In re Chapman

Decision Date27 October 2022
Docket Number21-BG-743
Parties IN RE Bryan A. CHAPMAN, Respondent. A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 439184)
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Bryan A. Chapman, pro se.

Myles V. Lynk, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Before Deahl and AliKhan, Associate Judges, and Fisher, Senior Judge.

AliKhan, Associate Judge:

Relying on a report and recommendation from one of its Hearing Committees, the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility determined that respondent, Bryan A. Chapman, had violated numerous Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that he receive a 90-day suspension. We conclude that, because he failed to take any exceptions to the Hearing Committee's report when the matter was before the Board, Mr. Chapman has forfeited his challenges in this court. Thus, we have no reason to question the Board's determination that Mr. Chapman violated several Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and we agree with the Board that a 90-day suspension is appropriate.1

I. Factual Background

Mr. Chapman has been a licensed attorney in the District of Columbia since 1993, primarily practicing in the field of employment discrimination law. In October 2010, he began representing Myrna Roberts, a mathematics teacher at Crossland High School, a school within Prince George's County Public Schools ("PGCPS").

Ms. Roberts, who was born in the U.S. Virgin Islands, believed that she was being treated unfairly by the principal of Crossland High School, Charles Thomas. In spring 2008, Mr. Thomas had reassigned Ms. Roberts from her full-time teaching position to a co-teaching position, meaning that she no longer had her own classroom or a consistent schedule. Over the course of the next few months, Ms. Roberts complained about the change in position to PGCPS officials and to her union, the Prince George's County Educators’ Association, but her complaints were strictly contractual in nature.

Separately, in September 2010, Mr. Chapman began representing a group of current and former teachers from Largo High School, also a part of PGCPS. That suit primarily alleged racial discrimination by Largo's principal, Angelique Simpson-Marcus, who is Black, against Jon Everhart, a white teacher, and those who defended him.

In October 2010, Ms. Roberts learned of the Largo suit through an acquaintance and contacted Mr. Chapman to determine whether she, too, had a valid employment discrimination claim. After two meetings, Mr. Chapman agreed to represent her. While Mr. Chapman explained to Ms. Roberts that she did not have a viable race discrimination claim, he stated that she did have a viable claim for national origin discrimination under Title VII. Mr. Chapman did not, however, explain that her claim (which was based on conduct that had occurred several years earlier) was subject to an administrative exhaustion requirement and might be time-barred.2

In November 2010, Mr. Chapman filed a joint complaint against PGCPS in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on behalf of Ms. Roberts and the Largo plaintiffs. Ms. Roberts's portion of the complaint only alleged national origin discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. PGCPS moved to dismiss in January 2011, arguing, inter alia , that Ms. Roberts and several other plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by timely filing complaints with the EEOC.

Immediately after PGCPS filed its motion, Mr. Chapman instructed Ms. Roberts to submit a claim to the EEOC "as soon as [she could]," despite knowing that she had missed the statutory deadline by several years. When Ms. Roberts requested assistance in submitting her EEOC complaint, Mr. Chapman sent her sample complaints he had filed on behalf of prior clients. Ms. Roberts eventually filed her EEOC complaint in March 2011, and she received her right-to-sue letter one week later.

In April 2011, the district court dismissed the joint complaint without prejudice, permitting each plaintiff to file an individual complaint. Despite the dismissal, Mr. Chapman continued to tell Ms. Roberts that she had a strong case.

In May 2011, Mr. Chapman filed Ms. Roberts's individual complaint in district court, alleging (1) national origin discrimination by PGCPS in violation of Title VII; (2) national origin discrimination by PGCPS in violation of Title VI; and (3) national origin discrimination by Ms. Roberts's union in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, and after a hearing, the district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. In dismissing the claims, the court observed that the Title VII claim remained time-barred; that the Title VI claim lacked any allegations of intentional discrimination; and that national origin discrimination was not actionable under section 1981. The court expressed its frustration with Mr. Chapman and how he had handled the matter, stating: "I think you've really encouraged some of your clients to come forth with lawsuits that have no basis ...."

