In re Chastain

• Docket Number: COA22-649
• Decision Date: 20 June 2023
• Citation: 889 S.E.2d 462
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: Patricia Burnette CHASTAIN
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

889 S.E.2d 462

In the MATTER OF: Patricia Burnette CHASTAIN

No. COA22-649

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed June 20, 2023

Zaytoun Ballew & Taylor, PLLC, by Matthew D. Ballew, Raleigh, Robert E. Zaytoun, Raleigh, and Claire F. Kurdys, for Respondent-Appellant.

Fox Rothschild LLP, by Kip D. Nelson, Greensboro, and Elizabeth Brooks Scherer, Raleigh, and Davis, Sturges & Tomlinson, PLLC, by Conrad B. Sturges, III, Louisburg, for Affiant-Appellee.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

RespondentPatricia Burnette Chastain appeals from an order permanently disqualifying her from serving in the Office of Clerk of Superior Court of Franklin County.This is Respondent's second appeal in this matter.Our Court addressed Respondent's first appeal in In re Chastain , 281 N.C. App. 520, 869 S.E.2d 738(2022)(" Chastain I "), and remanded the matter for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

In this appeal, we address Respondent's contention the trial court erred in its application of the appropriate standard for disqualification for office under Article VI of the North Carolina Constitution.Upon review of the trial court's application of the standard, together with Respondent's conduct, we hold the trial court properly disqualified Respondent from office as her conduct in office amounted to nothing less than corruption or malpractice.

I.Factual and Procedural Background

In 2014, Respondent was elected to serve as Franklin County Clerk of Superior Court.She was reelected to a second term in 2018.In July 2020, Affiant Jeffrey Thompson commenced this proceeding, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-105, seeking removal of Respondent from office.Upon motion by Respondent and a subsequent hearing on the matter on 10 September 2020, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge of Franklin County, Judge Dunlow, was recused by Judge J. Stanley Carmical.Accordingly, on 28 September 2020, Judge Thomas H. Lock, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge of Johnston County, presided over the removal hearing, which concluded on 30 September 2020.Following the hearing, on 16 October 2020, Judge Lock issued an order ("2020 Order") permanently removing Respondent from serving in the office of Clerk of Superior Court of Franklin County.On 4 May 2020, Respondent appealed the 2020 Order to this Court.On 1 February 2022, for reasons further explained in Chastain I , our Court vacated the 2020 Order and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with that panel's opinion.

Upon remand, Judge Lock again presided over the matter which came on for hearing on 16 March 2022.On 5 April 2022, Judge Lock entered an order ("2022 Order") permanently disqualifying Respondent from serving in the Office of Clerk of Superior Court of Franklin County in accordance with Article VI of the North Carolina Constitution.On 4 May 2022, Respondent filed notice of appeal from the 2022 Order.

II.Standard of Review

Upon removal proceedings against a clerk of superior court, the affiant bringing the charges must prove grounds for removal exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.In re Cline , 230 N.C. App. 11, 20–21, 749 S.E.2d 91, 98(2013).As such, we review the trial court's findings of fact, of which Respondent challenges, to determine whether they are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and in turn, whether those findings support its conclusions of law.State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294(2008)(internal marks and citations omitted).Challenged findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence.Morrison v. Burlington Industries , 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463(1981).Likewise, findings of fact which remain unchallenged are also binding on appeal.Koufman v. Koufman,330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731(1991).We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo.State v. Biber , 365 N.C. 162, 171, 712 S.E.2d 874, 880(2011).

III.Analysis

Respondent contends the trial court erred in permanently disqualifying and removing her from serving in the Office of Clerk of Superior Court of Franklin County, as it failed to properly apply the standard for disqualification under Article VI of the North Carolina Constitution.

At the outset, we recognize this Court is bound by our Court's previous decision in Chastain I .In re Civil Penalty,324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37(1989)("Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same [C]ourt is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher [C]ourt.");see alsoState v. Jones , 358 N.C. 473, 487, 598 S.E.2d 125, 133(2004)("While we recognize that a panel of the Court of Appeals may disagree with, or even find error in, an opinion by a prior panel and may duly note its disagreement or point out that error in its opinion, the panel is bound by that prior decision until it is overturned by a higher [C]ourt.").Thus, we analyze Respondent's contentions in accordance with our Court's opinion in Chastain I .

