In re Chavez

Citation134 Cal.Rptr.2d 54,68 P.3d 347,30 Cal.4th 643
Decision Date15 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. S099172.,S099172.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
PartiesIn re Esteban Noe CHAVEZ, On Habeas Corpus.

David K. Rankin, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Esteban Noe Chavez.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert Anderson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Garty W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Steven T. Oetting, Raquel M. Gonzalez and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People.

GEORGE, C.J.

When a defendant has pleaded guilty or no contest (nolo contendere) to a criminal charge, the defendant may not appeal the judgment of conviction on issues "going to the legality of the proceedings" unless, within 60 days of rendition of the judgment, he or she files with the trial court a written statement executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds for appeal and, within 20 days after that filing, the trial court executes and files a certificate of probable cause for appeal. (Pen.Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d).)1 The issue in this case is whether relief from default is available when a defendant fails to timely file the statement of reasonable grounds for appeal required in order to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

In the Court of Appeal, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his statement of reasonable grounds for appeal should be deemed timely filed under the common law doctrine recognizing the "constructive filing" of an appeal. Instead, the Court of Appeal applied rule 45(e) to relieve defendant from the default occasioned by his failure to timely file the statement of reasonable grounds, based upon his demonstration of good cause, and granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

In this court, the Attorney General asserts that defendant was not entitled to file his belated appeal under either the theory of constructive filing or the provision for relief from default. We conclude that (1) rule 45(e) does not authorize the Court of Appeal to relieve a defendant from default resulting from his or her failure to timely file a statement of reasonable grounds for appeal, and thus we need not determine whether defendant established good cause for relief from default; and (2) the doctrine of constructive filing of an appeal is inapplicable in the circumstances of the present case. Defendant's statement of reasonable grounds for appeal not having been timely filed, we conclude that the judgment granting defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be reversed.

I

In January 1999, following the discovery by police officers of more than 30 grams of heroin inside his vehicle, defendant was arrested and charged by information with possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351) and transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). It was alleged that defendant possessed for sale in excess of 14.25 grams of a substance containing heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352.5, subd. (1)), that he was ineligible for probation (§ 1203.07, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had suffered a prior felony conviction (§§ 192, subd. (a), 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)(1)).

On October 13, 1999, on the eve of trial and while represented by Attorney Ruben Salgado, defendant entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to all charges on the condition that he would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no more than eight years. The terms of the plea agreement provided that defendant was relinquishing his right to challenge on appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5.

On January 28, 2000, represented by newly substituted Attorney Robert Weinburg, defendant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty on the ground that at the time of his plea, he had not been made aware that the prosecution at trial would have to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the heroin for sale. On February 25, 2000, the trial court denied the motion and, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to a term of eight years in prison, consisting of twice the midterm of four years on the count of transportation of a controlled substance. The trial court stayed imposition of sentence on the other count of possession for sale of a controlled substance.

Defendant did not request that either attorney file a notice of appeal or a statement of reasonable grounds for appeal during the time between the date of the guilty plea and the date of the sentencing hearing. Several days following the sentencing hearing, defendant's family members urged to him to retain other counsel. On his behalf, defendant's aunt contacted Attorney Michael Garey. On March 6, 2000, Attorney Garey visited defendant in prison. Garey agreed to review defendant's file to determine whether to represent defendant on appeal, but did not agree to represent defendant in an appeal or to file any documents on his behalf. On April 24, 2000, one day prior to the expiration of the 60-day period in which to file a statement of reasonable grounds for appeal, Attorney Garey informed defendant's aunt that Garey did not believe adequate grounds existed to appeal from the judgment, and he declined to represent defendant.

On May 26, 2000, defendant forwarded to the California Appellate Project a motion to file a "belated notice of appeal." Defendant explained that in prison his receipt of mail was delayed up to three weeks, that he had not been permitted to use a telephone, and that only recently had he been advised in correspondence from his family that Attorney Garey had declined to represent him on appeal. On June 5, 2000, the California Appellate Project forwarded defendant's motion to Appellate Defenders, Inc.

On October 25, 2000, with the assistance of Appellate Defenders, Inc., defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal. Defendant alleged that he had failed to timely file the statement of reasonable grounds for appeal because of the conduct of Attorney Garey, and that, therefore, pursuant to the doctrine of constructive filing, defendant's statement of reasonable grounds should be deemed timely filed. The Court of Appeal determined instead that defendant, having shown good cause, was entitled to relief from default under rule 45(e), and granted the relief sought. The Attorney General petitioned this court for review. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

II
A

In order to place our discussion in context, we note the distinction between an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a plea of not guilty and trial, and an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a plea of guilty or no contest. When a defendant pleads not guilty and is convicted as the result of a trial, in general any issue bearing on the determination of guilt and apparent from the record is cognizable on appeal. (See § 1237.) By contrast, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest and is convicted without a trial, only limited issues are cognizable on appeal. A guilty plea admits every element of the charged offense and constitutes a conviction People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1177-1178, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 899 P.2d 896 (Hoffard); People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 281, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228), and consequently issues that concern the determination of guilt or innocence are not cognizable. (Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1178, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 899 P.2d 896; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63, 92 Cal.Rptr. 692, 480 P.2d 308 (Ribero).) Instead, appellate review is limited to issues that concern the "jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings, including the constitutional validity of the plea." (Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1178, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 899 P.2d 896; see People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409, 559 P.2d 1028; Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63, 92 Cal.Rptr. 692, 480 P.2d 308.)2

These distinctions between an appeal from a final judgment of conviction following a plea of not guilty and trial, and an appeal from a final judgment of conviction following a plea of guilty or no contest, are reflected in distinct but analogous statutes and related rules of court defining the procedure applicable to the taking of each type of appeal.

In the case of a judgment of conviction following a plea of not guilty and trial, section 1237, subdivision (a), generally authorizes an appeal without imposing any limitations on subject matter. Rule 31(a) sets forth the means to appeal, as well as the deadline—filing a notice of appeal in the superior court within 60 days after rendition of the judgment of conviction. (See § 1239, subd. (a).)

As we recently explained in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 301, 969 P.2d 146 (Mendez), the sole required procedural step of filing a notice of appeal is critical to rendering the appeal operative following a judgment of conviction. In general, a timely notice of appeal is "`essential to appellate jurisdiction.' (6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Appeal, § 3220, p. 3979.) It largely divests the superior court of jurisdiction and vests it in the Court of Appeal. (Id., §§ 3135-3136, pp. 3874-3876.) An untimely notice of appeal is `wholly ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss the appeal on motion of a party or on its own motion.' (Id., § 3220, p. 3979.) The purpose of the requirement of a timely notice of appeal is, self-evidently, to further the finality of judgments by causing the defendant to take an appeal expeditiously or not at all." (Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1094, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 969...

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