In re Byrd
| Decision Date | 11 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 7:14-cv-01469-TMP,Case No. 7:14-cv-01537-TMP |
| Parties | GENNIE V. BYRD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. D.A. JONES, et al., Defendants. BRIDGET BYRD, Plaintiff, v. LENORA WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
GENNIE V. BYRD, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
D.A. JONES, et al., Defendants.
BRIDGET BYRD, Plaintiff,
v.
LENORA WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 7:14-cv-01469-TMP
Case No. 7:14-cv-01537-TMP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION
May 11, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
These two cases, originally filed by separate plaintiffs, were consolidated by the court on September 25, 2014, because both cases involve the same series of events arising out of the disputed custody of a minor child. Now pending before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by defendants David A. Jones,
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Dornell Cousette, and the City of Tuscaloosa,1 filed October 7, 2014, (doc. 17),2 which was joined by defendant Smith (doc. 32) on November 25, 2014. Also pending are Motions to Strike the affidavits of defendants Jones and Cousette by the plaintiffs in Byrd I.3 (Docs. 36, 37). The motions have been fully briefed. The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by the undersigned (doc. 44).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
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party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
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a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court "shall" grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-252; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11 (1983).
However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The evidence supporting a claim must be "substantial," Marcus v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 379
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(5th Cir., Unit B, 1981); a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004); Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-1250 (11th Cir. 2004). If the non-movant's evidence is so thoroughly discredited by the rest of the record evidence that no reasonable jury could accept it, the evidence fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact requiring a jury determination. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) ("Respondent's version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have reviewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape."); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1988). Utilizing these standards, the court undertakes the analysis
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of whether the defendant has shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving plaintiffs, are as follows. Bridget Byrd (the original plaintiff in Byrd II), a resident of Michigan, is the mother of two minor children, B.B. and B.B.'s brother. In the summer of 2011 Bridget Byrd's mother and step-father, defendants Lenora and Samuel Williams ("the Williamses") picked up B.B. and her brother from Bridget Byrd's home in Michigan for what Bridget Byrd believed to be a summer visit. The Williamses brought B.B. and her brother to their home in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, with Bridget Byrd's consent. In July 2011, Bridget Byrd gave her father and step-mother permission, plaintiffs Lamond and Gennie Byrd ("the Byrds" are the original plaintiffs in Byrd I), to retrieve B.B. and her brother from the Williamses' home and return them to Michigan for a funeral. The Williamses allowed B.B.'s brother to return to Michigan, but did not allow the Byrds to take B.B.
Controversy over the custody of B.B. has existed for some time. In 2003, a Michigan probate court appointed Bridget Byrds' mother, defendant Lenora Williams, as the guardian of B.B. (Doc. 17-1). The docket sheet from the Michigan court, annexed as an exhibit to the Byrds' complaint, shows that a
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petition to terminate the guardianship was filed in October 2005, but the hearing to address the petition was "put on hold" because "visitation agreement already worked out." (Exhibit to Amended Complaint in Byrd I, Doc. 23-1, p. 2). In July of 2006, the docket sheet noted the "case [was] closed." On July 7, 2006, a letter was mailed to Lenora Williams from the Michigan probate court, stating:
A review of the court's file in this matter indicates that you, as the Guardian for the ward and the ward himself have recently moved outside the State of Michigan. The purpose of this letter is to inform you that you have one (1) month from today to establish a guardianship in your new community before the present guardianship here in Washtenaw County is administratively closed. Unfortunately, Letters of Guardianship issued in the State of Michigan are only valid as long as the individual is a resident of the state.
(Exhibit to Amended Complaint in Byrd I, Doc. 23-1, p. 4). And, indeed, on July 10, 2006, the docket sheet indicates that the "CASE [was] CLOSED." (Id. at p. 2).
Five years later, an entry on the docket sheet of the Michigan proceeding dated September 8, 2011, stated:
MOTHER CAME IN TO COURT LOOKING FOR ORDER TERMINATING GUARDIANSHIP INFORMED HER THAT THE CASE WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED AND AT THAT TIME ORDERS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURES. TOLD HER THAT i WOULD BE HAPPY TO SPEAK WITH HER CONTACT IN TUSCALOOSA
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COUNTY PROBATE COURT TO INFORM HER OF THE STATUS HERE.
(Exhibit to Amended Complaint in Byrd I, Doc. 23-1, p. 2)4 (all as in original).
A year later, in the summer of 2012, the controversy moved to Tuscaloosa County. On July 3, 2012, Bridget Byrd talked with defendant Cousette at the Tuscaloosa Police Department to obtain assistance in getting custody of her daughter from her mother. (Cousette Affidavit, Doc. 35). She showed Cousette a "Withdrawal of Parental Guardianship" petition filed in the Probate Court of Tuscaloosa County the day before (Doc. 19-1, ¶ 5), and she showed him "a letter from the court in Michigan" showing that Lenora Williams's guardianship of B.B. was terminated years before. (Bridget Byrd Affidavit, Doc. 20-1, ¶ 3). Cousette understood the Tuscaloosa petition to indicate that court proceedings had begun to gain custody of the child.5 (Cousette Affidavit, Doc. 35). Officer Cousette
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advised Bridget Byrd to allow the court proceedings to work. (Id.) Later that day, Cousette received a report from another officer, stating that Bridget Byrd had gone to the home of the Williamses, unsuccessfully seeking to get the child. Over...
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