A.The Standard

Our Court's decision in Chastain I analyzed two constitutional avenues under which a superior court clerk of a county in North Carolina may be removed—Article IV and Article VI of our State Constitution.SeeChastain , 281 N.C. App. at 524, 869 S.E.2d at 742.Article IV, section 17, authorizes the removal of a superior court clerk who engages in misconduct.Id. at 523, 869 S.E.2d at 741(citingN.C. Const. art. IV, § 17 (4)).Alternatively, Article VI, section 8, authorizes the removal of a superior court clerk "as a consequence of being disqualified from holding any office under Article VI where she is ‘adjudged guilty of corruption or malpractice in any office.’ "Id. at 524–25, 869 S.E.2d at 742(quotingN.C. Const. art. VI § 8 )(emphasis omitted).

After addressing both avenues for removal, the Court held "the Article IV avenue could not serve as the basis for Judge Lock's decision to remove [Respondent] from office," as our Constitution conferred jurisdiction to consider Respondent's removal, under Article IV, only upon the Senior Regular Resident Superior Court Judge, Judge Dunlow.Id. at 524, 869 S.E.2d at 742.Additionally, our Court held Respondent could be properly removed by Judge Lock, under Article VI, if Judge Lock were to find her conduct in office met the corruption or malpractice standard supplied by Article VI, section 8, of our State Constitution because, "unlike Article IV, Article VI does not specify any procedure or confer authority on any particular judge or body to make disqualification determinations[.]"Id. at 525, 869 S.E.2d at 742.

Our Court had not considered the removal of a clerk of superior court before Chastain I .Thus, the Court relied on precedent concerning the removal of other elected officials, primarily judges, and defined this corruption or malpractice standard to include, at a minimum, "acts of willful misconduct which are egregious in nature[.]"Id. at 528, 869 S.E.2d at 745.

The prior panel of this Court held willful misconduct requires more than just intent to commit an offense, but rather purpose and design in doing so.Id.( citingState v. Stephenson , 218 N.C. 258, 264, 10 S.E.2d 819, 823(1940) ).Similarly, this Court found willful misconduct in office to be more than an error in judgment or a mere lack of diligence.Id. at 528, 869 S.E.2d at 744(citingIn re Martin,302 N.C. 299, 316, 275 S.E.2d 412, 421(1981)(internal marks and citations omitted)).Instead, willful misconduct may, but is not required to, encompass conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption.Id.The Court reiterated that where a judge knowingly and willfully persists in misconduct of which the judge knows, or should know, to be acts of willful misconduct in office "and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute, he should be removed from office."Id.(quotingIn re Martin , 302 N.C. at 316, 275 S.E.2d at 421 );see alsoIn re Hunt , 308 N.C. 328, 338, 302 S.E.2d 235, 240(1983)("[C]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, if knowingly and persistently repeated, would itself rise to the level of willful misconduct in office, which is a constitutional ground for impeachment and disqualification for public office."(citingIn re Peoples , 296 N.C. 109, 157–58, 250 S.E. 2d 890, 918(1978) )).

This Court set a framework for what constitutes willful misconduct, defining the standard to include only acts of willful misconduct which are egregious in nature.Chastain,281 N.C. App. at 528, 869 S.E.2d at 745.We understand egregious acts to be those that are extremely or remarkably bad.Egregious , Black's Law Dictionary 652 (11th ed. 2019).In tailoring its definition, the Court relied heavily upon our Supreme Court's decision in In re Peoples —even so far as to say a respondent's actions would meet the standard if said acts of willful misconduct were, at a minimum, as egregious as those in Peoples .Chastain , 281 N.C. App. at 528, 869 S.E.2d at 744;see alsoIn re Peoples,296 N.C. at 156–57, 250 S.E.2d at 917–18.¹

The Court in Chastain I established this general definition of the corruption or malpractice standard.However, the application of the standard, as to the disqualification and consequential removal of clerks, has yet to be addressed.This is the task before this Court.We look to precedent addressing the application of the standard as to other elected officials, while recognizing the conduct which amounts to corruption or malpractice will necessarily differ based on the elected office held by the respondent.

B.Application of the Standard

Respondent contends the trial court erred in applying the corruption or malpractice standard defined by our Court in Chastain I .Specifically, Respondent argues her conduct did not rise to meet the standard and the trial court only concluded otherwise because...