In re Blackburn's Estate
| Decision Date | 01 November 1913 |
| Citation | 137 P. 381,48 Mont. 179 |
| Parties | IN RE BLACKBURN'S ESTATE. v. BLACKBURN ET AL. BLACKBURN |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Jeremiah J. Lynch Judge.
In the matter of the estate of Gideon E. Blackburn, deceased. Petition by Hannah A. Blackburn against Charles A. Blackburn as administrator, and others, for the removal of defendant administrator, etc. From an order dismissing the proceeding petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Nolan & Donovan, of Butte, for appellant.
Maury, Templeman & Davies, of Butte, and Wm. Wallace, Jr., John G. Brown, and T. B. Weir, all of Helena, for respondents.
Dr. Gideon E. Blackburn, of Butte, died intestate on March 24, 1912, leaving some estate, and surviving heirs as follows: Hannah A. Blackburn, his wife, Charles A. Blackburn, a son, and two daughters. On March 29, 1912, Charles A. Blackburn filed in the district court of Silver Bow county a petition for letters of administration of the estate, and also filed a writing signed by the widow, wherein she formally waived her right to such letters, and requested his appointment. In the petition it is recited that the estate and effects in respect of which letters of administration are asked do not exceed the value of $5,000, and that it consists of office and household furniture, libraries, book accounts, and miscellaneous stocks and bonds of unknown value. The petition came on for hearing in due course, and at the hearing the petitioner testified that, so far as he then knew, the value of the estate was not to exceed $5,000; of this, $2,900 was cash, the remainder being stocks, bonds, and other interests. The petition was granted, and Charles A. Blackburn has since acted as administrator. On June 5, 1912, he filed an inventory and appraisement, wherein he failed to list a gold watch and a pair of field glasses as part of the estate, but did list as the property of said estate a large number of securities and various parcels of realty claimed by the widow as her individual property. By this inventory it was made to appear that the estate was of the value of $34,996.07. On June 7, 1912, the widow filed her petition, alleging, in substance, that the administrator had willfully and fraudulently failed and refused to list the watch and field glasses above mentioned, and had converted the same to his own use, and that, with the intent to involve the estate in useless and unnecessary litigation, he had listed the securities and realty above referred to, belonging exclusively to her. On the following day the administrator filed a supplemental inventory, listing the watch, the glasses, a revolver, and an additional piece of real estate; so that, as finally presented by the two inventories, the appraised value of the estate is made to appear at $35,558.07. To the petition of the widow two answers were filed: One by the administrator, and the other by H. L. Maury on behalf of Daisy I. O'Neill and Sister M. Florentia, the daughters of deceased; the answer of the daughters, praying "that no relief be granted to Mrs. Hannah A. Blackburn," denies generally the allegations of her petition, including her widowhood; denies that the watch and glasses are of any value; alleges that she is not related to them, and that their mother is still alive. The answer of the administrator puts in issue the widowhood of the petitioner; explains the omission of the watch and glasses from the first inventory; denies the charges of fraud, waste, or intent to involve the estate in unnecessary litigation, or that any litigation he will bring will be in bad faith; and alleges that any claim he may assert or attempt to enforce will be under the permission of the court, for the sole use and benefit of the estate. By way of further answer the administrator pleads the waiver and request executed by the widow, and alleges that in consequence thereof, and of expenditures by him of money in the care of the estate, "she is not entitled to now assert any rights which she may have or claim, as widow, to have letters of administration issued to her." In reply to the answer of the administrator, the widow admits the execution of the waiver and request filed March 29, 1912, and alleges that the same was made by her "upon the solicitations of Charles A. Blackburn and the advices of John G. Brown, his attorney, and the representations of friendliness on the part of the said Charles A. Blackburn" towards her, and that since the issuance of letters of administration to him, he has become and now is hostile to her and the best interests of the estate "and dishonest and untrustworthy, as more fully appears from the petition herein on file." The matter was heard before the district court of Silver Bow county, the Honorable Jeremiah J. Lynch, judge presiding; and, upon the proceedings had, including the testimony taken, an order was made by which the petition of the widow was denied and the proceeding dismissed. From that order this appeal is taken.
The appellant contends that the petition should have been granted, because the widow is vested by the statute with a prior right to administer her late husband's estate, which cannot be affected by her renunciation; because the circumstances under which the administrator secured her renunciation were such that it ought not to be held effective in view of his present attitude towards her interests, and because the evidence establishes that he is not a fit and proper person to have control of the estate.
1. The position that the widow is entitled, notwithstanding her renunciation and the appointment of her nominee, to have him removed and letters issued to her whenever she so elects is grounded in the assumption that such is the unmistakable meaning of section 7450, Revised Codes. Notwithstanding the contention of appellant that this section is so clear as to be self-interpreting, its meaning cannot be ascertained from its language alone. Taken by itself--all collateral light excluded--we are without any information as to what right is recognized, what the character of that right is, or how that right may be asserted; all we can know is that whatever the right and however claimed, it would be unavailing where letters have been issued to the mother, since she is not mentioned among those as against whom it may be asserted. Such a conclusion, so manifestly contrary to the general plan and purpose of the statute, is of course untenable; but it serves to show that, to give the statute any intelligible meaning, we are required to construe it in connection with other provisions to which it stands in obvious relation. When this is done, a result is reached different from that upon which the appellant insists.
* * *" Section 7432, Rev. Codes.
"Letters of administration must be granted to any applicant, though it appears that there are other persons having better rights to the administration, when such persons fail to appear and claim the issuance of letters to themselves" (section 7444); but when letters have been granted to any other person than the surviving spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister, "and one of them who is competent, or any competent person at the written request of any one of them, may obtain the revocation of the letters, and be entitled to the administration" by presenting to the court an appropriate petition (section 7447), on which a citation to the administrator shall issue (section 7448), and a hearing be had (section 7449).
"The surviving husband or wife, when letters of administration have been granted to a child, father, brother or sister of the intestate; or any of such relatives, when letters have been granted to any other of them, may assert his prior right and obtain letters of administration, and have letters before granted revoked in the same manner prescribed in the three preceding sections." Section 7450.
The primary purpose of these provisions is, of course, to confer a prior right of administration upon those most interested in the estate, to signify the legislative will concerning the order of priority, to provide a method by which it may be once asserted in every case, and to authorize its assertion by nomination in certain instances. There is no warrant for the inference that the Legislature intended the right to continue after it had been once freely exercised; for, valuable though it is, the advantage conferred is solely for the benefit of the persons named, and involves no public purpose. It may therefore be waived (section 6181, Rev. Codes), and the effect of its waiver cannot be different from the effect of a waiver in other cases. This result, derived from our statutory provisions alone, is supported by an abundance of authority, and compels us to hold that if the renunciation and request of appellant, because of which the administrator was appointed, was fairly procured and freely given, she has exercised her prior right, and no longer has any to assert. In re Estate of Moore, 68 Cal. 281, 9 P. 164; Slay v. Beck, 107 Md. 357, 68 A. 573; Estate of Keane, 56 Cal. 407; In re Evans' Estate, 117 Mo.App. 629, 93 S.W. 922; Estate of Wooten, 56 Cal. 322; Stocksdale v. Conaway, 14 Md. 99, 74 Am. Dec. 515; In re Bedell's Estate, 97 Cal. 339, 32 P. 323; Estate of Kirtlan, 16 Cal. 162.
2. It is, however, the policy of our law that the widow shall control in limine the administration of her late husband's estate....
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