In re Clark
Decision Date | 27 May 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 35543.,35543. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Kenneth V. CLARK v. Mary Ann CLARK. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mary Ann Clark, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
SHELDON, KELLER and HARPER, Js.
The self-represented defendant, Mary Ann Clark, appeals from several decisions rendered by the trial court during postdissolution proceedings.1 The defendant claims that the trial court erred in (1) appointing a new guardian ad litem for the two minor children of the marriage and ordering the parties to equally share in paying the fees owed to the prior guardian ad litem; (2) modifying prior postdissolution orders delineating how and when the plaintiff, Kenneth V. Clark, is permitted access to the health and academic records of the parties' children; (3) “forc[ing]” her to sign written authorizations affording the plaintiff access to medical and educational material related to the children; and (4) vacating what the defendant claims was an automatically stayed access order pending her appeal. 2 We dismiss the appeal as it relates to the first claim raised by the defendant and, with regard to the remaining claims raised by the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The parties were divorced on August 18, 2009, but various disputes have continued, unabated, involving the filing of hundreds of postjudgment motions and eight appeals.3 This court's decision in Clark v. Clark, 127 Conn.App. 148, 150–51, 13 A.3d 682, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 914, 19 A.3d 1260 (2011), sets forth some of the facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal. 4 (Footnotes omitted.)
The dissolution judgment did not afford the plaintiff a right to visitation, but included orders that the plaintiff get copies of all school information, medical information, and information related to the children's activities. The court also ordered that “[a]ny and all parent-teacher conferences, counseling sessions or meetings involving any aspect of the health, education or welfare of either child, information, scheduling or prepared appointments shall be provided by each parent to the other parent,” and that “[b]oth parties may attend such events.” The plaintiff, however, was ordered not to interfere with any of these matters whatsoever. The plaintiff was ordered to begin parent coaching to assist him in parenting the two children. The guardian ad litem was to contact a mental health professional to see if the professional was willing to begin working with the children and the plaintiff toward reunification.5 The decree contemplated that the plaintiff should begin supervised visitation with the children when the mental health professional determined it was appropriate. A gradually increasing schedule of supervised visits was set forth as long as all mental health professionals agreed that it was in the best interests of the children, and, at the end of one year, the parties were ordered to review with the mental health professional future visitation between the children and the plaintiff and determine whether unsupervised and/or overnight visits were in the children's best interests.
On April 4, 2013, the parties appeared before the trial court, Emons, J. The plaintiff was represented by Attorney Kevin Collins and the defendant was self-represented. Also present were Attorney Sandra P. Lax, counsel for the minor children, and Attorney Dori–Ellen Feltman, guardian ad litem for the children. The hearing began with the defendant reporting to the court that the parties and the attorneys were “having meetings,” and that they would report back to the court after they finished.6 The same day, the court resumed the hearing and inquired if anything had been resolved as a result of the meetings between the parties and counsel. Feltman began by advising the court of the need to clarify certain court orders, stating,
Feltman indicated that the plaintiff had not seen the children for quite some time, but she did not believe that there were any court orders in place preventing him from contacting the children in any way. She then mentioned a court order from Judge Shay, which she indicated was issuedat a time when the older child was applying to boarding schools, that ordered the plaintiff not to contact the school being considered and not to interfere “so that the process in boarding school gets started.” She did not, however, “take that to mean that at the present time, [the plaintiff] doesn't have the right to contact the schools for purposes of checking in on the status of his children or contacting a physician to check in on the status of his children.” 7 Lax, agreeing with Feltman, also indicated a need for clarification. Lax then referred the court to the “sole custody statute,” General Statutes § 46b–56,8 and indicated that it allowed the plaintiff contact for information about the academics, the health and the welfare of the children. Lax stated, “[T]he fact that there's sole custody [in the defendant] cannot and should not preclude the fact that [the plaintiff] can contact to find out how the children are doing.” She then requested that the court “just reiterate the order that sole custody does not preclude the [plaintiff] from getting information pursuant to the statute.” The court responded: “Ordinarily under most sole custody orders it would not preclude them.”
The defendant then indicated to the court that there was no problem with the plaintiff getting information, that she was already providing the plaintiff with information from the schools and health providers, and that there had never been a disruption in his receipt of that information.9When the plaintiff's counsel requested that the defendant, as sole custodian, be ordered to sign release authorizations, the defendant expressed a willingness to sign so that the plaintiff's counsel could contact providers directly, stating, The plaintiff's counsel then responded, “Mr. Clark's call,” to which the defendant replied, “I can also add that to it, but....” The court then indicated, Feltman offered to draft the release authorizations.
The defendant expressed reservations about the order and raised an unrelated concern about the plaintiff's prior access to one former provider that resulted in a payment issue and the ultimate loss of that provider. She also raised an unrelated concern that insurance reimbursements directed to the plaintiff for the children's medical bills were not being forwarded to her, although she had advanced payment to the providers for many of the bills. The court indicated that this issue was not properly before it, but reassured the defendant by making it clear to the plaintiff that he must “do everything with regard to the payments and the billing on the up and up.”
At this point in the proceeding, Feltman informed the court that she had not been officially retained by the parties as guardian ad litem for the children and that there had been no court order with respect to her fees. Although the defendant argued to the court that she did not have the means to pay one half of Feltman's $7500 proposed retainer or her hourly rate of $375, the court ordered the parties to split the retainer equally and pay it no later than May 1, 2013. The court then indicated it would deal with a “report back” at the next short calendar on the issue of permitting the plaintiff contact with the children's providers.
On April 5, 2013, the defendant filed this appeal from the court's orders that she pay one half of Feltman's $7500 retainer fee and that she sign release authorizations allowing the plaintiff to obtain information regarding the children directly from their schools, therapists, and other health care providers.
On April 11, 2013, the parties, the plaintiff's counsel, Feltman and Attorney Louise Truax, on behalf of Lax, the attorney for the minor children, who was unable to be...
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