In re Carter, 9965.
| Decision Date | 01 August 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 9965.,9965. |
| Citation | 177 F.2d 75 |
| Parties | In re CARTER. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. George E. C. Hayes, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. James A. Cobb, Washington, D. C., and Howard Jenkins, Jr., were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Harold H. Bacon, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, and Messrs. Ross O'Donoghue and John D. Lane, Assistant United States Attorneys, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for the United States Attorney as amicus curiae, urging dismissal of the appeal. Mr. L. Clark Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for amicus curiae.
Mr. Philip B. Perlman, Solicitor General of the United States, Washington, D. C., reargued on behalf of the United States Attorney as amicus curiae, urging dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the orders.
Before CLARK, WILBUR K. MILLER and PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judges.
Writ of Certiorari Denied December 12, 1949. See 70 S.Ct. 250.
This is an appeal from orders of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, which revoked the authority of appellant to do business as a bondsman in criminal cases in this jurisdiction.
The applicable statute is a local one. In pertinent part it provides: 1
Pursuant to the statute, the District Court adopted rules which provided, among other things:
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It is clear from these rules that, as required by the statute, an applicant must show that he has not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude and that he is known to be of good moral character. It is also clear that the authorization is for a term, at the expiration of which the same considerations govern renewal as govern original approval; and that an authorization once given may be revoked for good cause.
Appellant Carter applied for and was granted authorization to engage in the business of executing bonds. He entered upon the business.
Several weeks later the judge who had approved this application called into question a statement in it. In response to Rule I(3), above-quoted, Carter had written that he had "never been charged and/or convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude". It appears that information came to the court that in 1928, some twenty years before present events, Carter had been charged three times with violation of the laws against gambling, and in 1935, thirteen years before, had been charged with receiving stolen property. Upon learning of these charges, the court called for an explanation and then issued a rule upon Carter to show cause why his authorization to engage in the bonding business should not be revoked.
Answer was made to the rule, and hearing was held upon it. It developed that Carter had never been convicted of any of the charges made against him and, indeed, had not even been tried upon any of them. All had been nolle prossed or dismissed. So the record stood that he had never been tried, much less convicted, of any offense, whether involving moral turpitude or not. It further developed that Carter's application for authority to engage in the bonding business had been prepared by a reputable, experienced and respected member of the bar. This attorney knew of the charges against Carter. He also knew that the statute and the rules required information as to convictions only. But never having theretofore prepared one of these applications, he went to the District Court and copied the language from an application which had been approved. That application used the expression "charged and/or convicted". The attorney interpreted the expression, in view of the statute and the rules, as meaning charged and convicted or simply convicted, visualizing a case in which a person, having been charged with one offense, might be convicted of a lesser one.
The court concluded that the statement on the application had been made in good faith, not willfully or with purpose to deceive the court. Nevertheless, the court revoked the authorization. It did so upon the ground that if, in passing upon the original application, it had had before it the facts of the charges, it would have made further inquiry into the suitability of the applicant to be a bondsman. It considered that the language used in...
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In re Carter
...by making them formal parties. The fact that they were not made formal parties does not deprive us of jurisdiction. In re Carter, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 177 F.2d 75; certiorari denied, Laws, Chief Judge et al. v. Carter, 338 U.S. 900, 70 S.Ct. 250, 94 L.Ed We adhere to the opinion formerly fi......
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Cross, In re
...interest in his bondsman's license that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Carter, 177 F.2d 75, 78 (D.C.Cir.1949); State v. Parrish, 254 N.C. 301, 303, 118 S.E.2d 786, 788 (1961); In re Greene, 130 A.2d 593, 595-96 (D.C.1957). See also Unite......
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Brady v. Department of Personnel
...47 N.J. 482, 487, 221 A.2d 721 (1966)) ]. See also Limongelli v. State Bd. Of Dentistry, 137 N.J. 317, 645 A.2d 677 (1993). In re Carter, 177 F.2d 75 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 900, 70 S.Ct. 250, 94 L.Ed. 554 (1949), and In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 862......
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Jordan v. United Insurance Company of America, 15994.
...862, 72 S.Ct. 89, 96 L.Ed. 648, and Judge Miller's concurring opinion, 89 U.S.App. D.C. at page 320, 192 F.2d at page 25; In re Carter, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 177 F.2d 75, certiorari denied, 1949, 338 U.S. 900, 70 S.Ct. 250, 94 L.Ed. 554; Minkoff v. Payne, 1953, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 210 F.2d ......