In re Coates

Citation318 Or.App. 772,508 P.3d 59
Decision Date06 April 2022
Docket NumberA172767
Parties In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Austin Wayne COATES, Petitioner-Appellant, and Yvonne M. Coates, Respondent-Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon

David R. Auxier, Baker City, argued the cause and filed the reply brief for appellant. Sean M. Jorgensen filed the opening brief. Also on the briefs was Intermountain Law, PC.

James A. Schaeffer argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was James A. Schaeffer, Attorney LLC.

Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and Hellman, Judge, and DeVore, Senior Judge.*

HELLMAN, J.

Husband appeals the trial court's general judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial court's distribution of marital property, award of spousal support to wife backed by a life insurance policy, and award of attorney fees to wife. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making any of those determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the dissolution judgment.

Husband requests that we exercise our discretion to review equitable proceedings de novo , as we have the authority to under ORS 19.415(3)(b). However, because this is not an exceptional case, we decline to exercise that discretion. ORAP 5.40(8)(c). Because we decline husband's request, "we are bound by the trial court's express and implicit factual findings if they are supported by any evidence in the record." Morgan and Morgan , 269 Or. App. 156, 161, 344 P.3d 81, rev. den. , 357 Or. 595, 358 P.3d 1001 (2015). If the trial court did not make express findings, we assume "that the trial court found the facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion." Kotler and Winnett , 282 Or. App. 584, 597, 385 P.3d 1200 (2016).

Because a fuller explanation of this case would not assist the parties, bench, or bar, we limit our discussion of the facts to those needed in our discussion below.

In the absence of a de novo review, we will not disturb a trial court's ultimate determination of what property division is just and proper or what spousal maintenance support award is just and equitable unless the trial court misapplied the statutory and equitable considerations required by ORS 107.105. Van Winkel and Van Winkel , 289 Or. App. 805, 810, 412 P.3d 243, rev. den. , 363 Or. 224, 434 P.3d 24 (2018) ; Mitchell and Mitchell , 271 Or. App. 800, 811, 353 P.3d 28 (2015). The trial court's ultimate determination as to what property division is just and proper in all the circumstances is a matter of discretion. Kunze and Kunze , 337 Or. 122, 136, 92 P.3d 100 (2004). The trial court's ultimate determination as to what spousal support award is just and equitable is also a matter of discretion. Berg and Berg , 250 Or. App. 1, 2, 279 P.3d 286 (2012). Our review of those decisions is for abuse of that discretion. Mitchell , 271 Or. App. at 811, 353 P.3d 28. Our review of the trial court's decision to award wife attorney fees is also for an abuse of discretion. Olson and Olson , 308 Or. App. 633, 634, 480 P.3d 965 (2021).

In his first assignment of error, husband argues that the trial court erred in determining that the North Powder property, a home he inherited during the parties’ marriage, was a marital asset subject to equitable division. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including the North Powder property in its property division for two reasons.

First, husband is correct that property acquired by one spouse through inheritance may not be subject to a presumption of equal contribution if the court finds that the property has been separately held by that party on a continuing basis from the time of receipt. ORS 107.105 (1)(f)(D). Husband, however, bore the burden of persuasion as to whether he had actually separately held that property on a continuing basis. Schwindt and Schwindt , 290 Or. App. 357, 366, 414 P.3d 859, rev. den. , 363 Or. 119, 421 P.3d 353 (2018) ; OEC 305. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial did not compel the trial court to accept husband's characterization of the property; in particular, we note wife's testimony about the parties’ joint use of the property and the intertwined nature of the family finances that were used to maintain and improve the property.

Second, even if husband is correct that the North Powder property was not a marital asset, the trial court still retained the discretion to divide the property equally based on a consideration of what is just and proper under all the circumstances. Id. at 368-69, 414 P.3d 859. In view of all the circumstances of the parties presented at trial, we cannot say that the trial court's inclusion of the property in the division of assets was outside the range of legally permissible outcomes. See Kunze , 337 Or. at 135, 92 P.3d 100 (explaining that the "just and proper" inquiry takes into account various social and financial objectives of dissolution in determining whether the division is equitable).

In his second assignment of error, husband argues that the trial court erred in two additional ways: first, by failing to award husband an equalizing judgment, and second, by also requiring husband to maintain life insurance for wife's benefit. Upon review of the record, however, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in both of those...

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