In re Christopher K.
| Decision Date | 15 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 98597.,98597. |
| Parties | In re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Annette Collins, Ashley Romito, Veronica Calderon Malavia and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Cathryn S. Crawford, and Thomas F. Geraghty, Chicago, and Richard Lindstrom, Haley Stein, Jennifer Lupfer, Jennifer Bruni, Tiffany Fobes, Alejandro Ponce de Leon, Christopher Stanton, Guy
Temple, Alfred Wang and Andrew Whiteup, law students, for Appellee.
Marsha L. Levick and Nina W. Chernoff, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for amici curiae Juvenile Law Center et al.
After a jury trial, respondent, Christopher K., was adjudicated delinquent for the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998)). The trial court imposed both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ) statute of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)). The appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction, but reversed his adult sentence. 348 Ill. App.3d 130, 154, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. The main issue before this court is whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a motion to prosecute a juvenile as an adult under section 5-805(3) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). We hold it does not and reverse the appellate court's modification of respondent's sentence. We also affirm respondent's conviction. In doing so, we hold the trial court did not err in determining respondent did not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel.
On January 23, 1999, 16-year-old Willie Lomax was shot and killed. Soon thereafter, respondent, who at the time was 14 years old, was arrested and taken into custody for the shooting. With his mother present, he was questioned by two Chicago Police Department detectives. Ultimately, respondent provided oral and court-reported statements admitting his involvement in the shooting.1
On February 1, 1999, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship charging respondent with first-degree murder. The State also filed a motion to prosecute respondent as an adult pursuant to section 5-805(3) of the Juvenile Court Act, which gives a juvenile court discretion to permit the prosecution of a minor under the state's criminal laws (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). This procedure is known as a discretionary transfer of jurisdiction (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). After a hearing, the trial court denied the State's discretionary transfer motion, and the State appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the State's motion. In re Christopher K., No. 1-99-3175, 318 Ill. App.3d 1218, 273 Ill.Dec. 759, 789 N.E.2d 933 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Initially, it rejected the State's contention that respondent was engaged in "adult activities" to such an extent that his behavior warranted transfer. The appellate court then reasoned that the trial court considered all the appropriate statutory factors in ruling on the State's motion. According to the appellate court, the trial court correctly gave the seriousness of the alleged crime and respondent's history of delinquency the most weight. The former factor weighed against respondent, because first degree murder is a serious crime, but the latter factor weighed in his favor, because he had only one prior station adjustment. The remaining six factors enumerated in the discretionary transfer statute were "equally split." Respondent's culpability, premeditated actions, and use of a deadly weapon all weighed against him, but his age, his willingness to participate meaningfully in available services, and the adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile system all weighed in respondent's favor. The appellate court concluded that the record supported the trial court's findings with respect to each statutory factor. Therefore, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion. In re Christopher K., No. 1-99-3175.
After the appellate court issued its mandate, respondent moved to quash his arrest for lack of probable cause, and to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Respondent also moved separately to suppress the statements he made to the police while in custody. The trial court denied both motions.
On June 20, 2001, the State filed a motion to designate respondent's case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)). When a juvenile court designates a case as an EJJ prosecution, the minor subject to the EJJ prosecution is entitled to a jury trial. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(3) (West 1998). If the trial results in a guilty verdict, the trial court must impose a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence, staying the adult sentence on the condition that the minor not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4) (West 1998). The trial court granted the State's EJJ motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, the jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder. Therefore, in accordance with section 5-810, the trial court committed respondent to the Illinois Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West 1998)) and imposed an adult sentence of 40 years' imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1998)), staying the latter on the condition respondent successfully complete his juvenile sentence.
Respondent appealed both his conviction and sentence. 348 Ill.App.3d at 154, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. With respect to the sentence, the appellate court found the trial court erred in designating respondent's case as an EJJ prosecution and, accordingly, in imposing a stayed adult sentence. 348 Ill.App.3d at 154, 284 Ill. Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. Specifically, the appellate court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the application of section 5-810 to respondent's case. 348 Ill. App.3d at 140, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. The court reasoned that the State's EJJ motion was directed toward the same "ultimate issue" as the State's discretionary transfer motion, which the trial court denied, and which was affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill.App.3d at 140, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. Therefore, the appellate court reversed respondent's adult sentence. 348 Ill.App.3d at 154, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. In addition, based on its interpretation of section 5-805 and section 5-810, the appellate court held the legislature intended discretionary transfer motions and EJJ motions to be filed simultaneously. 348 Ill.App.3d at 142, 284 Ill. Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. The appellate court rejected respondent's claims that section 5-810 violates the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (348 Ill.App.3d at 142-43, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145), and is unconstitutionally vague (348 Ill.App.3d at 143-47, 284 Ill. Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145).
With respect to respondent's conviction, the appellate court held the trial court did not err in denying respondent's motion to suppress his statements to the police. 348 Ill.App.3d at 151-53, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. The appellate court also upheld the trial court's denial of respondent's motion to quash his arrest and suppress related evidence. 348 Ill.App.3d at 153, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction. 348 Ill.App.3d at 154, 284 Ill.Dec. 492, 810 N.E.2d 145.
The State filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. We allowed the State's petition (177 Ill.2d R. 315) to address whether the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of a discretionary transfer motion. We also permitted The Juvenile Law Center and a number of other organizations concerned with the welfare of minors to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent (155 Ill.2d R. 345).
Prior to oral argument, the State filed a motion to dismiss certain issues respondent raised on cross-appeal as moot. We ordered the State's motion to be taken with the case. As a preliminary matter, we address this motion.
The issues on cross-appeal fall into three categories. First, respondent claims section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague. He argues the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it fails to provide adequate notice to a minor as to what acts violate the "conditions" (705 ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 1998)) of the minor's juvenile sentence for purposes of lifting the stay on the minor's adult sentence. He also argues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement of a minor's adult sentence by failing to specify what acts violate the "conditions" of the minor's juvenile sentence. In addition, respondent argues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the trial court did not specifically identify the "conditions" attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby failing to provide him with adequate notice as to what acts could trigger his stayed adult sentence. Respondent also argues the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the trial court did not specifically identify the "conditions" attached to his juvenile sentence,...
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