In re Bretton Woods Tel. Co.
Decision Date | 28 November 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 2011–892.,2011–892. |
Citation | 164 N.H. 379,56 A.3d 1266 |
Parties | Appeal of BRETTON WOODS TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. and another (New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission). |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Harry N. Malone & another on the brief, and Mr. Malone orally), for the petitioners.
Carolyn Cole, of Lebanon, by brief and orally, for intervenor segTEL, Inc.
Murtha Cullina LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts (Olga L. Gordon and Robert J. Munnelly, Jr. on the brief, and Mr. Munnelly orally), for intervenor New England Cable and Telecommunications Association, Inc.
The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appeal an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) denying their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. We affirm.
This appeal follows our decision in Appeal of Union Telephone Co., 160 N.H. 309, 999 A.2d 336 (2010). In that case, we held that an incumbent RLEC is entitled to prior notice and a hearing under RSA 374:26 (2009) before the PUC grants authority to a CLEC to enter the service territory of the RLEC. Appeal of Union Tel. Co., 160 N.H. at 319, 999 A.2d 336.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, we rejected the argument that RSA 374:22–g (2009), enacted after RSA 374:26, supplanted this requirement of prior notice and a hearing. Id. RSA 374:22–g provides:
We reasoned that "the legislative intent underlying RSA 374:22–g ... is to require the PUC to conduct a searching inquiry before determining whether it is consistent with the public good to allow more than one provider to provide telecommunications services in a single area." Appeal of Union Tel. Co., 160 N.H. at 319, 999 A.2d 336. We noted, however, that § 253(a) of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006), may preempt the requirement of notice and a hearing, and remanded this issue to "the PUC to determine in the first instance whether federal law preempts this state statutory requirement."1 Appeal of Union Tel. Co., 160 N.H. at 323, 999 A.2d 336. On remand, the parties settled before the PUC could resolve this issue.
The petitioners here then instituted the underlying proceeding and requested that the PUC rescind or declare null and void the registrations of CLECs authorized by the PUC to operate as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22–g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of our decision in Appeal of Union Tel. Co., the petitioners specifically argued that federal law does not preempt these requirements.
The stipulation provides:
The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that § 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempts RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22–g, II. Section 253(a) preempts state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2006). With respect to the notice and hearing requirement of RSA 374:26, the PUC found that in enacting § 253(a), "Congress determined that it is for the public good to allow more than one carrier to operate in any territory," and that "[b]ecause the public good determination has already been made by Congress ... no hearing is ‘due’." The PUC also found preempted each of the factors enumerated in RSA 374:22–g, II for determining whether allowing a telecommunications provider to enter the service territory of another provider would be consistent with the public good. Addressing specifically the factors requiring consideration of the incumbent provider's opportunity to earn a reasonable return and ability to recover net expenses incurred because of competition, the PUC concluded that the "threat of financial harm cannot serve to deny entry to competitors." With regard to the factor of fairness, the PUC expressed concern that the state statute does not make clear how to evaluate fairness, or "how to assess ‘fairness' to subsequent competitors after one has been granted authority to enter." The PUC also found that it was not well-positioned to address the factor of economic efficiency because "[t]he marketplace will be the ultimate determinant whether a competitor is operating in an economically efficient manner, and it is not for the Commission to make that determination in the context of [a] competitor's petition for entry." Finally, with regard to the factors of universal service and carrier of last resort obligations, the PUC reasoned the Telecommunications Act does not allow the states to prohibit competitive entry because of these factors.
The PUC next determined that RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22–g, II are not saved by § 253(b) of the Telecommunications Act, which allows states to impose requirements on a competitively neutral basis that are consistent with the Telecommunications Act's universal service provisions and "necessary to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers." 47 U.S.C. § 253(b) (2006). The PUC found that § 253(b) did not save RSA 374:26 because competitively neutral requirements are necessarily of general applicability and cannot be...
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