In re Brown
| Decision Date | 01 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 5-82-00437. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | In re David R. BROWN, Debtor. |
James G. O'Rourke, O'Rourke & Ambrogio, Stratford, Conn., pro se.
Ira B. Charmoy, Levin & Charmoy, Bridgeport, Conn., for debtor in Case No. 5-83-00703.
George A. Vannah, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Bridgeport, Conn., Estate Administrator.
ALAN H.W. SHIFF, Bankruptcy Judge.
On April 19, 1982, David R. Brown (debtor) signed a retainer agreement with the law firm of James G. O'Rourke (O'Rourke). Under that agreement, the debtor paid O'Rourke a $5,000.00 retainer and O'Rourke agreed to represent the debtor in a "Title 11 U.S.C. Chapter 13 proceeding." The agreement contemplated the possibility that the Chapter 13 case "may have to be converted to one under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7." The debtor further agreed "to employ O'Rourke to represent him in the sale of Real Property, which fee would be in addition to any bankruptcy fees."
In accordance with the retainer agreement, O'Rourke filed a Chapter 13 petition on behalf of the debtor. The Chapter 13 case was ultimately converted to a case under Chapter 11 and thereafter dismissed on March 15, 1983. The debtor then retained new counsel, Ira Charmoy (Charmoy), who filed a new Chapter 11 petition on his behalf on July 20, 1983.
On October 6, 1983, Charmoy conducted a Rule 2004 examination of Attorney Charles Ambrogio of the O'Rourke firm and obtained testimony that the O'Rourke firm did not disclose1 the entire fee it received from the debtor. It was also determined that O'Rourke had never applied for, nor had he ever received, a court order approving his employment as attorney for the debtor.
On October 19, 1983, more than seven months after the dismissal of the initial Chapter 11 case, O'Rourke filed an Application To Approve Employment Of Attorney, Nunc Pro Tunc. It is noteworthy that that application, which was never signed by the debtor, purports to be "the application of David R. Brown" and alleges that the "debtor in possession prays that the court approve, nunc pro tunc, its (sic) employment of the Law Office of James G. O'Rourke. . . ." In fact there is no indication that the debtor ever knew of its existence until after the application was scheduled for a hearing.
The Estate Administrator, made aware of the application by the clerk's office, contacted the O'Rourke firm and learned that the firm had received funds which had not been approved by this court. On October 26, 1983, the court signed an Order To Show Cause Why Moneys Ought Not Be Turned Over To The Bankruptcy Estate which, together with O'Rourke's Application To Approve Employment Of An Attorney, Nunc Pro Tunc, is now before the court.
Code § 327(a) authorizes a trustee2 with court approval to employ attorneys and other professionals who ". . . do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under Title 11." Bankruptcy Rule 215(a), which was applicable at the time O'Rourke rendered services to the debtor,3 also requires a court order for the employment of an attorney.4 Code § 330(a) provides, inter alia, for the compensation of attorneys appointed with court approval under Code § 327(a), and Rule 219(a) requires a person, seeking compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary expenses from the estate, to file an application with the court. Reading these sections and rules together in the context of this proceeding, it is apparent that in order to be eligible for counsel fees from an estate an application seeking court approval for the appointment of an attorney must be filed and an order obtained in advance of such employment.
It is O'Rourke's contention that the Affidavit of Proposed Attorney he filed on October 19, 1983 in support of his application for employment as attorney nunc pro tunc, satisfied the rule requiring a statement that he was a disinterested person and that had his application been timely filed, he would have been authorized to serve as the debtor's attorney. O'Rourke claims that his failure to timely file an application for court approval of employment was due to excusable neglect, and he urges this court, as a court of equity, to ratify his employment and permit him to retain a fee for services rendered. O'Rourke also claims that since an application for his employment as the debtor's attorney in the Chapter 13 case was not necessary5 and since he considered the converted Chapter 11 case to be a continuation of the Chapter 13 case, he was unaware that approval of his employment as attorney was necessary. Finally, O'Rourke claims that his fee agreement with the debtor antedated bankruptcy and included services for nonbankruptcy matters and that he should be entitled to retain his fee for the nonbankruptcy services he rendered.
