In re A.C.

• Decision Date: 26 October 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 17-0477,17-0477
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF A.C., J.Y., J.Y. JR., L.B., and E.B., Children
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

560 S.W.3d 624

In the INTEREST OF A.C., J.Y., J.Y. JR., L.B., and E.B., Children

NO. 17-0477

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued September 10, 2018

OPINION DELIVERED: October 26, 2018

Lynne A. Corsi, for Guardian/Attorney ad Litem for the Children.

Regina P. Clark, for M.C., Father of A.C. [did not appeal]

James E. Masek, L.B., Father of L.B. & E.B. [did not appeal]

Ray Chappelle, April E. Smith, for A.J.

Faith Simmons Johnson, Laura A. Coats, Denise Hale, for Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court.

Proceedings to terminate the parent–child relationship implicate rights of constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection. Involuntary severance of parental rights thus requires "clear and convincing evidence" that termination is warranted and in the child's best interest.¹ The intermediate proof standard is a constitutional minimum and a statutory mandate that necessitates a commensurately heightened standard of review.² In this government-initiated termination proceeding, the issue is whether—under the elevated proof standard—a parent's unrecanted and uncontroverted admission that termination is in her children's best interests, coupled with stipulations as to grounds for termination and permanency plans, are any evidence to support the trial court's best-interest findings. Rejecting legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges to the termination decree, the court of appeals affirmed, holding such evidence—in the form of statements in a mediated settlement agreement signed by the parents, counsel, and others—is sufficient to support termination.³ We agree. We recently held in In re K.S.L. that similar affirmations in an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment are, in the ordinary case, ample evidence to support a best-interest determination.⁴ Discerning no material difference in the evidentiary value of a parent's voluntary statements in a mediated settlement agreement, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I. Background

The Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) took custody of four children after receiving reports that two of them were living with Mother in a squalid, structurally unsound, and drug-infested habitation. A fifth child was later removed from Mother's custody at birth based on allegations that the baby's meconium tested positive for methamphetamines/amphetamines.⁵ DFPS sued to terminate Mother's parental rights to all five children, alleging myriad statutory grounds including abandonment, neglect, endangerment, and noncompliance with the provisions of a court order establishing the actions necessary to reclaim custody.⁶ DFPS also sought to terminate parental rights of three men alleged to be the children's fathers.

Pursuant to Chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code, the parties engaged in mediated settlement proceedings that culminated in an agreement signed by Mother, the putative fathers, the parents' respective attorneys, the children's guardian and attorney ad litem, a Court-Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) supervisor, and DFPS representatives and counsel.⁷ In the mediated settlement agreement (MSA), the parents stipulated that their parental rights would be terminated on two specific statutory grounds—constructive abandonment as to the baby and failure to comply with a court order as to the other children—and best interests.⁸ In two separate places, the parties collectively agreed the MSA's terms were in the children's best interests.

In the MSA, the parties assented to DFPS's appointment as permanent managing conservator with all concomitant rights and duties under the Texas Family Code, including the right to consent to adoption, and the parents' appointment as non-parent possessory conservators with limited visitation rights. The MSA also includes permanency plans for the children, providing for specific relative and non-relative placements for each child and requiring DFPS to consent to adoption by the designated individuals "[a]bsent unforeseeable circumstances." As a failsafe if adoption by the designated individuals is not viable, the agreement requires DFPS to transfer permanent managing conservatorship to those individuals "absent unforeseeable circumstances." The parents' stipulations as to termination are not contingent on either the children's placement with the individuals named in the agreement or the parents' consent to an alternative placement.

Specific admonishments and acknowledgments confirm the availability of counsel and herald the gravity and voluntariness of the parents' stipulations:

• "THE FOLLOWING MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION AND IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO SECTION 153.0071 OF THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE. THIS AGREEMENT IS SIGNED BY EACH PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT AND EACH PARTY'S ATTORNEY WHO IS PRESENT AT THE TIME THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. A PARTY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THIS MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING RULE 11, TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OR ANOTHER RULE OF LAW. "⁹

• "Each signatory to this settlement agreement has entered into the settlement freely and without duress after having consulted with professionals of his or her choice."

• "Each party has been advised by the mediator that the mediator is not the attorney for any party and that each party should have this agreement approved by that party's attorney before executing it."

• "This stipulation is signed voluntarily and with the advice and consent of counsel ... and its provisions are intended to be incorporated into a final order."

• "THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE THAT THIS MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS BINDING ON SAID PARTIES AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION. "

Shortly after the MSA's execution, two of the children were returned to DFPS's care due to a material change in the personal circumstances of the fictive kin designated in the MSA as anticipated adopters. In light of this development, Mother filed a motion to invalidate and modify the MSA, but only as to the agreed placement for those two children, stating the placement had become unworkable and was not in the children's best interests. Mother requested a new placement match for those children and the right to designate suitable relatives or fictive kin. Mother did not, however, repudiate her admissions regarding termination of her parental rights to any of her children. To the contrary, she affirmatively requested that "the MSA's conditions of termination of [her] parental rights, including the legal grounds ..., be kept in place with the new placement." The trial court denied the motion, noting the agreement provided for DFPS's consent to adoption and did not preclude DFPS from looking for substitute placements.

The parties waived a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a prove-up hearing the following month. On request, and without objection, the trial court took judicial notice of the MSA, which had been filed in the court's records. A DFPS caseworker also testified as to the MSA's contents, including the parents' stipulations regarding the grounds for termination, and that severance of the parent–child relationship was in the children's best interests. No other witnesses were called, and no evidentiary elaboration was offered.

Although Mother had an opportunity to testify, she appeared only through counsel, who advised the court: "My client is not here today but she has signed the mediated settlement agreement ...." The children's ad litem asserted, without objection, that the relief specified in the MSA was in the children's best interests, and the CASA representative agreed. No contrary evidence was offered.

At the close of evidence, the trial court found grounds to terminate the parent–child relationship as to each child and that termination of each parent–child relationship was in that child's best interest. The court approved the MSA and incorporated it into the final order, both orally and in the termination decree. No post-judgment motions were filed.

Mother appealed, but the fathers did not. In three appellate issues, Mother challenged the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's best-interest findings and appointment of DFPS's director as the children's permanent managing conservator. The court of appeals affirmed.¹⁰ As to evidentiary support for the best-interest findings, the court observed that:

• Mother never withdrew her voluntary stipulations in the MSA and had the opportunity to object at the prove-up hearing, but failed to do so;

• Mother's agreement to terminate her parental rights based on constructive abandonment and failure to meet the court-ordered requirements for reunification "support inferences adverse to Mother regarding potential dangers to the children, her parenting abilities, and her relationships with the children";

• the MSA defined the placement plans for the children, which contemplated that "unforeseeable circumstances" might prevent the agreed placements from taking place; and

• the MSA did not condition termination of Mother's parental rights on the agreed placements.¹¹

The court thus held that the stipulations and placement plans in the MSA are sufficient evidence of several factors relevant to the best-interest determination.¹² The court also upheld the managing-conservator appointment because termination of Mother's parental rights was appropriate and she presented no evidence that she is a "suitable, competent adult" to serve as managing conservator.¹³

On petition for review to this Court, Mother asserts that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard negates the evidentiary value of her best-interest stipulations in the MSA and the best-interest testimony at trial, which she characterizes as conclusory and lacking factual support. She acknowledges, however, that her stipulations as to grounds for termination, along with judicial notice of a temporary order, are legally sufficient to support the trial court's findings as to those facts and has abandoned...