In re Caldwell

• Decision Date: 17 April 1986
• Docket Number: Adv. No. 3-85-1290.,Bankruptcy No. 3-85-01637
• Citation: 60 BR 214
• Parties: In re Albert H. CALDWELL, Debtor. James E. HARDIN, James C. Hardin and Ralph Majors, Plaintiffs, v. Albert H. CALDWELL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

60 B.R. 214 (1986)

In re Albert H. CALDWELL, Debtor James E. HARDIN, James C. Hardin and Ralph Majors, Plaintiffs, v. Albert H. CALDWELL, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 3-85-01637, Adv. No. 3-85-1290.

United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Tennessee.

April 17, 1986.

Herbert S. Moncier, Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

James C. Shastid, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CLIVE W. BARE, Bankruptcy Judge.

I

In this adversary proceeding plaintiffs allege the nondischargeability of a judgment entered in their favor in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Tennessee, in the amount of $40,000.00. Civil Action No. 3-774-79, styled James E. Hardin, James C. Hardin and Ralph Majors v. Albert Caldwell, et al. Asserting that the state court jury verdict and judgment against the defendant-debtor for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and imprisonment have collateral estoppel effect and that the state court judgment resolves all issues of material fact, plaintiffs move for summary judgment. Bankruptcy Rule 7056, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Submitted in support of their motion are the affidavit of Herbert S. Moncier, attorney for the plaintiffs, the transcript of evidence from the civil action, the trial court's jury charge, the state court judgment, and the opinion by the Tennessee Court of Appeals on direct appeal of the jury verdict.

Defendant has filed no counter-affidavit or other document in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

In their complaint to determine dischargeability plaintiffs allege:

4.¹ On or about December 28, 1978, Defendant, an assistant chief of police for the City of Knoxville, caused Plaintiffs to be subjected to false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising out of an incident on December 24, 1978, involving Plaintiffs and Defendant\'s son, wherein Defendant\'s son stole property belonging to one of the Plaintiffs and later assaulted Plaintiff Ralph Majors with a stolen sawed-off shotgun and a loaded double barrel derringer.

5. Defendant knew Plaintiffs were guilty of no criminal acts stemming from the December 24, 1978 incident, and Defendant had no probable cause to believe the same. Criminal warrants charging Plaintiffs with the offenses of assault and battery were maliciously instituted by Defendant for purposes other than bringing individuals believed to have violated the law before a court of justice. Defendant instituted the criminal warrants against the recommendation of a Knox County General Sessions Court Judge, and Defendant personally directed the arrest and jailing of Plaintiffs utilizing his position as Assistant Chief of Police with the City of Knoxville and knowing that his son had been criminally charged in this incident and was the subject of further accusations and investigations regarding a stolen shotgun.

6. Plaintiffs were falsely arrested, booked, fingerprinted and held in jail until able to make bond.

7. A preliminary hearing was held on the criminal warrants on January 26, 1979, at which time all charges were dismissed as to all Plaintiffs.

8. In a civil action instituted by Plaintiffs against Defendant in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Tennessee, No. 3-774-79, the jury awarded Plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages against Defendant on Plaintiffs\' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The award of damages against Defendant as modified by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, was in the total amount of $40,000.00, representing $15,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages awarded to Plaintiff James E. Hardin against Defendant, $15,000.00 awarded to Plaintiff James C. Hardin against Defendant, and $10,000.00 awarded to Plaintiff Ralph Majors against Defendant.

9. The debt owed from Defendant to Plaintiffs is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

Defendant's response to paragraphs 4 through 8 is as follows:

That the information and allegations contained in paragraphs four through eight of the Complaint are denied to the extent they adversely affect the interest of your debtor and strict proof is demanded of allegations that are set out which are meant to bring this action under the terms of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

At the civil trial instituted by plaintiffs against the defendant-debtor for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and imprisonment, the trial court instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows:

The three elements in a malicious prosecution for your consideration to authorize a malicious prosecution to be proper, it must be shown to your satisfaction first an acquittal or final discharge of the original prosecution; two, that the charges were made through malice, and malice is a motive that is not hatred, but rather by indirect and improper motives, malice must consist of any other motives other than an honest desire to bring the guilty to justice; and three, done without a reasonable or plausible ground or cause to believe that it is true.

