In re C.J.C.
| Citation | 603 S.W.3d 804 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-0694,19-0694 |
| Parties | IN RE C.J.C., Relator |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Holly J. Draper, Brandi Crozier, The Draper Law Firm, PC, McKinney, Brad M. LaMorgese, Orsinger, Nelson, Downing & Anderson LLP, Dallas, for Relator.
Michelle May O'Neil, Karri Lee Bertrand, O'Neil Wysocki, P.C., Dallas, Linda Needham Risinger, Megan Simpson, Law Office of Linda Risinger, Frisco, for Real Party in Interest.
Brad Hakala, The Hakala Law Group, PC, Long Beach, CA, for Amicus Curiae A Voice For Choice Advocacy.
Michael P. Farris, Washington, DC, Ryan Jeffrey Tucker, Scottsdale, AZ, for Amicus Curiae Alliance Defending Freedom.
Thomas C. Sanders, Tom Sanders, P.C., Sugar Land, for Amicus Curiae Parental Rights Foundation.
Francois Paxti-Lysander, pro se.
Jeffrey C. Mateer, Texas Attorney General's Office, First Asst. Attorney General, Kyle D. Hawkins, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Natalie D. Thompson, W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Attorney General of Texas, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, for Amicus Curiae State of Texas.
Julia C. Hatcher, Attorney at Law, Galveston, Tina Montoya, Law Offices of Tina M. Hall, PLLC, Terrell, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Family Defense Attorneys.
Cecilia M. Wood, Law Offices of Cecilia M. Wood, P.C., Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Home School Coalition.
Andrew Brown, Robert Earl Henneke, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Public Policy Foundation.
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Mitchell Law PLLC, Jonathan M. Saenz, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Values.
Elizabeth ‘Beth’ Mary Johnson, Calabrese Budner, LLP, Dallas, John Christopher Nickelson, Law Office of Gary L. Nickelson, Fort Worth, Mary Evelyn McNamara, Rivers McNamara, PLLC, Austin, for Amicus Curiae The State Bar of Texas Family Law Council.
In Troxel v. Granville , the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a trial court's order requiring a fit parent to permit visitation with her children's grandparents.1 The Court recognized that the United States Constitution "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."2 To protect that right, a plurality in Troxel applied "a presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children."3
We have similarly recognized that "[t]he presumption that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to [a] parent is deeply embedded in Texas law."4 The government may not "infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better decision’ could be made."5 Even before Troxel , the Texas Legislature adopted a parallel presumption, requiring that a child's parents be appointed managing conservators in initial child custody suits unless it "would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development."6
The statutory presumption governing original custody determinations, however, is not carried forward into the statute governing proceedings to modify those determinations.7 Thus, we have held that the statutory presumption does not apply in modification proceedings.8 The question presented in this case is whether the presumption that fit parents act according to the best interest of their children applies when modifying an existing order that names a parent as the child's managing conservator. Because a fit parent presumptively acts in the best interest of his or her child and has a "fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control" of that child,9 we hold that it does.
Abigail was born in 2014.10 Abigail's father, C.J.C., is the relator in this mandamus proceeding. Abigail's mother died in a car accident when Abigail was three years old.
Abigail's father and mother lived together from 2011 to 2016 and never married. In 2016, Abigail's father filed a suit requesting that a court determine conservatorship, possession, and child support for Abigail. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the trial court named Abigail's mother and father her joint managing conservators. The order granted Abigail's mother the right to designate Abigail's primary residence and granted Abigail's father regular periods of possession. The court adopted the parents' "custom possession order" that divided possession almost equally by the time Abigail was three.11
Abigail's mother became involved in a relationship with Jason. By September 2017, Abigail and her mother had moved into Jason's home. Until her mother's death, Abigail resided with her mother in Jason's home during her mother's periods of possession.12
In January 2018, Abigail's mother petitioned to modify the existing court order. She sought increased child support and to modify Abigail's possession schedule. Abigail's father answered and asked that the court deny the requested relief.
Abigail's mother died in July 2018 while that suit was pending. Abigail began to live exclusively with her father. Her mother's attorney filed a suggestion of death,13 and Abigail's father moved to dismiss the modification proceeding.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Abigail's maternal grandparents petitioned to intervene in the modification suit. The grandparents asked to be named joint managing conservators with Abigail's father. 14
Jason also petitioned to intervene, seeking similar relief. Both Jason and Abigail's grandparents asked for court-ordered visitation with her. Abigail's father objected to court-ordered visitation and moved to strike both petitions for lack of standing, which the trial court denied.15
Abigail's father sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals. The court of appeals granted relief in part, concluding that Abigail's grandparents had no standing to seek conservatorship of Abigail because no evidence existed that her father's conservatorship "would significantly impair [Abigail's] physical health or emotional development," as the statute governing grandparent intervention requires.16 But the court of appeals determined that Jason had standing to intervene because he had exercised "actual care, control, and possession" of Abigail when she resided with her mother, for at least six months preceding her mother's death.17 We denied the parties' requests for mandamus relief in this Court.
The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing. Jason testified, along with Abigail's father, grandmother, and therapists. Abigail's father agreed that Abigail's maternal grandparents should remain active in her life. He stated that Abigail's grandparents could see her "on a regular basis," noting that they had visited Abigail and that he had invited them to attend Abigail's activities since her mother's death.
Though Abigail's father did not object to Abigail's seeing Jason while she visited her grandparents, he objected to Jason's having a legal right to possession of Abigail "on his own." "As her father and a fit parent," Abigail's father testified, "I don't see why anyone else outside of her mother or myself would have those rights to visitation and to make decisions for her." Abigail's father further testified that Abigail had expressed no desire to visit Jason.
Over Abigail's father's objection, the trial court entered temporary orders naming Jason a possessory conservator of Abigail. Those orders grant Jason an unrestricted "duty of care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline" during his periods of possession. The court also granted Jason possession of Abigail for six hours every second and fourth Saturday for four months, followed by three months during which Jason would additionally have overnight possession every second and fourth Saturday, from noon Saturday until Sunday afternoon. The trial court further stated that, at the expiration of those seven months, the parties "will be back here for a final hearing" or will "have a mediation at which [they] will be able to work out a schedule on an ongoing basis."
The court ordered Abigail's father and Jason to electronically "communicate regarding the child." The court warned that it might order "reunification therapy" if the parties "get into a situation where I feel like there needs to be another therapist involved to help this child." "The [c]ourt has determined what is in [Abigail's] best interest," it continued, "and you are to make this as agreeable as you can force yourself to do."
In addition to these periods of possession, the court granted Jason "the right to confer with [Abigail's] counselor ... regarding his visits with the child" and "the right to receive information regarding school activities and attend activities accompanied by [Abigail's grandparents] at the [grandparents'] election." The orders provide that, during Jason's period of possession, Abigail's grandparents "shall be present for the comfort of the minor child." And the orders grant Jason "the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment during an emergency" during his periods of possession.
Abigail's father filed a second petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, challenging the temporary orders. The court of appeals denied relief.18 He then petitioned this Court for relief, arguing that the trial court's orders violate his right to parent Abigail without government intervention.19
Abigail's father observes that no evidence shows, and no one contends, that he is an unfit parent. The trial court therefore had no basis to name Jason as Abigail's possessory conservator, he argues, nor to order that Jason have periods of possession over her father's objection. Invoking Troxel and decisions from this Court, Abigail's father argues that he has a "fundamental due process right to the presumption that, as a fit parent, he is acting in the best interests of his child and should be able to do so free from state interference." Because Jason did not rebut the presumption established in Tro...
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