II. Procedural History

After her suit was dismissed, Ms. Roberts submitted a complaint to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Mr. Chapman and Disciplinary Counsel then exchanged several letters regarding the alleged misconduct over the next few years. In February 2020, after completing its preliminary investigation, Disciplinary Counsel served Mr. Chapman with a specification of charges alleging that he had violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 19-301.1 (competence), 19-301.2(a) (consultation with a client), 19-301.4(b) (explaining a matter to a client), and 19-303.1 (filing frivolous claims) in his representation of Ms. Roberts.

Mr. Chapman submitted an answer denying the charges in April 2020, and both parties presented evidence and arguments before a Hearing Committee in October 2020. The Committee heard testimony from Mr. Chapman, Ms. Roberts, and Ms. Linda Correia, Disciplinary Counsel's expert in employment discrimination law. After the hearing concluded, both parties submitted post-hearing briefs. Mr. Chapman notably did not brief the issue of sanctions. Instead, he accepted a number of Disciplinary Counsel's findings of fact, proposed additional findings of fact without citing to the record (contrary to the Hearing Committee's instructions), and requested dismissal of all charges.

In August 2021, the Hearing Committee issued its report and recommendation, finding that Disciplinary Counsel had proved each of the charged rule violations by clear and convincing evidence. The Hearing Committee also found the testimonies of Ms. Roberts and Ms. Correia to be credible, but determined that Mr. Chapman's testimony lacked credibility. The Hearing Committee recommended a 90-day suspension.

After the Hearing Committee submitted its report to the Board, the parties had 10 days to take exceptions to its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Disciplinary Counsel timely indicated that it had no exceptions; however, Mr. Chapman never filed anything with the Board. With no exceptions to consider, the Board issued a two-page report and recommendation adopting the Committee's report in full after determining that it was supported by substantial evidence in the record. We now consider the Board's report and recommendation.3

III. The Disciplinary Process

Before beginning our analysis, we summarize the typical process for attorney discipline. When the Office of Disciplinary Counsel receives a complaint regarding a District-barred attorney's conduct, it opens an investigation. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 8(a). Depending on the results of the investigation, Disciplinary Counsel may choose to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against the respondent attorney by filing a petition with the Executive Attorney of the Board and delivering a specification of charges to the respondent. Id. § 8(b)-(c). If disciplinary proceedings are initiated, the respondent must respond within 20 days or risk defaulting on the charges. Id. § 8(e)-(f). Disciplinary Counsel and the respondent then present their evidence and arguments before a Hearing Committee. See id. § 8(i). Within 120 days of the hearing's conclusion, the Hearing Committee submits its report and recommendation to the Board on Professional Responsibility. Id. § 9(a).

Once the Board receives the Hearing Committee's report and recommendation, the parties have 10 days to file exceptions to the report. Id. § 9(b); Board Pro. Resp.

R. 13.3. If exceptions are filed, the Board will schedule the matter for briefing and oral argument. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(b); Board Pro. Resp. R. 13.4. If no exceptions are filed, "the rights of the parties to brief and argue before the Board shall be waived, and the Board shall take action based on the record." Board Pro. Resp. R. 13.5; see D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(b) ("If no exceptions are filed, the Board shall decide the matter on the basis of the Hearing Committee record.").

"When reviewing the findings of a Hearing Committee, the Board shall employ [a] ‘substantial evidence on the record as a whole’ test." Board Pro. Resp. R. 13.7. At the conclusion of its review, the Board will adopt or modify the Hearing Committee's report, remand the matter to the Hearing Committee for further proceedings, "direct Disciplinary Counsel to issue an informal admonition, or dismiss the petition." D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(c); see Board Pro. Resp. R. 13.7. Unless the Board dismisses or remands the case, or unless the matter concludes in a reprimand or admonition, the Board will issue its own report and recommendation and submit it to this court. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(d).

After the Board's report and recommendation is submitted to the court, the parties have 20 days to file exceptions. Id. § 9(e). The court will then schedule the matter for...

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