In re C.L.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2021
• Docket Number: DA 20-0155
• Citation: 406 Mont. 258,498 P.3d 758
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: C.L., a Youth.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

406 Mont. 258

498 P.3d 758

In the MATTER OF: C.L., a Youth.

DA 20-0155

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: September 29, 2021

Decided: November 16, 2021

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Jeavon Lang, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Joshua Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Valerie M. Winfield, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Appellant C.L., a youth, appeals a December 24, 2019 order of the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County (Youth Court), which denied C.L.’s motion to dismiss the State's July 2, 2019 petition to revoke C.L.’s probation. The Youth Court later relied on the findings from its December 24, 2019 order to grant two dispositional orders: a January 16, 2020 dispositional order—which granted the State's July 2, 2019 petition to revoke C.L.’s probation and imposed a suspended sentence to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) for placement in a secure juvenile facility—and the Youth Court's subsequent July 30, 2020 dispositional order—which granted a second February 27, 2020 petition by the State to revoke C.L.’s probation and committed C.L. to Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility (Pine Hills). As a result, C.L.’s consolidated appeal requests these two dispositional orders be vacated. We reverse, vacating the Youth Court's two dispositional orders and remanding this matter for an entry of order dismissing the State's July 2, 2019 and February 27, 2020 petitions to revoke C.L.’s probation.

¶2 C.L.’s consolidated appeal presents the following single issue for review:

Did the Youth Court err when it revoked C.L.’s probation under a consent decree without C.L.’s Youth Court Petition having been reinstated?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On August 1, 2018, the State filed a youth court petition under § 41-5-1402, MCA, accusing then-13-year-old C.L. of one count of felony criminal mischief. The petition alleged that C.L. had broken several picture windows at a residence in Great Falls, Montana. C.L. denied committing the offense and the case was initially set for a jury trial. However, C.L. and the State ultimately entered a consent decree under § 41-5-1501, MCA, which provided, among other conditions, that C.L. would obey all State and local laws, attend regular probation appointments, refrain from using drugs or alcohol, and be subject to random drug testing and searches. C.L. was to be on probation for one year.

¶4 On December 6, 2018, the Youth Court held a hearing on the consent decree and asked C.L. to "change [his] plea to true in order to finish up [and] ... close the loop with this consent decree." In response, C.L. entered an admission of "true" to the State's allegations. On December 7, 2018, the Youth Court issued an order which approved the parties’ consent decree, ordered that the youth court petition against C.L. be "suspended," and asserted that C.L. "shall be subject to the terms of the consent decree, pursuant to § 45-5-1501(1)(a), MCA."

¶5 On July 2, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke C.L.’s probation (July 2019 petition), alleging that C.L. had consumed drugs and alcohol and had been cited for misdemeanor theft of alcohol. The State's July 2019 petition requested that C.L. be committed to Pine Hills. Notably, the State's petition to revoke C.L.’s probation did not seek to reinstate the State's previous youth court petition against C.L. Instead, the State's July 2019 petition requested that the Youth Court "proceed with disposition" under § 41-5-1512, MCA (titled "[d]isposition of youth in need of intervention or youth who violate consent adjustments"), and § 41-5-1513, MCA (titled "disposition—delinquent youth [ ]").

¶6 On December 2, 2019, C.L. filed a motion to dismiss the State's petition, arguing that the State had not followed the proper procedure under the Montana Youth Court Act. Specifically, C.L. maintained that under the terms of § 41-5-1431(1), MCA (titled "[p]robation revocation proceeding[s]"), probation revocation proceedings may only be initiated for youths that have been adjudicated as a "delinquent youth" or adjudicated as a "youth in need of intervention." Thus, because C.L. had entered an alternative disposition in lieu of adjudication—i.e., a consent decree—C.L. claimed that he was not an "adjudicated" youth and, therefore, probation revocation proceedings could not be initiated under § 41-5-1431, MCA. Instead, C.L. contended that, under the terms of § 41-5-1501(4), MCA (governing "[c]onsent decree[s] with petition[s]"), the correct procedure was for the State to reinstate the suspended youth court petition in response to C.L.’s alleged failures to comply with the consent decree.

¶7 The State opposed C.L.’s motion to dismiss, arguing a consent decree was akin to a deferred imposition of sentence in criminal cases involving adults. The State further argued that C.L. had admitted to the allegation of felony criminal mischief during the parties’ consent decree hearing and, thus, the Youth Court had the authority to impose a disposition when the terms of the consent decree were violated.

