In re Champagne

• Decision Date: 30 October 1992
• Docket Number: Adv. No. 92-1033.,Bankruptcy No. 90-11438
• Citation: 146 BR 506
• Parties: In re Roland B. CHAMPAGNE, Debtor. Roland B. CHAMPAGNE, Plaintiff, v. EQUITABLE CREDIT UNION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Rhode Island

146 B.R. 506 (1992)

In re Roland B. CHAMPAGNE, Debtor Roland B. CHAMPAGNE, Plaintiff, v. EQUITABLE CREDIT UNION, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 90-11438, Adv. No. 92-1033.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Rhode Island.

October 30, 1992.

Christopher Lefebvre, Pawtucket, R.I., for debtor/plaintiff.

Richard A. Sinapi, Morneau & Sinapi, P.C., Inc., Cranston, R.I., for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ARTHUR N. VOTOLATO, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Debtor's Motion for Reconsideration of our September 25, 1992 Decision and Order, wherein we denied the Debtor's request for relief based on his failure to properly allege a violation of the discharge injunction under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) 145 B.R. 122.¹

The Debtor's initial criticism of our September 25 ruling is that the Court (incorrectly) relied upon the parties' "inartfullysic drafted joint pre-trial order" in finding that Equitable Credit Union ("ECU") had the right to repossess the Debtor's mobile home.² In the July 27, 1992, Joint Pretrial Order, there are two pertinent facts listed as undisputed. Paragraph seven states "that on or about January 31, 1991, the Bankruptcy Court removed the automatic stay previously entered pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 in the debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding." Paragraph nine provides that "the debtor acknowledges that Equitable Credit Union had an absolute right to peacefully repossess their collateral pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws."

These statements, together with the facts elicited at the hearing, were the basis for our conclusion that "ECU obtained relief from the automatic stay in order to repossess the mobile home, upon a finding that the Debtor had no equity in the collateral." Champagne v. Equitable Credit Union (In re Champagne), 145 B.R. 122, 123 (Bankr.D.R.I.1992).

Apparently this statement has caused the Debtor such consternation and concern about prejudice to him that he filed the instant motion asking us to "correct and/or amend said findings to clarify that ECU never moved for or obtained relief from the stay to proceed against the mobile home." (Debtor's Mem.Supp.Mot.Recons. at 2.) Normally, where this Court makes a material misstatement of fact either through inadvertence or lack of adequate information, we welcome input from the parties and will correct the record where appropriate. In this instance however, the questioned statement of fact is one submitted to the Court by the parties themselves and, in the circumstances, is one we deem immaterial to our ultimate determination. In addition, we do not accept oversight responsibility for the wording of joint pretrial orders or other stipulated matters. The parties alone are accountable for the results of their submissions,³ and the Debtor's reliance on the principles of equity to relieve or rescue him from agreements contained in the joint pretrial order is totally misplaced.

The main purpose of the joint pretrial order is to assist the Court by narrowing the contested facts, and framing the legal issues. Where facts are stated as undisputed, it is not our practice nor is the Court required to investigate the record to verify that said stipulations are accurate. The parties are expected to correctly articulate their positions in the joint pretrial order, and the Court considers such stipulations binding. Accordingly, the Debtor's admission in the joint pretrial order that the Court removed the automatic stay on January 31, 1991, together with his statement that ECU had the "absolute right to peacefully repossess their collateral," precludes his present argument that the automatic stay was in effect on the day ECU repossessed its collateral.⁴

This brings us to the second issue raised in the Debtor's motion for reconsideration—his request for a new trial or an amendment of our September 25, 1992 judgment. In support of these requests, the Debtor asserts an entirely new legal ground against ECU, not previously raised in any of the pleadings filed in this proceeding, nor argued at trial. Specifically, he now argues that "the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) was still in place as to the mobile home on February 8, 1991 and the actions of the credit union violated the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(1)." (Debtor's Mem.Supp.Recons. at 4.)

This sudden change in position and belated attempt to assert an entirely new claim against ECU, after the evidentiary hearing where the Debtor represented verbally and in writing that ECU had the absolute right to repossess the mobile home, is an inexcusable violation of Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9011, and displays a total disregard of the requirements of this Court, and the good-faith and meritorious pleading practice mandated under the law. We subscribe to the standard enunciated in In re Wedgestone Financial, 142 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D.Mass.1992) that to succeed on a motion to reconsider, "the Court requires that the moving party show newly discovered evidence or a manifest error of fact or law." Id. at 8. On the basis of the complaint filed in this proceeding, which was limited to a claim for damages resulting from the manner in which ECU repossessed the Debtor's...