In re Birdseye

• Decision Date: 09 March 1905
• Citation: 77 Conn. 623,60 A. 111
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re BIRDSEYE et al.

60 A. 111

77 Conn. 623

In re BIRDSEYE et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 9, 1905.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.

Proceedings for the probate of the will of Ann Bohan, deceased. From an order setting aside the verdict of the Jury in favor of Mary J. Birdseye and another, contestants, and granting a new trial, the contestants appeal. Affirmed.

Ann Bohan died at Bridgeport December 24, 1902, after an illness of some three weeks. December 15, 1902, she made a will. December 18, 1902, she made another will. The latter will was admitted to probate by the court of probate for the district of Bridgeport on January 21, 1903. Mary J. Birdseye and her daughter Mary T. Birds-eye, as executrix and legatee under the first will, appealed from this order to the superior court. The reasons of appeal were: (1) The will was not legally executed; (2) the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity; and (3) the will was procured through undue influence. The jury returned a verdict finding the issue for the appellants, and that the will in question was not the last will and testament of Ann Bohan. The court (Roraback, J.) set the verdict aside and ordered a new trial. The appeal to this court assigns as the only reason of appeal that the superior court erred and mistook the law in setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.

Henry C. Stevenson and Clifford B. Wilson, for appellants. Stiles Judson, Jr., and Henry E. Shannon, for appellee.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). The supervision which a judge has over the verdict is an essential part of the jury system, and the power of granting new trials for verdicts against evidence is vested in the trial courts. Bartholomew v. Clark, 1 Conn. 472; Bissell v. Dickerson, 64 Conn. 61, 29 Atl. 226. When error is claimed in the exercise of this power, great weight is due to the action of the trial court, and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness. Loomis v. Perkins. 70 Conn. 444, 446, 39 Atl. 797; Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 71, 49 Atl. 854; Uncas Paper Co. v. Corbin, 75 Conn. 675, 678, 55 Atl. 165. A court has some discretion in the matter of a new trial, but it is a legal discretion. It should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they, or some of them, were influenced by prejudice, corruption, or partiality. Burr v. Harty, 75 Conn. 127, 129, 52 Atl. 724; Fell v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76 Conn. 494, 495, 57 Atl. 175. When the action of a trial court can reasonably be regarded as within the limits of this discretion, it should not be disturbed upon appeal. The question of law presented upon appeal from the decision of a trial judge awarding a new trial for a verdict against evidence necessarily involves a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence as it appears in the printed record to support the verdict, making all due allowance for' the oftentimes controlling evidential matters appearing in the trial, and known to the judge and jury, but which do not appear in the report of the evidence; nevertheless the real question of law is, does it appear that the trial judge has mistaken the law defining the limits of his discretion, or manifestly abused that discretion? Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 447, 39 Atl. 797.

The record in the present case fails to show that the trial judge, in granting a new trial, either mistook the limits of his legal discretion, or abused the power vested in him. The proponents of the will were bound to prove its legal execution, and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix. It appears that the execution of the will was proved beyond question, and also the testamentary capacity of the testatrix. The appellants contesting the will were bound to prove the exertion of undue influence in...