In re Castro-Tum, Interim Decision #3911

• Decision Date: 04 January 2018
• Docket Number: Interim Decision #3911
• Citation: 27 I&N Dec. 187
• Parties: Matter of Reynaldo CASTRO-TUM, Respondent
• Court: U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals

27 I&N Dec. 187

Matter of Reynaldo CASTRO-TUM, Respondent

Interim Decision #3911

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

January 4, 2018

The Attorney General referred the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals to himself for review of issues relating to the authority to administratively close immigration proceedings, ordering that the case be stayed during the pendency of his review.

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(h)(l)(i) (2017), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") to refer this case to me for review of its decision. The Board's decision in this matter is automatically stayed pending my review. See Matter of Haddam, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001). To assist me in my review, I invite the parties to these proceedings and interested amici to submit briefs on points relevant to the disposition of this case, including:

1. Do Immigration Judges and the Board have the authority, under any statute, regulation, or delegation of authority from the Attorney General, to order administrative closure in a case? If so, do the Board's decisions in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17 (BIA 2017), articulate the appropriate standard for administrative closure?

2. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently lack the authority to order administrative closure, should I delegate such authority? Alternatively, if I determine that Immigration Judges and the Board currently possess the authority to order administrative closure, should I withdraw that authority?

3. The regulations governing removal proceedings were promulgated for "the expeditious, fair, and proper resolution of matters coming before Immigration Judges." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 (2017). Are there any circumstances where a docket management device other than administrative closure—including a continuance for good cause shown (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017)), dismissal without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) (2017)), or termination without prejudice (8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f))—would be inadequate to promote that objective? Should there be different legal consequences, such as eligibility to apply for a provisional waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility under the immigration laws or for benefits under federal or state programs, where a case has been administratively closed rather than continued?

4. If I determine that Immigration Judges and the

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