In re C.M.T., 2004 PA Super 418 (PA 10/29/2004)

• Decision Date: 29 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1891 MDA 2003.,1891 MDA 2003.
• Citation: 2004 PA Super 418
• Parties: IN RE: C.M.T., a Minor, APPEAL OF: L.A.P., Natural Mother.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1

2004 PA Super 418

IN RE: C.M.T., a Minor, APPEAL OF: L.A.P., Natural Mother.

No. 1891 MDA 2003.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: October 29, 2004.

Appeal from the Order entered October 29, 2003 In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County Civil Division at No. JV 65-2003.

Before: MUSMANNO, GANTMAN and BECK, JJ.

OPINION BY BECK, J.:

¶ 1 In this appeal from an order of the juvenile court adjudicating a high school student dependent, we address the burden of proof required to establish that a child is "habitually and without justification truant from school" under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. We hold that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the truancy is "without justification." We further hold that in this case, the hearing court erred in refusing to allow appellant to present evidence to justify her absence from school. For these reasons, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 C.M.T., a thirteen year old student at Middleburg High School, and her mother L.A.P. ("Mother") appeared before the Juvenile Court in Snyder County for a dependency hearing on October 29, 2003 after the Snyder County District Attorney filed a Petition seeking to have C.M.T. declared dependent due to habitual truancy. The Petition was filed in response to a referral made by Donna Samuelson, the Assistant Principal at Middleburg.

¶ 3 C.M.T. has Asperger's Syndrome, a neurological disorder that entitles her to special education programming and services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485. Pursuant to her rights under the IDEA, C.M.T. has had an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) in place since at least November 2002. Asperger's Syndrome is a high-functioning form of autism that affects a person's social interactions and ability to understand instructions. Among its many symptoms are a failure to develop peer relationships, a lack of social reciprocity and significant impairment of social and occupational functioning. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) 299.80. See also www.autism.org/asperger.html. Testimony at the hearing revealed that C.M.T. suffers from anxiety, panic attacks, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder. She takes a variety of medications to treat these disorders, including Klonopin, Zoloft, Lobutrin and Abilifi.

¶ 4 At the conclusion of the hearing the court adjudicated C.M.T. dependent, placed her under the supervision of the Snyder County Juvenile Probation Office and ordered her to attend school regularly and on time. Mother filed this timely appeal, asserting that: 1) the hearing court erroneously shifted the burden of proof at the hearing by requiring Mother to prove C.M.T.'s absences were justified, rather than requiring the Commonwealth to establish that the absences were unjustified; 2) the hearing court failed to conduct a comprehensive inquiry when it excluded the testimony of an expert witness who Mother offered to establish that C.M.T.'s truancy was justified because of her disabilities, their negative affect on her ability to attend school, and the school district's failure to provide services to overcome her disabilities; and 3) the record does not support the adjudication of dependency as it establishes that C.M.T.'s truancies were justified by her disabilities.

¶ 5 We begin with the standard and scope of review in dependency cases:

[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not supported by the record. Although bound by the facts, we are not bound by the trial court's inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the court's determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, and must order whatever right and justice dictate. We review for abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, accordingly, is of the broadest possible nature. It is this Court's responsibility to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheless, we accord great weight to the court's fact-finding function because the court is in the best position to observe and rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.

In re E.P., J.P. & A.P., 841 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting from In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 12 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

¶ 6 Mother first argues that the hearing court erred by placing the burden of proof on her to establish that C.M.T.'s absences from school were "justified" under the Juvenile Act, rather than requiring the Commonwealth to prove that the absences were "without justification." We agree.

¶ 7 Adjudication of dependency is governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301-64 (the Act). Included among the definitions of a "dependent child" under the Act is "a child who . . . while subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually and without justification truant from school . . . ." § 6302 (emphasis supplied). Mother contends that "without justification" is an element of the definition of a dependent child that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving. The hearing court disagreed, concluding instead that the question of justification for C.M.T.'s absences was an affirmative defense that Mother bore the burden of proving. Hearing Court Opinion, 1/29/2004, at 2.

