In re Buffets Holdings Inc.

Decision Date16 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 08-10141(MFW).,08-10141(MFW).
Citation387 B.R. 115
PartiesIn re BUFFETS HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Debtors.
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Delaware

Erin Edwards, Joel A. Waite, John T. Dorsey, Joseph M. Barry, M. Blake Cleary, Nathan D. Grow, Patrick A. Jackson, Pauline K. Morgan, Ryan M. Bartley, Sean T. Greecher, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Debtors.

OPINION1

MARY F. WALRATH, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion of the Debtors2 for approval of the assumption and assignment of an unexpired lease of non-residential real property located in Warrington, Pennsylvania, (the "Assumption Motion") and the Debtors' First and Third Motions for authority to reject certain non-residential real property leases, including property located in Moline, Illinois, and Muskegon, Michigan (the "Rejection Motions"). The Motions are opposed by FP1 LLC and FP2 LLC (collectively "FP"), which assert that the leases are not separate but are integrated into master leases which must be assumed or rejected in toto. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The Debtors filed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 22, 2008. The Debtors comprise the nation's largest steak-buffet restaurant chain and the second largest restaurant company in the family-dining segment of the restaurant industry. As of the filing of their bankruptcy cases, the Debtors had more than 600 company-operated restaurants and 16 franchise locations in over 40 states.

Prior to their bankruptcy filings, in 2002 and 2003 the Debtors sought to recapitalize, replace their expensive secured debt, and issue a dividend to shareholders. (Duncan Tr, 17:17-18:12, 19:12-19.)3 This was accomplished in three stages. In stage one, the Debtors entered into a sale/leaseback transaction in which they sold certain restaurants and the ground on which they stood and then leased them back. This resulted in cash to pay part of the secured debt and took the restaurants and the debt off their balance sheet. In stage two, the Debtors entered into a sale/leaseback transaction with respect to twenty-nine restaurants where they owned the building but not the land on which it stood. In that transaction, which is the subject of this dispute, the Debtors assigned their ground leases and sold the buildings constructed thereon to FP.4 The Debtors then subleased from FP the grounds and buildings pursuant to four Master Leases. The Debtors received a sum of cash (approximately $35 million) and removed the restaurants and debt from their balance sheet. The conclusion of the first two stages permitted the Debtors in the third stage to refinance their secured debt at more reasonable rates and to issue a dividend to shareholders.

On the petition date, the Debtors filed their First Motion for authority to reject certain non-residential real property leases, including a lease with FP1 in Moline, Illinois. On February 22, 2008, the Debtors filed their Third Motion to reject certain other non-residential real property leases, including a lease with FP2 in Muskegon, Michigan. On March 25, 2008, the Debtors filed the Assumption Motion with respect to the Warrington lease they have with FP2. The Debtors have ceased operations at each of the three locations and want to reject or assign the leases in order to cut costs. (Tr. 100:15-101:6.) FP filed objections to the three Motions, and a joint evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the individual leases were severable from the Master Leases and could be assumed or rejected separately was held on April 14, 2008.5 The parties have briefed the issues and the matter is ripe for decision.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over these Matters which are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A), (M) & (O).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Review of Case law

Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a debtor has the right to assume or reject an unexpired non-residential real property lease in accordance with section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). See also N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984) (noting that "the authority to reject an executory contract is vital to the basic purpose to a chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can release the debtor's estate from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization."); In re Convenience USA, Inc., No. 01-81478, 2002 WL 230772, at *7 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2002) (concluding that section 365 allows a debtor to "pick and choose among the debtor's executory contracts and unexpired leases and to assume those which are beneficial to the estate and to reject those that are not beneficial.")

