MORROW
Circuit Judge.
This is
an application for the disbarment of John L. Boone, a duly
and regularly admitted and practicing attorney and counselor
of this court. The petition for disbarment is made by
Alphonzo B. Bowers, and is as follows:
'That
your petitioner is, and has been, the plaintiff or
complainant in certain actions at law and suits in equity
now and of late pending in this court, as follows: (1) A
B. Bowers, V. A. W. Von Schmidt; (2) A. B. Bowers V
Williams & Bixler and Golden State & Miners' Iron
Works; (3) A. B. Bowers V. San Francisco Bridge Co. (at
law); (4) Same V. Same (in equity); (5) Same V. McNee
Bros.; (6) Same V. Pacific Improvement Co.; (7) Same V.
City of Oakland; (8) Same V. Oakland Iron Words; (9) Same
v. John Hackett et al. That your petitioner is and now, and
for a long time has been, the plaintiff or complainant in
certain actions at law and suits in equity in the circuit
courts of the United States for the circuits and districts
hereinafter named; (10) A. B. Bowers V. Linden W. Bates
(circuit court, Northern district of Illinois); (11) A. B.
Bowers v. Heldmaier & Neu (same court); (12) A. B. Bowers
V. American Hydraulic Dredging Co. (same court); (13) A. B.
Bowers V. Northern National Bank (same court); (14) A. B.
Bowers V. Chicago Drainage Commission (same court); (15) A.
B. Bowers V. San Francisco Bridge Co. and New York Dredging
Co. (circuit court, district of Washington); (16) A. B.
Bowers V. The New York Dredging Co. (circuit court,
Southern district of New York); (17) A. B. Bowers V.
American Dredging Co. (circuit court, Eastern district of
Pennsylvania); (18) A. B. Bowers V. Bucyrus Co. (circuit
court, district of Wisconsin). That your petitioner is the
patentee of the United States under twelve several patents
granted to him directly, and is the assignee of eighteen
other patents, all connected with the inventions pertaining
to the art of dredging, and all and singular the above
mentioned and described actions at law and suits in equity
were brought to recover damages for and to restrain the
infringement of the said patents. That in the action of A.
B. Bowers V. A. W. Von Schmidt, lately pending in this
court, such proceedings were had that a final decree was
duly given and made in favor of your petitioner, and
against the defendant therein, enjoining and restraining
the defendant from further using said patents, and awarding
damages to your petitioner. That in said cause such
proceedings were further had that an appeal was taken by
defendant to the United States court of appeals for the
Ninth circuit, in which, after full argument and due
consideration, said decree was in all things affirmed, and
an opinion rendered and filed in said causes. That the
decisions are of great value to your petitioner, as an
explanation and construction
of the law and the facts in said cause, and the legal
validity and construction of the patents therein involved,
and are entitled to have, and do have, great weight in
other courts of the United States when cited in causes now
pending as authority, on account of the thorough and
exhaustive examination of the law and the facts in and by
the said opinions. That for nearly nine years last past one
John L. Boone has been, and now is, an attorney, counselor,
and solicitor of this court, and was during said period the
attorney, counselor, and solicitor of your petitioner, as
plaintiff, in the actions and suits hereinabove mentioned
as pending in this court. That as such attorney, counselor,
and solicitor said Boone possessed the special and peculiar
confidence of your petitioner, and obtained full and
complete knowledge of and from your petitioner of all the
facts and evidence in said causes. That in the progress of
said causes your petitioner paid to said Boone for his
services the sum of about four thousand dollars in full of
all his just claims and demands against your petitioner,
and said Boone in the month of April, 1897, withdrew, by
mutual consent, from the employment of your petitioner and
the further prosecution of said causes. That thereafter the
said Boone, with the full intent and purpose to betray the
confidence of your petitioner, and to violate his trust and
duty as the attorney, counselor, and solicitor of your
petitioner, did offer and seek to be employed and retained
by the defendant in the action of A. B. Bowers V. Linden W.
