In re Brown

• Decision Date: 05 October 2021
• Docket Number: 35657-4-III
• Parties: In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of SAMUEL LEE BROWN, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of SAMUEL LEE BROWN, Petitioner.

No. 35657-4-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3

October 5, 2021

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Siddoway, A.C.J.

Samuel Brown seeks relief from personal restraint in the form of a 264-month sentence imposed for his conviction of a first degree murder committed when he was 17 years old. He seeks resentencing in light of the holding in State v Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires trial courts to consider mitigating qualities of youth when sentencing juveniles, even in the adult criminal system, and must have discretion to impose sentences below otherwise-applicable standard ranges and enhancements.

While Houston-Sconiers is a significant decision, is material to Mr. Brown's sentencing and therefore applies retroactively to his collateral attack, he is unable to make the necessary showing that the court's inability to anticipate Houston-Sconiers actually and substantially prejudiced him. We therefore dismiss his petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2002, then 17-year-old Samuel Brown killed William Porter in Mr. Porter's apartment. Mr. Brown believed Mr Porter had stolen his cell phone and clothing. Mr. Brown later confessed that when he confronted Mr. Porter about the alleged theft, Mr. Porter attempted to defend himself by brandishing a shotgun, but Mr. Brown wrested the weapon from him. Mr. Brown then used the shotgun or a baseball bat to severely beat Mr. Porter. Mr. Brown left him for dead.

Mr Brown admitted his crime when questioned by police. Charges against him were transferred to adult court and he pleaded guilty to first degree murder.

Based on Mr. Brown's offender score of zero, the standard sentence range for first degree murder with a deadly weapon inclusive of the deadly weapon enhancement, was 264 to 344 months. Pursuant to a plea agreement, and with the agreement of Mr. Porter's family and law enforcement, the State recommended that the court impose a low-end sentence of 264 months. At the time the court accepted Mr. Brown's plea, it informed him that it was not bound to follow the recommendation, "which means I can do 264 months and do something else within the standard range or go outside the standard range if I find substantial, compelling reasons to do so." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 9.

Mr. Brown had waived a presentence report, but defense counsel provided the court with a 5-page report of biographical information. At the outset of sentencing, defense counsel recounted some of that history. He told the court that Mr. Brown came from a "dependency background" and had "very, very little contact with his biological father." RP at 14. He described both of Mr. Brown's parents as "heavily involved in the drug culture," and said that Mr. Brown's primary parent, his mother, "was an unabashed drug user" and "not shy about using those drugs"-including intravenous drugs-"in the presence of Sam." RP at 14-15. The mother's influence led her two sons to become drug users and sellers at young ages. Mr. Brown was eventually placed in a foster home, from which he ran away at age 14. Mr. Brown's half-brother, whom defense counsel said Mr. Brown loved dearly, was murdered about a year before Mr. Brown murdered Mr. Porter.

Defense counsel stated that Mr. Brown was homeless at the time he murdered Mr. Porter, and that it was well documented that he was on drugs (Seroquel, Klonopin, and marijuana) at the time of the murder. He said the cellphone Mr. Brown mistakenly believed had been taken by Mr. Porter was one of the few material belongings that had significance to Mr. Brown, which probably contributed to Mr. Brown's tragic compulsion to get it back. He also suggested that Mr. Brown could have been acting on some "transferred anger" because he had just learned from his girlfriend that she had aborted a pregnancy with Mr. Brown's child so that she could be with another young man. RP at 18.

Defense counsel expressed his client's remorse for the tragedy he had visited on Mr. Porter and his family, and concluded,

It is also very much a tragedy for Sam Brown and he is gonna be in prison for a long, long time and he's going into prison at a very early age and that's gonna be a difficult circumstance for him.

RP at 19. Mr. Brown then personally apologized to the friends and family of Mr. Porter who were present.

The trial court heard from Mr. Porter's sister and the prosecutor. The prosecutor said it was important to the family in agreeing to the plea deal that Mr. Brown would receive a 22-year sentence and there would be no trial or appeal.

In announcing Mr. Brown's sentence, the court began by saying it had read the summary of his history and heeded the argument of his lawyer. The court continued:

And I don't think anyone in this room would disagree that you had a horrible life, that some of the things in this were beyond your control, that you were placed in positions and situations that you, as a child, should never have been in, that no child should have ever been in.

I think we can all sympathize with that and understand that. RP at 23-24. The court added that none of what had happened to Mr. Brown had been Mr. Porter's fault, however, and "you, for some reason, have taken his life." RP at 24. It stated, "I am very glad, Sir, that you stood up and apologized to these folks." Id.

After an exchange with Mr. Brown about the choices he would make during his time spent in prison, and the effect those choices would have on his life after prison, the trial court said:

Mr. Brown, I think, quite frankly, at this point you are pretty lucky that [the prosecutor] and law enforcement and the family and friends have agreed to the low-end recommendation. As I told you, this is just a recommendation. I can do more than that, but because of your history and your past, I think I'm willing to go along with it.

You are getting a break, Sir. You are getting a break that you never gave to William Porter. So I am going to accept the recommendation.

RP at 26. In addition to the term of total incarceration, the court sentenced Mr. Brown to 24 to 48 months of community custody and ordered substance abuse and anger management evaluations and treatment, as requested by the State.

Mr. Brown did not appeal. His judgment and sentence became final on September 6, 2002, when it was filed.

Almost 15 years later, our high court decided Houston-Sconiers, in which it held that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to recognize that "'children are different.'" 188 Wn.2d at 9. In the context of Washington's sentencing scheme, that means that sentencing courts must both consider the mitigating qualities associated with youth at sentencing and, when sentencing a juvenile who was tried as an adult, must have absolute discretion to impose sentences below ranges and enhancements that might otherwise be mandatory. Id. at 21.

Relying on Houston-Sconiers, in October 2017 Mr. Brown filed a pro se motion in superior court for modification of his judgment and sentence. The superior court transferred Mr. Brown's motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP). We stayed consideration of the PRP pending our Supreme Court's review of cases addressing whether Houston-Sconiers represented a significant and material change in the law that requires retroactive application on collateral review. After the Supreme Court decided that issue in companion cases in September 2020, we lifted the stay and accepted supplemental briefing.

ANALYSIS

A Washington offender is generally barred from filing a PRP "more than one year after [his] judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." RCW 10.73.090(1). "A petitioner can overcome the one-year time bar if he can identify (1) a significant change in the law, (2) that is material to his conviction or sentence, and (3) that applies retroactively." In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 315, 440 P.3d 978 (2019); RCW 10.73.100(6). In companion decisions in September 2020, our Supreme Court held that Houston-Sconiers did constitute a significant change in law, was material if a sentence was imposed without conforming to its twin mandates, and in that event applied retroactively on collateral review. In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 247, 474 P.3d 507 (2020) cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1754 (2021); In re Pers. Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 266, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1753 (2021).

In sentencing Mr. Brown in 2002, the trial court had the discretion to depart from the standard sentencing range. Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 316-17 (The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, "has always provided the opportunity to raise youth for the purpose of requesting an exceptional sentence downward.") (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 336, 422 P.3d 444 (2018)). The court recognized its discretion and defense counsel advanced Mr. Brown's youth as a sentencing consideration.

But Mr Brown's 2002 sentence preceded key case law establishing the constitutional importance of considering brain science and developmental immaturity in imposing a sentence on a juvenile, and it cannot be said that the court complied with that mandate. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). In particular, there is no indication that the trial court considered what are now characterized as "'hallmark features'"...