In re Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1934
• Docket Number: No. 3888.,3888.
• Parties: In Re SOUTHERN PAC. CO.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

38 N.M. 325

32 P.2d 814

In Re SOUTHERN PAC. CO.

No. 3888.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 30, 1934.

Proceeding on the application of the Southern Pacific Company to discontinue Sunday passenger train service on its Dawson branch, wherein the Corporation Commission sought the enforcement of its order requiring the applicant to restore Sunday train service. On removal from the Corporation Commission.

Enforcement of the Commission's order denied.

Order of State Corporation Commission requiring railroad to restore Sunday train service on its branch line held unreasonable, where such service could be afforded only at considerable net loss to railroad and showing of public inconvenience from its discontinuance was not impressive. Comp.St.1929, § 116-401 et seq.; Const. art. 11, § 7.

E. R. Wright, of Santa Fé, and Del W. Harrington, of El Paso, Tex., for Southern Pac. Co.

Frank H. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Corporation Commission.

WATSON, Chief Justice.

The Corporation Commission seeks enforcement of its order requiring the Southern Pacific Company to restore Sunday train service on its branch line from Tucumcari to Dawson.

For a long time the towns on this 132-mile branch had enjoyed daily mixed train service each way. The company discontinued Sunday service for reasons of economy, and citizens of the town of Roy protested.

In its report and order the commission notes that this curtailment of service was effected without the formality of an application to the commission pursuant to 1929 Comp. St. § 116-401 et seq. Whether this fact had any bearing on the result, we are unable to determine. It prompts us to say, however, that the statute mentioned is not applicable to the case.

The railroad presents the proposition that neither Constitution nor statute “gives the corporation commission any power or authority to dictate to the railroads as to train schedules or when they shall operate their trains.” This is an important question of course. The brief of the Attorney General does not touch it. The indicated counter proposition is that such power is embraced within the constitutional duty (article 11, § 7) “to require railway companies to provide and maintain adequate *** facilities. ***” If we were to decide this question, we should desire fuller argument than it has yet had. In view of our conclusion as to the reasonableness of the order, we may avoid decision of the more important law question.

We think it plain from...