In re Christina M.
| Decision Date | 02 August 2005 |
| Citation | 877 A.2d 941,90 Conn. App. 565 |
| Parties | IN RE CHRISTINA M. ET AL.[*] |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Bishop, DiPentima and Peters, Js.
Raymond J. Rigat, for the appellant (respondent father).
Cheryl A. Juniewic, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Paula D. Sullivan, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
David T. Stone, for the minor children.
Cases involving the termination of parental rights are always difficult. This case highlights that difficulty because, as the trial court found, "the children love their parents and . . . the parents love the children." It also found, however, that "unfortunately, [the] mother and father cannot or will not make the changes necessary to provide the consistent, nurturing, responsible care that [their daughters] need." Accordingly, the court sought the proper balance between the parents' constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody and control of their children, and the interest of the state, acting as parens patriae, to protect the children's health and safety. It concluded that, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j),1 the state had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that each parent "had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." The court rendered judgment terminating parental rights, and each parent has appealed.2 We affirm the judgments of the court.
The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), initiated the present proceedings on October 15, 2002, when she filed petitions for the termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent father with respect to each of their three daughters. Each petition recited the undisputed fact that, in earlier proceedings, the parents had been found to have neglected each daughter. Each petition then alleged that, despite reasonable efforts to reunite each daughter with her parents, the parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Accordingly, each petition requested the court to terminate the parental rights of both parents pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii). After the appointment of separate counsel for the mother, the father and the daughters, and after a three-day evidentiary hearing, the court found that the commissioner had proven her allegations and rendered judgments of termination anticipating the adoption of the daughters.
In their appeals from the judgments terminating their parental rights, the parents have raised three issues for us to consider. First, as a matter of fact, both parents challenge the validity of the court's findings that the commissioner had presented clear and convincing evidence to establish, in accordance with § 17a-112 (j), that, despite efforts by the department of children and families (department) to improve the parents' ability to provide proper care for their daughters, the parents had not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. Second, as a matter of law, both parents fault the court for having failed to appoint, on its own initiative, not only a lawyer to represent the children's legal rights but also a guardian ad litem to represent their best interests. Finally, as a matter of law, the father also claims that, to protect the procedural due process rights of economically disadvantaged parents, article first, §§ 8 and 10, of our state constitution must be construed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the grounds for termination of parental rights. We disagree with each of these claims.
The centerpiece of the parents' appeals is their contention that, in the adjudicative phase of the termination proceedings,3 the court improperly found that the commissioner had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be in the best interests of their three daughters to terminate the parental rights of their parents. Specifically, the parents claim that the court improperly found that (1) the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify their family and (2) each parent had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation. Significantly, they do not question the accuracy of the facts recited by the court. They argue instead that the court's findings with respect to their parenting skills were ill-founded because the court failed to take into account the extent to which their poverty impaired their ability to conform to departmental expectations of appropriate parental behavior. We are not persuaded.
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) sets forth the requirements for termination of parental rights that apply to parents who already have lost their custodial rights with respect to their children. In particular, § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii) requires that a court find that: (1) the children are neglected; (2) they have been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months; (3) the parents "have been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child[ren] to the parent[s] pursuant to section 46b-129"; and (4) the parents have "failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age[s] and needs of the child[ren], such parent[s] could assume a responsible position in the [lives] of the child[ren] . . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112 (j).
The court described the undisputed circumstances that led to the commissioner's initial appointment as the legal custodian of the parents' three daughters. In January, 2000, the two older daughters were taken into the custody of the commissioner as a result of concerns about their safety arising out a domestic violence incident between the mother and the father that led to the father's arrest. Because of this violence and a perceived deficiency in the parenting skills of the mother and the father, on July 12, 2000, these daughters were adjudicated neglected and committed to the commissioner.
On January 26, 2001, the older daughters were reunified with their parents and their newly born sister. Both before and after the reunification, the department provided family reunification services that were intended to help the parents improve their parenting skills. The father successfully completed an anger management program. At that time, there were no concerns about substance abuse4 or physical abuse, although the department was troubled by household disarray that, in its opinion, raised safety issues.
Reunification came to an end, however, when the department received a new report that the mother and the father had struck each other and their daughters. As a result, the commissioner obtained custody of the three daughters on October 3, 2001. The daughters have never again been united with their parents.
The court also described the factual basis of its finding that the commissioner had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the department had satisfied the requirement of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii) to take "specific steps . . . to facilitate the return of the child[ren] to the parent[s] . . . ." Family reunification is an important social objective. As our Supreme Court recently has reminded us: "[A]n important goal of the child protection statutes, in addition to protecting children from abuse and neglect, is to preserve family integrity by . . . teaching parents the skills they need to nurture and care for their children." Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 754, 865 A.2d 428 (2005).
The court's findings describe a variety of reunification programs that the department offered to the parents to enable them to improve their parenting skills so that they might regain their right to care for their daughters. The parents do not deny that the department engaged the services of numerous professionals, including a clinical psychologist, a parent aide program conducted by United Services, Inc., and supervised visitation programs conducted by EastConn Family Visitation Center and Lighthouse Family Services, Inc. Although the parents attended all the meetings scheduled by the clinical psychologist, the court faulted them for having been less conscientious in participating in other programmatic services, even though some of these sessions were scheduled at their home.5 They did not accept offers of transportation to other program venues. On occasion, the father gave vent to his frustration by angry, threatening behavior directed at the service providers.
In its third set of findings, the court described the factual background of its finding that the commissioner had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents had failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii). The court's crucial finding with respect to this issue was that, despite the parents' acknowledged love for their daughters, they "lacked the parenting skills and overall competence to care for the girls on a full time basis."
The court based its finding on numerous reports that the parents' inability to set goals and priorities had an adverse impact on their efforts to provide a safe family home for their daughters. The court cited evidence of inappropriate nutritional decisions and of the father's distaste for academic pursuits. The court was concerned that the parents did not recognize the risk posed to their daughters by the presence of a paternal grandfather who was a convicted and registered sex offender. The court relied on the conclusions of three different service providers that the parents were unable to provide a safe home for their daughters. Significantly, the clinical psychologist,...
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2005 Connecticut Appellate Review
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