In re Civil Commitment of R.V.
| Decision Date | 02 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-2929-17T2 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF R.V. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Simonelli and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. 20018.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant R.V. (Christina Lewis, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Alexandria S. Correa, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Robert E. Barry, Union County Counsel, attorney for respondent County of Union (Kevin G. Campbell, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).
R.V. appeals from a February 22, 2018 order that continued his involuntary commitment to Trinitas Regional Medical Center. R.V. is no longer involuntarily committed,1 but the matter is not moot because the February 22, 2018 order may be considered in a future commitment hearing, which implicates R.V.'s constitutional liberty. See In re Commitment of T.J., 401 N.J. Super. 111, 118 (App. Div. 2008). Further, R.V. is liable for the cost of the confinement that ensued as a result of the February 22, 2018 order. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-60(c)(1). If R.V. should not have been confined, he will be entitled to a credit. See In In re Commitment of B.L., 346 N.J. Super. 285, 292 (App. Div. 2002).
After reviewing the record and applicable legal principles, we reverse.
The salient facts are these. On February 12, 2018, the court entered a temporary order for R.V.'s involuntary commitment for inpatient treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(m). A hearing to review his continued eligibility for involuntary commitment was held on February 22, 2018. At that hearing two witnesses testified, M. Awais Sethi, M.D., and R.V.'s mother. Their pertinent testimony was as follows.
Dr. Sethi, who was not qualified as an expert witness, testified R.V. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, for which he had been previously hospitalized before his commitment just a few weeks before. During that priorhospitalization, he received medication and was discharged. Then, approximately one year before he was involuntarily committed in February 2018, R.V. stopped taking his medication and became agitated and aggressive, "destructive of property" in his home, and "very religiously preoccupied."
Sethi observed R.V. after he was hospitalized on February 12, 2018, and found R.V. to be "very easily agitated" and "religiously preoccupied." The doctor stated he "couldn't really follow [R.V.'s] conversation[s] because [R.V.] would say things that didn't make much sense of a religious nature." While hospitalized, R.V. took medication for a short period and his condition improved, but he then refused to take medication and the noted improvement "vanished."
The day before Sethi testified, he saw R.V., who at that time claimed he was talking to God. The doctor testified, The doctor acknowledged that he had never seen R.V. harm another or damage property.
The doctor further testified R.V. is a "possible" danger to himself or to others, an opinion the doctor based upon R.V.'s state of mind, events that occurred before R.V.'s hospitalization, his history of mental illness, and the treatment he hasreceived, as set forth in hospital records. The doctor recommended that the court continue R.V.'s commitment for another four weeks, to permit R.V. to be treated with medication and become well enough to be discharged.
R.V.'s mother testified she had not seen R.V. engage in aggressive behavior when he stopped taking his medication, but he did become preoccupied with religion, did not sleep or eat, and talked endlessly. She stated R.V. is "fine" when he takes his medication and could return to her home if he resumed taking it.
After the mother testified, Sethi was recalled as a witness. He indicated he heard the mother testify and he stated her testimony supported his opinion R.V. was not able to function safely in the community, because "he just reads the Bible and walks around, doesn't eat, doesn't drink." Sethi repeated that if R.V. took his medication, he could be discharged from the hospital.
At the conclusion of Sethi's testimony, the court did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law, as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). The court merely ordered that R.V.'s involuntary commitment continue another two weeks, and scheduled a review hearing for March 8, 2018. The record does not reveal what occurred at the March 8, 2018 hearing. In his brief, R.V. mentions he was transferred to a long-term locked institution and subsequently discharged, but he does not state when suchadmission occurred and if it was related to the involuntary commitment that commenced in February 2018.
On appeal, R.V. asserts an array of arguments. They include that Sethi was not qualified as an expert witness during the February 22, 2018 hearing, and that his opinion R.V. was a danger to himself and others was based upon only a possibility, an opinion that falls far short of the requirement the State prove by clear and convincing evidence a party has a mental illness and that it causes him to be dangerous to themselves, others, or property.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15(a) authorizes a court to continue an individual's involuntary commitment past a temporary commitment order as long as "the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the patient needs continued involuntary commitment to treatment . . . ." The statute defines "in need of involuntary commitment to treatment" as "an adult with mental illness, whose mental illness causes the person to be dangerous to self or dangerous to others or property and who is unwilling to accept appropriate treatment voluntarily after it has been offered . . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(m).
"Dangerous to self" is defined as:
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