However, the State acknowledged that C.L. had entered a consent decree under § 41-5-1501, MCA, and that its petition to revoke C.L.’s probation was filed under § 41-5-1431, MCA.

¶8 On December 24, 2019, the Youth Court issued an order denying C.L.’s motion to dismiss. The Youth Court's order effectively adopted the State's argument and held that C.L.’s admission of "true" at the consent decree hearing constituted a "change of plea"—a term typically reserved for adult criminal proceedings. Due to C.L.’s supposed "change of plea," the Youth Court reasoned that it had "adjudicated [C.L.’s] guilt in the same way that it does in adult proceedings before it imposes a deferred imposition of sentence," and that "[a]t that point, the proceedings for disposition were suspended pending a determination that [C.L.] had successfully completed the period of the consent decree." (Emphasis added.) As a result, the Youth Court claimed it had the authority to revoke C.L.’s probation. The Youth Court did not address C.L.’s argument that § 41-5-1501(4), MCA ("[c]onsent decree with petition"), provides the correct procedure that the State is obligated to follow when a youth violates the terms of his consent decree. Instead, the Youth Court's order relied upon In re Appeal of Cascade Cnty. Dist. Ct. , 2009 MT 355, ¶¶ 16-17, 353 Mont. 194, 219 P.3d 1255. However, Cascade Cnty. dealt with the statutory procedures the State may resort to when a youth violates the terms of a "consent adjustment" under § 41-5-1302, MCA —a similar, but statutorily distinct, procedure from that of a "consent decree" under § 41-5-1501, MCA.

¶9 On January 9, 2020, the Youth Court held an evidentiary hearing on the State's July 2019 petition to revoke C.L.’s probation. Again, C.L. objected that the State's recommended sentence of Pine Hills was not available as a possible disposition under a consent decree. However, the Youth Court denied C.L.’s objection and stated it did not "want to go around that horn again."

¶10 On January 16, 2020, the Youth Court issued a dispositional order finding that C.L. had violated the terms of his probation. The Youth Court concluded that C.L. was both a "delinquent [y]outh" and "serious juvenile offender" under the definitions provided in § 41-5-103, MCA (the definitional section of the Youth Court Act). The Youth Court's order committed C.L. "to the Montana Department of Corrections until age [ ] 18 or sooner released, for placement in a secure state Youth correctional facility[.]" Notably, the Youth Court ordered this commitment "pursuant to §§ 41-5-1512(1)(c) and 41-5-1513(1)(b), MCA"—two statutes which, respectively, prescribe the procedures available to a youth court when a youth violates a "consent adjustment" and when a youth is formally adjudicated as a "delinquent youth." C.L. appealed this order on March 13, 2020, and asked the Youth Court to stay its imposition, which it did.

¶11 On February 27, 2020, the State filed a second petition to revoke C.L.’s probation (February 2020 petition), alleging C.L. had tested positive for marijuana and that the Great Falls Police Department found marijuana and drug paraphernalia during a search of C.L.’s residence. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on July 30, 2020, the Youth Court issued a dispositional order on that same date which revoked C.L.’s probation and committed C.L. to Pine Hills "until age [ ] 18, or sooner released." The record reflects that, at the time of C.L.’s commitment to Pine Hills in July of 2020, the formal petition against C.L. had never been reinstated and C.L. had never received an adjudication on the merits of the charge of criminal mischief.

¶12 On August 25, 2020, C.L. appealed the Youth Court's July 2020 dispositional order. As with its previous January 2020 dispositional order, the Youth Court stayed its imposition. On January 11, 2021, this Court consolidated C.L.’s two appeals. C.L.’s single argument in this consolidated appeal is that the Youth Court erred when it denied C.L.’s motion to dismiss because the youth court petition against C.L. was never reinstated, as required by the Youth Court Act. C.L. further notes that, should this Court decide that the Youth Court erred in denying C.L.’s motion to dismiss, both the Youth Court's January 2020 dispositional order and the Youth Court's July 2020 dispositional order must be vacated on the grounds that the Youth Court would not have had the proper statutory authority to issue either of these orders.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶13 "This Court reviews a youth court's interpretation and application of the Youth Court Act for correctness." Cascade Cnty. , ¶ 10 (citing In re K.D.K. , 2006 MT 187, ¶ 15, 333 Mont. 100, 141 P.3d...