Bates, and the other cases hereinbefore mentioned, now
pending in the circuit court of the United States in and
for the Northern district of Illinois, in consideration of
such employment and retainer, did assert and suggest to
Thomas A. Banning, Esq., of Chicago, Ill., at the said city
of Chicago, who was then and there the attorney, solicitor,
and counselor of Linden W. Bates, the defendant in said
cause, that the decree in the cause of A. B. Bowers against
A. W. Von Schmidt, hereinabove mentioned, was procured by
fraudulent means, and that he (said Boone) could not remain
in the case under the circumstances; thereby meaning and
intending to convey to said Banning the idea that he, said
Boone, knew that said decree was procured by false and
perjured evidence and testimony, and should not have been
rendered or made. That your petitioner is ignorant of the
particular or specific evidence to which said Boone
intended to refer, and is unable to say more than that the
said charge is wholly and entirely false and untrue. That
all the evidence and testimony in said cause are and were
true and genuine, and no other than just, lawful, and
honest means were employed or resorted to by your
petitioner in said cause. That said offer and statement by
said Boone were made with the full intent and purpose to
obtain employment by and from said Linden W. Bates and the
other cases, under the pretense that he could and would
betray the confidence of your petitioner, and disregard his
professional obligations, and thereby assist the said Bates
and others to defeat your petitioner's actions against
him and them, and to thwart, embarrass, and retard your
petitioner's suits and actions now pending. That the
said offer and statement were made and intended to defraud
the said Bates and others out of any money they might pay
to said Boone as the price of his treachery or his
testimony or his legal services, under the false pretense
that he (said Boone) could or would bring forward any proof
of his statement or suggestion made to said Banning. That
the said statement and suggestion was a gross breach of
duty and lack of respect by the said Boone to this
honorable court, and a breach of his professional
obligation to maintain the respect due to judicial officers
and courts of justice. That many months ensured between the
conclusion of taking testimony in said suit and argument
thereof. That many months ensued between the argument and
the rendition of the decree. That over a year elapsed
between the rendition of the decree and the argument on the
appeal. That over eighteen months elapsed between the
argument and the affirmance of said decree. That said Boone
was present at almost all times at the taking of evidence,
and must have known what false and fraudulent evidence was
given, and when and by whom it was given, and what alleged
fraudulent means were used by petitioner to gain a
favorable decree in said cause. And your petitioner further
shows that on May 11, 1897, at his office in the city and
county of San Francisco, at No. 314 Pine street, the said
Boone did say to one Samuel H. Saleno, the agent and
attorney in fact of your petitioner, that unless your
petitioner would carry out some supposed promise alleged to
have been made by your petitioner to said Boone some five
years back, in regard to the payment of money, he (said
Boone) would accept the retainer that was awaiting him
(meaning the alleged retainer sought by said Boone from
Linden W. Bates), and the acceptance would be very
disagreeable to Bowers. He, said Boone, further said that
statements had been made to him in years gone by that would
be proof positive of perjury, and which, if made public by
the other side, would result in the complete loss of
Bowers' patents, and might involve his liberty,-- all of
which was said by said Boone with a malicious intent and
purpose to intimidate your petitioner, and extort money from
him without any just claim or demand therefore.'
The
respondent filed an answer, to which a demurrer was
interposed. The demurrer was sustained, and the respondent
thereupon filed an amended answer, in which he denies the
charges of unprofessional conduct as charged. Testimony was
thereupon taken on both sides, and the question to be
determined, broadly stated, is whether or not the charges
preferred have been sustained.
There
seems to be some discrepancy between the views of counsel as
to the number of charges preferred in the petition, counsel
for petitioner contending that the allegations of the
petition sustain four charges of disbarment, while counsel
for respondent claim that they make but two. The respondent,
undoubtedly, is entitled to notice of the charges preferred
against him, and that these should be set out clearly and
unambiguously, so that he may know exactly what he is called
upon to meet, and may have ample opportunity of explanation
and defense. As was said Ex parte Robinson, 10 Wall. 505,
512:
'This
is a rule of natural justice, and should be equally
followed when proceedings are taken to deprive him of his
right to practice his profession as when they are taken to
reach his real or personal property. And such has been the
general, if not the uniform, practice of the
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