It is well settled in this Circuit that generally compensation will be denied to an attorney for a trustee or debtor in possession who acted without complying with Rule 215(a) or its predecessor, General Order 446. Matter of Futronics Corp., 655 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir.1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); see In re Progress Lektro Shave Corporation, 117 F.2d 602, 604 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Eureka Upholstering Co., 48 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.1931); In re Rogers-Pyatt Shellac Co., 51 F.2d 988, 991 (2d Cir.1931); In re H.L. Stratton, Inc., 51 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.1931) cert. denied sub nom. Jonas & Neuburger v. General Motors Acc. Corp., 284 U.S. 682, 52 S.Ct. 199, 76 L.Ed. 576 (1932).
As the court in In re Rogers-Pyatt Shellac Co., supra 51 F.2d at 992, observed, construing General Order 44 which as noted is the substantive equivalent of Rule 215(a):
the only argument in favor of a nunc pro tunc order is that of hardship. But the hardship is of the appellants\' own making. The rule is clear, and they are charged with knowledge of it. To give heed to the argument of hardship in such circumstances would nullify the requirement that the affidavit be filed before the appointment is made. One reason for that requirement is obviously to allow the court to consider the grounds advanced for selecting counsel presumptively disqualified by representation of the petitioning creditors, unaffected by the emotional pressure which inevitably arises in their favor after the services have been rendered. . . . If the rule is to have vitality and the evils against which it is aimed are to be eliminated, it should be enforced literally. Impliedly it forbids a nunc pro tunc order to validate for purposes of compensation an appointment which could not properly have been made had the required affidavit been filed.
The requirement of obtaining an order was established to avoid the problem of having the court rule upon the merits of the claims for services post facto rather than having the court initially decide whether such services were required. In re New York Investors, Inc., 130 F.2d 90, 91-92 (2d Cir.1942). In Connelly v. Hancock, Dorr, Ryan & Shore, 195 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir.1952), the court relaxed its nunc pro tunc standards under circumstances, not present here, where the relevant facts in connection with the appointment of the attorneys were "generally disclosed to the judge . . . and at any rate they were soon disclosed in a formal petition. . . ." Thus it appears that nunc pro tunc applications are to be denied in this Circuit absent hardship beyond the control of the proposed attorney.
O'Rourke, apparently recognizing the narrow grounds in this Circuit for appointment nunc pro tunc, claims that his failure to file the required application in advance was due to excusable neglect. O'Rourke's argument is unsupported by any factors that rise to the level of excusable neglect as those words of art have been defined by this court and the Court of Appeals in this Circuit.
In In re Manning, 4 B.C.D. 304, 305 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn.1979), the court defined excusable neglect as ". . . the failure to timely perform a duty due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform." In In re Martin-Trigona, 11 B.R. 414, 416 (1981), this court, quoting Fase v. Seafarers Welfare and Pension Plan, 574 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir.1978), discussed the meaning of excusable neglect in a different context as follows:
The question thus becomes "whether there was excusable neglect entitling appellants, in the district court\'s discretion, to an extension of time. . . ." The answer, of course, depends on the meaning given to the phrase "excusable neglect". In this regard, we believe that the determination of "whether neglect is excusable depends on the facts of the case at hand and . . . should be determined on the basis of the `common-sense meaning of the two simple words applied to the facts which are developed.\'" This common sense approach is to be coupled with an awareness that the "excusable neglect" standard is intended to be a "strict one", that the party requesting the extension must make a clear showing that the circumstances causing the delay were unique and that the neglect was excusable, and, finally, that "courts should sanction deviations from the letter of the rules only on the most compelling showing that the purposes of the Rules are served".
See also In re Diana B. Johnson, 35 B.R. 79 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn.1983).
The filing of an application for authorization to employ an attorney was not beyond O'Rourke's control. The failure to file that application was the result of ordinary negligence not excusable neglect.
In the alternative, O'Rourke argues that an application under Rule 215(a) was not necessary because the Chapter 11 case in which he rendered the services was a mere...
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