. . . Members of the jury, criminal judicial processes are provided for the protection of society from criminal elements. When such processes are used for a purpose other than a desire to bring the person prosecuted to justice, and thereby cause damage to a person wrongfully prosecuted, the law will allow recovery of damages from the prosecutor in what is called a malicious prosecution case. . . . It is not enough that the prosecution prosecution sic was not founded; it must have been malicious and without probable cause to impose liability on the instigators of it. Now, malice is not the same thing as failure to act, as any reasonable man would have under the circumstances. In fact, that is the definition of negligence. It is distinguishable from that mere negligence in that characteristic of negligence is inadvertence, or the absence of an intent to injure; but to constitute malice, there must have been a motive, an intent, and it must have been an improper motive or intent. And so malice is not in itself the same thing as want of probable cause, but malice may be inferred by the jury from the want of probable cause, although you are not required to make such a finding. The term malice does not mean that which must arise or be motivated by a spiteful or revengeful disposition, but includes, as well, conduct injurious to another proceeding from a mind not sufficiently cautious before it brings about an injury to another. . . .

. . . . .

Now, just touching on false imprisonment and false arrest; obviously, if you find plaintiffs are entitled to recovery on the malicious prosecution, it would follow they would be entitled to the false arrest count, also. Otherwise, not. A plaintiff who has been falsely arrested or falsely imprisoned by a defendant is entitled to recover damages therefrom. That\'s the long and short of it. A small definition of false imprisonment: An unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another. It\'s almost too simple, isn\'t it?

To constitute a false imprisonment, there must have been an intentional and unlawful restraint, confinement, or detention which compels a person to stay or go somewhere against his will, such as the jail. The restraint necessary to constitute a false imprisonment may result either from the exercise of force or from an expressed or implied threat of force. It is not necessary to constitute a false imprisonment that there be confinement in a jail, although it would be if a malicious prosecution on behalf of the plaintiff is sustained.

. . . .

. . . On top of that, the plaintiffs ask for punitive damage, or as they used to say when I was a young lawyer, smart money. If you find these injuries and complaints were willfully and maliciously afflicted upon a plaintiff or plaintiffs or so wantonly done as to imply a conscientious disregard for the rights of others, such as the persons injured, if they were injured, are done with a bad motive, then you may go further and assess by way of punitive damages such a sum as in your judgment would be a warning to the defendant or defendants not to commit similar acts in the future, being mindful all the while of the instructions I give you as a whole.

Transcript of Evidence at 891-909.

At the conclusion of the civil action instituted by plaintiffs against the defendant-debtor, the jury awarded plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages. The amount of damages awarded, as modified by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, was in the total amount of forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00), representing fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) in compensatory and punitive damages awarded to plaintiff James E. Hardin; fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) in compensatory and punitive damages awarded to plaintiff James C. Hardin; and ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in compensatory and punitive damages awarded to plaintiff Ralph Majors. In all other respects the jury verdict and judgment were affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In particular, in response to the defendant-debtor's contention on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a judgment against him, the Tennessee Court of Appeals responded and ruled,

The trial judge properly submitted the issue of conspiracy to the jury. There is evidence that Chief Caldwell requested the other defendants come to his office four days after the incident and, upon arrival, statements and charges were formulated. After the warrants were typed, Chief Caldwell personally presented the warrants to a magistrate. While the magistrate issued the warrants, he testified he advised Caldwell he "was making a mistake." Caldwell then personally supervised plaintiffs\' arrests. There is ample evidence to support the jury\'s decision that Albert Caldwell conspired with the other defendants to maliciously prosecute plaintiffs.

Hardin v. Caldwell, 695 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985) (emphasis added). The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to grant permission to appeal. Thereafter defendant-debtor instituted a ...