In re Bridges, 00-BG-1346.
Decision Date | 22 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 00-BG-1346.,00-BG-1346. |
Citation | 805 A.2d 233 |
Parties | In re Charles BRIDGES, Respondent. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Pamela J. Bethel, Washington, for respondent.
Catherine L. Kello, Assistant Bar Counsel, with whom Joyce E. Peters, Bar Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of Bar Counsel.
Before TERRY, SCHWELB and GLICKMAN, Associate Judges.
In this appeal, we accept the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility and impose reciprocal discipline on respondent Charles Bridges. Bridges is an attorney who is admitted in the District of Columbia, Maryland and other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals of Maryland publicly reprimanded Bridges for his failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation commenced by the State's Attorney Grievance Commission. The findings of fact supporting the reprimand, which were made after an evidentiary hearing before a Maryland Circuit Court judge, are set forth in the Maryland court's opinion and need not be repeated here. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bridges, 360 Md. 489, 759 A.2d 233 (2000). In brief, the Attorney Grievance Commission had opened an inquiry into whether Bridges had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Maryland prior to his admission to the Maryland bar. The Maryland Court of Appeals ultimately exonerated Bridges of this charge because he had strictly limited his pre-admission legal practice to permissible federal matters. See id.,759 A.2d at 244-45. See also Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383-85, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963) ( ); Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Inc., 316 Md. 646, 561 A.2d 200, 211 (1989) ( ). The Maryland Court of Appeals determined, however, that Bridges violated Rules 8.1 and 8.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)1 during the course of the unauthorized practice investigation by refusing to provide requested information, failing to appear at hearings of the inquiry panel, concealing his whereabouts from the Attorney Grievance Commission, and destroying relevant documents. Bridges, 759 A.2d at 245-47.
The Maryland Rules have their counterparts in Rules 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) of this jurisdiction's Rules of Professional Conduct,2 and the Board on Professional Responsibility now recommends that we impose functionally equivalent reciprocal discipline on Bridges in the form of a public censure. See In re Bell, 716 A.2d 205, 206 (D.C.1998) (). Our rules governing the members of our bar provide that reciprocal discipline "shall be imposed unless the attorney demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence," that the case falls within one or more of five enumerated exceptions.3 D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c). "The rule thus creates a rebuttable presumption that the discipline will be the same in the District of Columbia as it was in the original disciplining jurisdiction." In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C.1992) (footnote and citation omitted).
Bridges objects to the imposition of reciprocal discipline on three grounds, none of which carries the day for him. First he contends (implicitly invoking, we presume, the first three exceptions listed in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c), see footnote 3, supra) that the Maryland Court of Appeals had no authority to discipline him because, under Sperry, it had no jurisdiction over his federal practice. We need not belabor the manifold defects we perceive in this argument. The Maryland Court of Appeals considered and rejected Bridges' jurisdictional arguments, and "giving due deference to [the] decision of another jurisdiction in a reciprocal discipline case, the principles of collateral estoppel obligate us to accept the holding of that court." In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 179, 181 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted). Cf. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 706, 102 S.Ct. 1357, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982) ( )(citation omitted). Collateral estoppel aside, the Maryland Court of Appeals did not purport to assert jurisdiction over federal matters. The court disciplined Bridges solely because he did not cooperate with a state investigation into whether his legal practice was authorized. Nothing in Sperry limits the state's power either to conduct such an investigation or to sanction an attorney for obstructing it.
Bridges next offers a host of reasons why, in the language of the second exception in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c), there was such "infirmity of proof" in the Maryland proceeding that this court should not accept the Maryland court's determination of misconduct as conclusive. Bridges objects, for example, to rulings on the admissibility of evidence, evaluations of his credibility as a witness and inferences drawn from the evidence. We see no need to prolong this opinion with a point-by-point analysis of each objection that Bridges asserts. The burden of proof on an attorney who would seek to establish the "infirmity of proof" exception by the requisite clear and convincing evidence is a heavy one. The exception is not an invitation to the attorney to relitigate in the District of Columbia the adverse findings of another court in a procedurally fair proceeding. See In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 777 (D.C.2000). Bridges does not shoulder his burden in this case. Not only has he failed to substantiate his objections by presenting us with the evidentiary record of the Maryland hearing along with "chapter and verse" citations to the claimed deficiencies in that record—a virtual sine qua non, one would think, for showing that the proof was so infirm that the findings and conclusions must be disregarded—but he also does not demonstrate that the Maryland court lacked evidence of misconduct on his part. While he offers excuses, Bridges does not dispute the main findings that he failed to provide requested information, left the jurisdiction in the middle of the investigation without informing the Attorney Grievance Commission, and failed to appear at two hearings of an inquiry panel to which he had been summoned.
Bridges' final objection to the imposition of reciprocal discipline is that the misconduct for which he was sanctioned in...
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In re Ditton, No. 06-BG-44.
...the Board that collateral estoppel precludes us from reconsidering respondent's jurisdictional and standing arguments. See In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.2002). Respondent's allegations of bias are completely unsupported. See In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 1003 (D.C.2002); Faulkenstein v......
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In re Nace, 13–BG–1439.
...of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the federal objectives.”). Cf. In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 234–35 (D.C.2002) (rejecting argument that Maryland Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over attorney's federal practice; “The court discip......
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In re Zdravkovich
...attack the findings or judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals. See In re Shearin, 764 A.2d at 777. See also In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.2002) (holding that the infirmity of proof "exception is not an invitation to the attorney to relitigate in the District of Columbia the adver......
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In re Schoeneman, 02-BG-1186.
...conduct of his federal legal practice, citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 1(a); In re Wade, 526 A.2d 936 (D.C.1987); cf. In re Bridges, 805 A.2d 233, 234-35 (D.C.2002) (rejecting respondent's argument in reciprocal that Maryland court had no jurisdiction over misconduct occurring in respondent's fede......