If the debtor decides to assume a lease, however, it must generally assume all the terms of the lease and may not pick and choose only favorable terms to be assumed. "The [debtor] may not blow hot and cold. If he accepts the contract he accepts it cum onere. If he receives the benefits he must adopt the burdens. He cannot accept one and reject the other." In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir.1951). See also In re Fleming Cos., Inc., 499 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that debtor could not assume and assign store lease because an essential term of it required service from a warehouse whose lease had already been rejected); In re ANC Rental Corp., Inc., 277 B.R. 226, 238-39 (Bankr.D.Del.2002) (holding that debtor may not assume only part of a contract but must assume the entire agreement).

Section 365(f)(1) states that a debtor's right to assume and assign a lease is enforceable notwithstanding any provision in a lease which prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of that lease. Consequently, the courts will not enforce provisions designed solely to impair the debtor's ability to assume or reject leases. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). See also Fleming Cos., 499 F.3d at 307 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code invalidates contract provisions that are so restrictive as to be de facto anti-assignment clauses); In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 299 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that section 365(f)(1) ensures the "free assignability [of executory contracts or unexpired leases] as a means to maximize the value of the debtor's estate.... [T]o that end, [it] allows the [debtor] to assign notwithstanding a provision in the contract or lease, or applicable law, prohibiting, restricting, or conditioning assignment."); The Shaw Group, Inc. v. Bechtel Jacobs Co., LLC (In re The IT Group, Inc.), 350 B.R. 166, 179 (Bankr. D.Del.2006) (noting that "[c]ross-default provisions are `inherently suspect' because they interfere with the debtor's rejection power by saddling the estate (albeit indirectly) with the burdens of unwanted executory contracts."); Convenience USA, 2002 WL 230772, at *7 (concluding that "cross-default provisions are unenforceable in bankruptcy where they would restrict the debtor's ability to fully utilize the provisions of § 365.... Thus, where a debtor is a party to a number of unexpired leases, cross-default clauses that would serve to prevent the debtor from assuming some of the leases without assuming the others at the same time are unenforceable under § 365(f).").

The fact that there is one document reflecting the parties' agreements does not mean that it is one contract. "The `all or nothing' requirement [of assumption or rejection under section 365] does not mean ... that every document denominated a `contract' or a `lease' must be treated as a single, indivisible whole.... If a single contract contains separate, severable agreements, however, the debtor may reject one agreement and not another." 2 William L. Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton, III, Norton Bankr.L. & Prac. § 39:11 (2d ed.1999).

The determination of whether a specific contract or lease is an indivisible agreement or is several agreements in one is a question of state law. See, e.g., In re T & H Diner, Inc., 108 B.R. 448, 453 (D.N.J.1989) ("The question of divisibility is a matter of state law. In New Jersey the determination of whether a transaction constitutes one or several contracts is primarily based upon the intentions of the parties.") (citations omitted); In re Adelphia Bus. Solutions, Inc., 322 B.R. 51, 55 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that state law governs the interpretation of leases); In re Wolflin Oil, LLC, 318 B.R. 392, 397 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2004) ("Where a lease or contract `contains several different agreements, and the lease or contract can be severed under applicable nan-bankruptcy law, section 365 allows assumption or rejection Of the. severable portions of the lease or contract.'") (emphasis added) (quoting In re FFP Operating Partners, LP, No. 03-90171, 2004 WL 3007079, at *1 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. Aug. 12, 2004)); In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (applying Ohio law to issue of whether contract was divisible).

Under Illinois law,6 the test for severability depends on the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Super Stop Petroleum, Inc. v. Clark Retail Enters. (In re Clark Retail Enters.), 308 B.R. 869, 888 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.2004) (Illinois law requires a determination of "the intention of the parties as established by a reasonable interpretation of the terms and provisions of the contractual document itself, by the circumstances of the transaction at issue, and by the subject matter to which the contract has reference."). The issue is whether the parties intended a single contract even though it may be expressed in separate agreements or whether they intended separate contracts even though they are "bundled" together in one agreement.

Illinois courts use the "four corners" approach to contract interpretation, under which the courts will confine their review to the four corners of the document itself if it is not ambiguous to ascertain the parties'...

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