In re Caldwell

CourtUnited States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Eastern District of Arkansas
Citation164 F. 515
Docket Number956.
PartiesIn re CALDWELL.
Decision Date17 October 1908

Downie Rouse & Streepey, for petitioners.

J. A Comer, for trustee.

TRIEBER District Judge.

The only question involved in this proceeding is whether the petitioners, to whom wages are due for services rendered within three months of the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings as musicians, hired by the bankrupt to play on his roof garden, are entitled to priority under section 64 cl. 4b, of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447)). To decide this question requires the determination of the meaning of the word 'servant' in that section, for it is conceded that the petitioners are neither workmen, clerks, nor salesmen.

While lexicographers define the word differently, the Century Dictionary defining it as 'one who exerts himself or labors for the benefit of a party or employer; an attendant a subordinate assistant'-- the courts have not considered themselves bound by the definitions found in dictionaries, but have construed the word so as to carry into effect the intent of the lawmakers. In Cawood v. Wolfley, 56 Kan. 281, 43 P. 236, 31 L.R.A. 538, 54 Am.St.Rep. 590, the court was called upon to construe the words 'wages of servants,' in a statute regulating the classification and priorities of demands against estates of deceased persons-- i.e., whether, as in the case at bar, a clerk in a store was a servant, entitled to priority of payment-- and it was held that such a person was a 'servant,' within the meaning of the statute. The court in its opinion said:

'The Legislature by the enactment has manifested a purpose to secure all wage earners their hire, and to prefer their claims to any other creditors. It is conceded that the term 'servant' in its usual application, especially in the law, is broad enough to include a clerk; but it is argued that the word is here used in a restricted sense, and means only menial or household servants. We are loath to recognize any such classification as 'menial servants.' The word is broad enough to include a clerk, and we think the Legislature intended to do so.'

In Frank & Dugan v. Herold, 63 N.J.Eq. 445, 52 A. 155, it was held that skilled operators employed in a manufacturing establishment are 'servants.' The Vice Chancellor, in his opinion, said:

'Now, I say that the relation of master and servant existed between plaintiff and these operators. I do not use the word 'servant' in any menial sense. Any person who works for another for a salary is a servant in the eye of the law; and in the law the relation of master and servant does not necessarily include anything menial or degrading.'

A definition of the word, which is very comprehensive and meets my views as to its legal meaning, is that given in 20 A. & E. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 11:

'A servant is one who is employed to render personal services to his employer otherwise than in the pursuit of an independent calling, and in any such service remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter.'

And on page 12, where it is said:

'The relation of master and servant exists where the employer has the right to select the employe, the power to remove or discharge him, or the right to direct both what work shall be done and the way and manner in which it shall be done.'

The bankruptcy act, while primarily intended to secure an equal distribution of the assets of the bankrupt among his creditors, evinces a strong intent on the part of Congress to protect those who are dependent on their daily earnings for their support, and gives them a preference over ordinary creditors, limiting it to three months' wages. As to the limitation of three months, it was no doubt influenced by the fact that persons who permitted their...

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8 cases
  • Unemployment Compensation Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1941
    ...Center Restaurants v. Miller, 18 N.Y.S. 302; Comer v. State Tax Commission (N. M.) 29 P.2d 936; Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1; In re Caldwell, 164 F. 515; The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d 201; Claus v. DeVere 235 N.W. 450. Considering the objectives of the Unemployment Compensation Law, it is clear t......
  • In re Ko-Ed Tavern, 7947.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • July 14, 1942
    ...341; In re Bush Terminal Printing Corporation, D. C.E.D.N.Y., 32 F.2d 264, 265, affirmed per curiam 2 Cir., 32 F.2d 265; In re Caldwell, D.C.E.D.Ark., 164 F. 515, 517. 3 Keyes v. Davie, 9 Cir., 231 F. 688, 690; Blessing v. Blanchard, 9 Cir., 223 F. 35, 37, Ann.Cas.1916B, 4 In re Pacific Co-......
  • Manly v. Hood
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • January 14, 1930
    ...Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152, 160, 32 S. Ct. 457, 56 L. Ed. 706; In re McDavid Lumber Company (D. C.) 190 F. 97; In re Caldwell (D. C.) 164 F. 515; In re Erie Lumber Co. (D. C.) 150 F. 817; In re Rouse (D. C.) 91 F. 514; Ex parte Rockett, Fed. Cas. No. But, even if clause 5 of......
  • In re Saint Joseph's Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • April 10, 1991
    ...(W.D.Wis.1916) (milk handlers who were found to be "independent contractors" were held not entitled to priority). But see In re Caldwell, 164 F. 515, 517 (E.D.Ark.1908) (musicians hired to play in an orchestra on the debtor's roof garden were held entitled to wage priority because such a pa......
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