In re Boggess

Citation21 F. Supp. 905
PartiesIn re BOGGESS.
Decision Date18 January 1938
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

Jno. S. Fullerton, of Ashland, Ky., for bankrupt.

Caldwell & Gray, of Ashland, Ky., for creditors, Dr. C. C. Woods and others.

SWINFORD, District Judge.

On January 11, 1936, Charles Dudley Boggess, Jr., was adjudged a bankrupt on his voluntary petition. The first meeting of the creditors was held the 23d day of January, 1936. The bankrupt listed as his only asset a one-half interest in a note in the amount of $16,000.

At the first meeting of the creditors this note was discussed and the bankrupt stated that it was secured by a mortgage on a small tract of land. Eventually the trustee realized on the bankrupt's interest in the note $1,600. The bankrupt filed with his schedule of liabilities a list of his creditors, with claims aggregating approximately $1,091.03. One claim was later voluntarily paid by the bankrupt, amounting to $150.

The Bankruptcy Act, § 57n, as amended by the Act of May 27, 1926, and sections 65e, 66b, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 93(n), 105(e), 106(b), contains the following provisions:

Section 57n. "Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to six months after the adjudication."

Section 65e. "A claimant shall not be entitled to collect from a bankrupt estate any greater amount than shall accrue pursuant to the provisions of this title."

Section 66b. "(b) Dividends remaining unclaimed for one year shall, under the direction of the court, be distributed to the creditors whose claims have been allowed but not paid in full, and after such claims have been paid in full the balance shall be paid to the bankrupt."

Two of the creditors, with claims aggregating approximately $258.69, filed their claims, duly proven, within six months from the date of the adjudication of bankruptcy.

No other claims were filed or presented within six months after the adjudication, but in June, 1937, which was after the expiration of the six-month period, creditors with claims approximating the aggregate amount of $700 presented to the referee their respective proofs of claims and asked that they be filed and allowed. The bankrupt objected on the ground that the claims were not properly proven or tendered for filing within six months of the date of adjudication. The referee entered an order denying the creditors' motion to file the claims and disallowing the claims.

The creditors, whose claims were disallowed, filed a petition alleging either fraud or mistake on the part of the bankrupt in filing his schedule and prayed that a notice be given to all the creditors and that they be given an opportunity to file proofs of claims; prayed for an order allowing and directing payment of all lawful and just debts. The bankrupt filed a demurrer to this petition. The referee treated the demurrer as the bankrupt's motion to dismiss the petition.

The court is called upon to pass upon the two following questions:

First: Should dilatory creditors be permitted to prove their claims after the expiration of six months from date of adjudication and participate in the distribution where the trustee has sufficient money to pay the costs of administration and all creditors in full where only the bankrupt objects?

Second: Does the petition state facts sufficient to entitle such creditors to prove their claims and be paid when only the bankrupt objects?

The allegation of fraud in the claimants' petition is pleading a conclusion.

The record in the case shows that the bankrupt did nothing to conceal his assets or in any way mislead the claimants. No facts are alleged which would constitute fraud.

A motion to dismiss admits only matters of fact well pleaded, not conclusions of law, mere pretenses, and suggestions. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stoner, 8 Cir., 92 F.2d 845.

In Bush v. Madeira's Heirs, 53 Ky. 212, 14 B.Mon. 212, the court says: "The demurrer admits, for the purpose of testing their sufficiency, the facts stated in the petition or bill; but the exhibits referred to must be taken into view, as controlling any statement which is inconsistent with them, except so far as the exhibits are themselves directly impeached."

The petition of the...

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  • In re 74 Knowles Street Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • October 18, 1943
    ...City of New York v. Jersawit, 2 Cir., 135 F.2d 210; In re Ebeling, 7 Cir., 123 F.2d 520; In re Kornblum, D.C., 22 F.Supp. 245; In re Boggess, D.C., 21 F.Supp. 905; In re Bender Body Co., D.C., 47 F.Supp. 867; In re Schildhaus, D.C., 4 F.Supp. 696; In re Baker's Baking Co., D.C., 285 F. 652;......

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