upon refusal of the person so required to find sureties of the peace in either of said cases, the justice of the peace may commit him to the jail in the county, to remain until he shall be discharged by due course of law, or until the next session of the superior court having criminal jurisdiction in said county, which may make further order relating to the subject-matter of said offense," etc.

A literal rendering of the statute, without the aid of another statute, to which we shall presently refer, would give color to the applicant's claim. This section, however, considered by itself, does not necessarily have the meaning attributed to it. The first clause, in very general language, shows that jurisdiction is conferred in one of two ways; that is, from personal knowledge on the part of the justice, or "upon complaint of another." No de tails are given as to the steps required to bring the complaint of another "before the justice who is to try it. This omission, as we shall see, is supplied by another statute. The complaint of another performs precisely the same office, and is every way equally effective, whether upon the annexed warrant the accused is brought to trial before the justice who issued the warrant, or before another justice by authority of the same warrant, there to answer to the same complaint. The latter justice acts as truly" upon complaint of another" as he would if all the proceedings had been rigidly confined to him. So as to the second clause, which provides that "when any person shall complain, on oath, to a justice of the peace, * * * such justice * * * may require sureties, etc. The complaint is to the justice first addressed, for the immediate purpose of having a warrant annexed either to bring the case before himself or another justice of the county, but when the accused, by authority of the warrant, is brought before another or substituted justice, then the complaint is to the latter. With the aid of section 690 of the General Statutes we think such a construction is admissible and reasonable. This section provides that "every justice of the peace may issue process upon any complaint authorized by law to any proper officer, or by name to any indifferent person, to be served in any part of the state, to apprehend and bring before himself or any other proper authority, for trial or examination, any person against whom complaint is made for any criminal offense for which he ought to be brought before such authority." This language is obviously comprehensive enough to include this proceeding. In terms it includes "every justice of the peace" and "any complaint authorized by law," thus referring to other provisions of the statute giving authority. It also includes "any person against whom complaint is made for any criminal offense for which he ought to be brought before such authority."

The offenses referred to are criminal in their nature. Our statutes have always classed them with crimes. In section 695, now under consideration, they are called "offenses," and when the justice of the peace has exhausted his jurisdiction the higher court, to. which further control is committed, is "the next session of the superior court having criminal jurisdiction in said county." But the claim is made that the general provisions of section 690 cannot be resorted to, because the power to require sureties of the peace is a special jurisdiction given to justices in section 695, and that special jurisdiction cannot be controlled by other provisions of the statute conferring general jurisdiction in criminal cases. The principle invoked is undoubtedly a sound one, but it only applies where the special provisions preoccupy and cover the ground in question. If, for instance, section 695 had provided specially for the issuing of a warrant of arrest, and for its return before the same justice who issued it, the claim would rest on a good foundation. But these provisions are omitted in the section referred to. There is no provision for issuing any process to bring the accused before any court. This is a matter, therefore, left open for the operation of the general provisions of section 690. If the latter does not apply, there is a serious defect in the special provisions referred to. The applicant's counsel, in his brief, cites the statute of 1821, relative to bastardy proceedings, and the decision in Hopkins v. Plainfield, 7 Conn. 286, referring to that act, asstrongly supporting his construction of the act now under consideration. As it impresses us, it weakens, rather than strengthens, his argument, for it illustrates and furnishes additional foundation for the precise distinction we have made. That act provided that when a woman exhibited her complaint on oath to a justice of the peace, " * * such justice shall issue a warrant and cause such person to be apprehended and brought before him, and that he should order the person to become bound," etc. This act is erroneously said to be similar to section 695. On the contrary, by an additional provision, it supplies an important omission in that section, which we consider a controlling one; that is, it points out in detail the steps to be taken by the justice to whom complaint might be made,—that he was to issue his warrant to cause the person accused to be brought before him, and he was to order the person to become bound. The opinion of the court in Hopkins v. Plainfield, supra, in referring to the effect of this statute, italicizes the words "him" and "he" precisely as we have done above. The court assumes that the act, on account of those words, might have the meaning attributed to it, but the decision in fact was based on the ground that the statute applied only to cases where the woman was prosecutrix and did not apply to a prosecution by the town as that was. There was a plea in abatement in that case that the process was issued by one justice of the peace, and the person charged was directed to be, and in fact was, brought before another justice. But the court held the plea insufficient, and upon a ground having some analogy to the principles we apply to this case, viz., for the reason that the special provision relative to the issue of process contained in the section, relating to a prosecution by the injured woman, was omitted in another section of the same act, providing for prosecutions by the town, and the court saved the case by going outside the provisions of the special act, (as we do,) and by applying a general provision that any justice of the peace had power to bind over the accused to the county court.

We may...