In re C.C.W.
| Citation | 440 P.3d 749 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 20170360-CA,20170360-CA |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF C.C.W. and Z.C.W., Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age. R.D.T. and Guardian Ad Litem, Appellants, v. C.L.W., Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Troy L. Booher, Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull, and Shane A. Marx, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant R.D.T.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant Guardian ad Litem
David Pedrazas, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellee
Judges Ryan M. Harris and Michele M. Christiansen Forster jointly authored this Opinion. Judge Gregory K. Orme concurred in the result.
¶1 R.D.T. (Mother) petitioned the juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of her ex-husband, C.L.W. (Father), as to their children, C.C.W. and Z.C.W. (collectively, the Children). After Mother presented her case-in-chief, Father asked the court to dismiss Mother’s petition. The court granted the motion on the ground that—although Father had abandoned the Children and had twice been incarcerated for violently attacking Mother and, later, another woman—it was not in the Children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Mother and the Guardian ad Litem (the GAL) appeal, contending that the court misapplied the law to the facts. In one significant respect, we agree, and therefore vacate the juvenile court’s determination and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 Mother and Father married in September 2005. Z.C.W. was born in August 2006 and C.C.W. in January 2009. Shortly after C.C.W. was born, and when Z.C.W. was three years old, Father brutally attacked Mother and threatened to kill her at gunpoint after the two had an argument about Father’s infidelity. Father was charged with aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault, and ultimately pled guilty to kidnapping and aggravated assault. The court presiding over his criminal case sentenced him to prison, where he was incarcerated from April 2010 to March 2013.
¶3 While Father was incarcerated, Mother filed for divorce, and a divorce decree was entered in 2010 that awarded Mother sole physical custody of the Children. Mother and Father have each remarried thereafter.
¶4 In 2014, one year after his release from prison, Father violated his parole by leaving the state, attacked another woman in Missouri, and later pled guilty to domestic assault. For this crime, he was incarcerated in Missouri from May 2014 to December 2016.
¶5 In October 2016, just before Father was released from prison for the second time, Mother petitioned the juvenile court to terminate Father’s parental rights. Mother filed the petition because she believed, among other things, that Father had abandoned the Children, and because she believed that reintroducing Father into the Children’s lives would be disruptive and potentially violent. The case proceeded to trial.
¶6 After Mother presented her case-in-chief, but before he put on any evidence of his own, Father asked the court to dismiss Mother’s petition. The juvenile court granted Father’s motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein it found that Father had abandoned the Children but that Mother had not shown that it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.
¶7 The juvenile court first found that there were grounds for termination because Father did not attempt to communicate at all with the Children beginning in 2012, during his first incarceration, and through 2016 when Mother filed her termination petition. Significantly, Father did not attempt to communicate with the Children during the year between his two terms of incarceration, even though an order of therapeutic reintroduction had been entered to reestablish Father’s relationship with the Children. The court found that, rather than take advantage of this opportunity, Father left the state, violated his parole, and committed another assault. As a result of Father’s neglect of his parental responsibilities, the court found that he destroyed the parent-child relationship. Accordingly, the court found that Father had abandoned the Children.
¶8 The court also found that Mother’s testimony regarding Father’s attack on her was credible. In the court’s words, "Father’s crimes were extremely violent, and they caused his victims, [Mother] in particular, unthinkable physical and emotional injuries."1 Notwithstanding this determination, the court found that Father’s history of violence toward women did not make him an unfit parent because those acts were against adults, not children. In particular, the juvenile court stated that, while Father’s "crimes may have made him a terrible husband, ... assaulting your spouse or another person[ ] does not necessarily mean that you are unable to fulfill your duties as a parent." The court found it significant that "[t]here is no evidence that [Father] is an inherently violent person or that he has been violent with his own or other children."
¶9 Having found that there were grounds for termination—namely, abandonment—the court began its best-interest analysis. The court found that under Mother’s care, the Children were good students, excelled in extracurricular activities, and enjoyed "security and stability." Somewhat contradictorily, the court then stated that Mother "has not necessarily had consistently stable relationships in her own life which [h]as resulted in some instability or inconsistency in the [C]hildren’s lives." The court added that the Children "have experienced a changing landscape of parental figures during their entire lives, and two of these significant changes have nothing to do with [Father]." The court stressed that, at the time, there was no plan for Mother’s current spouse to adopt the Children, and therefore "there is no other individual, step-parent or otherwise, available to take over that legal parental role." However, the court also found that Mother’s spouse was "developing a parent relationship" with the Children.
¶10 The court found that the Children have not asked about Father and "have no information" about him. But the court expressed its view that "Father’s circumstances are different now." Although Father suffers from post-traumatic stress and bipolar disorders, he "obtained treatment for his mental health needs while incarcerated and he currently receives therapy and medication management" through the federal government’s Department of Veterans Affairs. Since being released from prison, Father has been "a coach and a mentor to other children." Father now resides with his second wife and two stepchildren. He has also maintained contact with his older daughter who is the Children’s half-sister and whom the Children know. The court stressed that Father "does not have the ability to ever assume full custody of the [C]hildren," that he is willing to participate in reunification services, and that he "desires the opportunity to provide love, support and guidance to the [C]hildren." The court specifically found that, if the reunification process were The court concluded that "[t]here is insufficient evidence that [Father] exercising parent-time with the [C]hildren would cause significant harm or risk of harm to the [C]hildren’s physical, mental or emotional well-being."
¶11 Also, during its best-interest determination, the court found it significant that the Children might be eligible to receive support payments from the federal government as a result of Father’s military service. While Father was incarcerated, Mother was able to apply for an apportionment of his benefits to be used as support for the Children. During Father’s incarcerations, the Children obtained approximately $38,000 in support. The court found that these payments amounted to child support.
¶12 After considering all of its findings, the court concluded that there were no "compelling reasons to terminate [Father’s] parental rights and that it [was] not strictly necessary to terminate [Father’s] parental rights."
¶13 Mother and the GAL contend that the juvenile court erred in granting Father’s motion to dismiss, asserting that Mother presented clear and convincing evidence that Father’s parental rights should be terminated. A court may grant such a motion "if (1) the claimant has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, or (2) the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." In re J.A. , 2018 UT App 29, ¶ 26, 424 P.3d 913 (quotation simplified).2
¶14 In this case, although the juvenile court determined that statutory grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights, the court granted Father’s motion on best-interest grounds, concluding that the evidence Mother presented in her case-in-chief did not provide "compelling reasons" to terminate Father’s rights. Because termination decisions "rely heavily on the [trial] court’s assessment and weighing of the facts in any given case," its decision "should be afforded a high degree of deference." In re B.R. , 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. For us "to overturn the [trial] court’s decision the result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave [us] with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quotation simplified).
¶15 Mother and the GAL contend that the juvenile court misapplied the law to the facts. While expressing no opinion on the ultimate decision to be made in this case, we agree that the juvenile court’s analysis was materially flawed and that remand is therefore required.
¶16 Under Utah law, before terminating a parent-child relationship, a court must find (1) that there are grounds for termination and (2) that terminating parental rights is in the...
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