¶ 8 It is well-settled that in a dependency proceeding under the Juvenile Act, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the statutory requirements are met. R.W.J., 826 A.2d at 14. The hearing court's rationale for placing the burden on Mother was that the dependency proceeding was criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, thus requiring the "accused" to assert and prove an affirmative defense. This was clear error.

¶ 9 First, adjudications under the Juvenile Act, even adjudications of delinquency, are not criminal in nature. In the Interest of G.T., 597 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 1991) (en banc) ("Delinquency proceedings are not criminal in nature but . . . intended to address the special problems of children who have engaged in aberrant behavior disclosing a need for special treatment."); In the Interest of Tasseing H., 422 A.2d 530, 535 (Pa. Super. 1980) (explaining that purpose of juvenile proceedings is to facilitate "treatment, reformation and rehabilitation," not to punish). Further, although an adjudication of delinquency is based on an act that "would be a crime if it had been committed as an adult . . . ." G.T., 597 A.2d at 641 (emphasis added), "a child can be adjudicated dependent . . . for noncriminal conduct." In the Interest of Michael Y., 530 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 1987); see also In the Interest of R.B., 621 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("[A] child adjudicated dependent has committed no crime nor been charged with a crime.").

¶ 10 Part of the confusion on this issue stems from the fact that the hearing court at times characterized the proceedings as addressing "a violation of the compulsory attendance law" and thus, a crime. However, the instant proceedings did not arise as a prosecution for violation of the compulsory education provisions of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 13-1333. Rather, the matter arose from a Dependency Petition filed pursuant to the Juvenile Act. While the truancy provisions of the Juvenile Act certainly must be construed in light of the compulsory education requirements of the Public School Code, proceedings pursuant to the two statutes are of a very different nature. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354, Official Comment (stating policy of "differentiation of juvenile proceedings from criminal proceedings"). Under the Juvenile Act, truancy is a status offense, and thus is noncriminal in nature.¹ R.B., 621 A.2d at 1042; Michael Y., 530 A.2d at 118-19.

¶ 11 The court erred in analogizing justification under the truancy provision of the Juvenile Act to the affirmative defense of justification under the Criminal Code.²

¶ 12 Returning to the language of the provision, we find that it requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of three distinct facts, that is, that the child is (1) subject to compulsory school attendance and (2) habitually truant (3) without justification. With regard to the third item, the issue on appeal, we recognize that proving a negative is not an easy task. Neither party has presented us with controlling authority on the issue and we have found none. Although our research of the issue elsewhere reveals varying treatment among the states,³ after careful consideration, we adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which addressed directly the difficulty faced by the state in establishing lack of justification. The Minnesota court set forth a logical and workable standard.

¶ 13 In the Matter of the Welfare of L.Z., C.R.P. & S.L.P., 396 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 1986), addressed a Minnesota statute that defined a truant as "a child . . . absenting himself from attendance at school without lawful excuse." Id. at 217 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 19). The L.Z. court first concluded that the absence of a lawful excuse was an element of truancy and then went on to consider how the state could satisfy its burden. The court noted that "it is extremely difficult to prove why a child is absent from school." Id. at 218. However, it concluded that, if a proper foundation is laid, school attendance records are admissible to show: "(a) the child was absent on a particular day; (b) what excuse, if any, was offered by the parent; and (c) the fact that no excuse was received from the parent or guardian . . . ." Id. at 220-21. The L.Z. court recognized that in certain cases "[t]he absence of a lawful excuse . . . may involve a judgment of school personnel on the validity of a proffered excuse." Id. at 220. Thus, if "the school rejects a facially valid excuse," the child must have an opportunity "to confront the person making the adverse judgment." Id....