In re O'Brien

• Decision Date: 06 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–13–00283–CV.,14–13–00283–CV.
• Citation: 436 S.W.3d 78
• Parties: In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Valerie Delaine O'BRIEN and Richard Eldon O'Brien.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

436 S.W.3d 78

In the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Valerie Delaine O'BRIEN and Richard Eldon O'Brien.

No. 14–13–00283–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

May 6, 2014.

Robert J. James Kersey, Granbury, for Appellant.

Curtis E. Pritchard, Cleburne, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice FROST and Justices JAMISON and WISE.

OPINION

MARTHA HILL JAMISON, Justice.

Appellant Valerie O'Brien contests the division of property contained in the final decree of divorce dissolving her marriage to appellee Richard O'Brien. In four issues, Valerie contends the trial court erred in (1) assigning a $32,000 community debt entirely to Valerie, (2) denying Valerie credit for the community estate's payment of storage fees related to Richard's separate property during the marriage, (3) denying Valerie credit for payment of Richard's share of a community land debt during the 28–month pendency of the litigation, and (4) characterizing Valerie's separate property business as community property. We affirm.¹

Background

The trial court rendered its final decree in the O'Briens' divorce on December 6, 2012. The court subsequently issued findingsof fact and conclusions of law. Among its findings of fact, the court stated that during the marriage, the parties acquired certain community property, including an interest in real property situated in Somervell County, Texas; “[m]iscellaneous personal property which had either negligible value or was divided equally between the parties”; and “[a] business known as Valerie's Music, which was awarded in its entirety to” Valerie. The court further found that the parties held as a community liability a line of credit in Valerie's name with J.P. Morgan Chase. Regarding separate property, the court found that Valerie owned certain real property (where the couple resided during the marriage), and that Richard had used $24,965.51 of his separate property to pay Valerie's debt on her separate property. Accordingly, the court granted Richard a $24,965.51 reimbursement claim for the payment of Valerie's debt. The court further noted that the parties had stipulated to the fact and amount of Richard's payment. Lastly, the court stated that it was denying Valerie's request for a credit against the reimbursement claim, saying it was “contrary to the law and the stipulation.”

In its conclusions of law, the court stated that the divorce was granted on grounds of insupportability, all of the property belonged to the community estate except Valerie's real property, and “[t]he division of the property ... is just and right ... irrespective of the characterization of any item of property as community or separate.” The court further noted Richard's reimbursement claim was part of a just and right division of assets and liabilities of the marriage and again stated Valerie was not entitled to any offset “because community property funds were used to pay community property expenses.”

In its decree, the court awarded each party one-half of the couples' interest in the Somervell County real property. The court further awarded each side numerous personal property items in their individual possession or control, as well as the cash and financial and retirement accounts in their control. Regarding the business known as Valerie's Music, the court awarded “any and all interest in the business” to Valerie. Concerning debts, the court ordered Richard to pay all debts incurred in his name as well as all taxes and other charges on any real or personal property awarded to him. The court also ordered Valerie to pay all debts incurred in her name, “including but not limited to the JP Morgan Chase line of credit.” The Court additionally confirmed the real property that belonged to Valerie as her separate property and ordered her to pay Richard $24,965.51, with a lien in his favor for that amount being placed on Valerie's separate real property.

Standards of Review

In dividing marital property upon divorce, a trial court must order a division in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party. Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001. The property division need not be equal, but it must be equitable, and a trial court may consider numerous factors when exercising its broad discretion to divide the marital property, including the relative earning capacity and business opportunities of the parties, the parties' relative financial condition and obligations, the parties' education, the size of the separate estates, and the probable need for future support. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.1981). A disproportionate division must be supported by some reasonable basis. Alonso v. Alvarez, 409 S.W.3d 754, 758–59 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

We presume the trial court properly exercised its discretion and will correct the trial court's division of marital property only when an abuse of discretion has been shown. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698. The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action, but rather, whether the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985). We indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of finding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dividing the community estate. Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 669 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). To prevail on a complaint about the division of property, an appellant has the burden of demonstrating based on evidence in the record that the division was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Mohindra v. Mohindra, No. 14–06–00056–CV, 2007 WL 3072057, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d. at 672; Posey v. Posey, 561 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1978, writ dism'd). When the complaining party does not provide values of the property to the trial court, that party cannot complain on appeal of the trial court's property division. Monroe v. Monroe, 358 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (citing Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d. at 670). Under the abuse of discretion standard, sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground of error but rather is a relevant factor in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Walston v. Walston, 971 S.W.2d 687, 691–92 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied).

Reimbursement is an equitable right that arises when the funds or assets of one estate are used to benefit and enhance another estate without the first estate receiving some benefit. Willmore v. Quigley, No. 14–12–00060–CV, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 23, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40, 56–57 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). Reimbursement is not available as a matter of law but lies within the trial court's broad discretion. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.1982); Zamiatowski v. Zamiatowski, No. 14–12–00478–CV, 2013 WL 1803604, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] April 30, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court's discretion in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is as broad as its discretion to effect a just and proper division of the community estate. Willmore, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3; see also Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.1988) (“In the final analysis, great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to value a claim for reimbursement.”).

In considering a claim for reimbursement, a court must take into account all the relative circumstances of the spouses, determine the rights of both spouses, apply equitable principles to determine whether to recognize the claim, and order a division of the claim for reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner that the court considers just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party. Willmore, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3. A party claiming a right of reimbursement must plead and prove that expenditures were made and that they are reimbursable. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d at 458–59; Willmore, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3; Beard, 49 S.W.3d at 56–57. Claims for reimbursement may be offset against each other if the court determines that is appropriate. Willmore, 2013 WL 2296187, at *3.

Line of Credit

In her first issue, Valerie contends that the court erred in assigning the JP Morgan Chase line of credit—a community debt—entirely to her.² At trial, Valerie requested that Richard be assigned some of that debt or that she be given an offset for Richard's share of the debt against the $24,965.51 reimbursement judgment she was ordered to pay. In her appellate briefing, Valerie neither expressly states a basis—legal or otherwise—for her contention that the trial court erred in assigning this debt to her, nor cites any authority supporting her assertion that the trial court erred. This issue is therefore inadequately briefed. SeeTex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that an appellant's brief “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”); In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911, 929 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (declining to craft appellant's argument for him).

Moreover, Valerie offers no contentions, analysis, or values regarding the cash and financial and retirement accounts or the other debts the trial court divided between the parties. Without such information, it is impossible to determine whether the trial court reached an equitable, just, and right division of the marital estate as a whole. SeeTex. Fam. Code § 7.001; Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. As discussed above, to prevail on a complaint about the division of property, an appellant has the burden of demonstrating based on evidence in the record...