In re Coburn

Decision Date06 October 1919
Docket NumberNo. 16.,16.
PartiesIn re COBURN et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Kent County; John Vander-Werp, Judge.

Proceeding for the disbarment of Corie C. Coburn and Roman F. Glocheski. An order and decree of disbarment was entered against respondents, and they bring certiorari. Affirmed.

Argued before BIRD, C. J., and MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ. Leon W. Harrington and Harold W. Bryant, both of Grand Rapids, for petitioners.

Smedley & Linsey, of Grand Rapids, for respondents.

STONE, J.

This is a proceeding for the disbarment of Corie C. Coburn and Roman F. Glocheski, who for some years have been members of the bar in the courts of this state. The proceeding was instituted at the instance and on the recommendation of the Grand Rapids Bar Association, and was conducted in the circuit court for the county of Kent. That court appointed two members of the bar as friends of the court, to make, prefer, and prosecute the charges. The petition of the friends of the court is fully set forth in the record. That part which is material here, after stating that the respondents were members of the bar of this state, and practicing attorneys at law and in chancery in the courts thereof, alleges:

That on June 7, 1917, one John Moses, of the city of Grand Rapids, commenced an action by writ of capias ad respondendum for damages for an assault and battery alleged to have been committed on him by Ciorba Mikleuis and Popa Ilis jointly, both of said city, and in said writ the ad damnum clause was the sum of $1,000; that thereupon, and on the same day, said Mikleuis and Ilis were arrested by a deputy sheriff of said county and lodged in the county jail thereof, their bail having been fixed by a circuit judge at the sum of $200 each; that said respondent Glocheski learned of such arrest, through some third party unknown to the petitioners, and visited Mikleuis and Ilis in said jail, and was employed as their attorney in said action; that said respondent then and there discovered that said Ilis had certain currency upon his person, and was also the owner of a large sum of money, to wit, $511, and that said respondent Glocheski thereupon accepted a payment of $10 from said Ilis for legal services to be rendered to said Ilis and Mikleuis, and then and there made an arrangement with the sheriff, whereby a cash deposit of $400 was made with said sheriff in lieu of a bail bond, and thereupon said Ilis and Mikleuis were released from said imprisonment, and accompanied said respondent, who advised them to come to his office on the following morning; that in the forenoon of the following day the respondent Coburn, having been employed to assist the other respondent in said case, and claiming to represent said Ilis and Mikleuis, negotiated a settlement, with the attorney for said Moses, of the said action against said Ilis and Mikleuis and that it was then and there agreed by and between said respondent Coburn and said attorney for said Moses that the sum of $100 should be paid in full settlement of all claims then existing of said Moses against said Ilis and Mikleuis, and that it was as a part of the same consideration also agreed that said action would be dismissed, without costs; that shortly thereafter, and on the same day, said respondent Glocheski called at the office of said attorney for said Moses, paid the said sum of $100, and was then and there given a full and complete release of said cause of action, duly executed by said Moses, and that a stipulation was then and there entered into between said attorney for Moses and said respondent Glocheski, by the terms of which the said action was to be dismissed, without costs; that on said 8th day of June said respondents entered into a joint conference with said Ilis and Mikleuis, and, while acting as their attorneys, assumed to advise said Ilis and Mikleuis of their rights and duties, and to give them legal counsel as to their course of procedure in and about said action, and, while acting as such attorneys, made, in substance, the following false and fraudulent representations to said Ilis and Mikleuis in order to induce them to pay to said respondents the sum of $600:

(a) That said Ilis and Mikleuis were liable on account of said action to be fined by said circuit court the full sum of $1,000, unless they procured and paid to said Glocheski and Coburn the said sum of $600.

(b) That said Ilis and Mikleuis would be immediately imprisoned, unless they paid said sum to said Coburn and Glocheski, and would be obliged to return to jail at once.

(c) That said sum of $600 was necessary in order to prevent said Ilis and Mikleuis from either being fined the full sum of $1,000 or immediately returned to jail.

(d) That they, the said Coburn and Glocheski, were negotiating directly with the said court, and that the said sum of $600 was required by said court to be paid in order that the matter might be settled, and the said Ilis and Mikleuis obtain their freedom. And that said repondents at the same time then and there knowingly, willfully, and fraudulently concealed from said Ilis and Mikleuis the following facts, which were then well known to said respondents:

(a) That the entire matter could be adjusted and settled, and the case dismissed, for the sum of $100.

(b) That the said cause of action had, prior to that time, been compromised, adjusted, and released, and a stipulation for the dismissal thereof, without costs, entered into, all upon payment of the full sum of $100 to the attorney for said Moses.

(c) That the said Ilis and Mikleuis were not liable unless and until, after a trial of the said cause of action, a judgment should be rendered against them either for fines, damages, penalties, or imprisonment.

(d) That the matter was one which was not a necessary or customary subject of negotiation directly with said court, and was such that it could be entirely adjusted with the said Moses and his attorney.

(e) That the said respondents were about to appropriate to themselves $500 of the said $600 so to be paid. That thereupon, and on the same day, the said Ilis and Mikleuis, believing and relying in good faith upon the said representations of said respondents, and in order to be relieved of the supposed necessity of returning to jail or suffering a fine, procured and paid the said sum of $600 to the said respondents, of which said sum of $600, $100 was properly applicable to the settlement and adjustment of said cause of action, and $500 thereof, in breach of their fiduciary relation to their said clients, was by the said respondents wrongfully and fraudulently appropriated to their own use.’

That said Ilis and Mikleuis are Roumanians, and are unfamiliar with the English language, and with the customs and laws of this state and country, and relied wholly upon the advice and counsel given to them by said respondents as their attorneys, and paid said sum of money, believing the said false representations, and the necessity for such payment; that said acts and doings of said respondents constitute gross misconduct upon their part in the practice of the profession of law, for which misconduct both should be disbarred from the practice of said profession in this state, and such disbarment was prayed for.

Upon the filing of such petition, an order was duly entered requiring the respondents to appear and answer, and a certified copy of the petition was duly served upon each of said respondents. Each of the respondents answered said petition, specifically denying all fraud and fraudulent representations charged therein. Both answers admit that in the forenoon of June 8, 1917, it was agreed that the sum of $100 should be paid in full settlement of all claims then existing of said Moses against said Ilis and Mikleuis, which should be in full of all costs, and everything connected with said case, and that on the same day said respondent Glocheski called at the office of the attorney of said Moses and paid the said sum, and that a stipulation was then entered into dismissing said cause. But it was denied that such settlement was agreed upon or made until after said Ilis and Mikleuis had left the offices of respondents, and had gone with respondent Glocheski to secure the funds to pay whatever might be demanded by the attorney for said Moses, ‘provided the same did not exceed the sum of $600.’ The exact time of the settlement was a disputed question.

A lengthy hearing was had upon the issue made and a large amount of testimony was taken. Upon the hearing it appeared that at the first meeting between respondent Glocheski and Mikleuis and Ilis the latter had been directed to bring with them an interpreter at the meeting to be held June 8th at Glocheski's office, and that an interpreter attended and acted as such at that meeting. The right of Ilis and Mikleuis, at the hearing, to testify to what was translated to them through such interpreter, was objected to by respondents, and the ruling...

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3 cases
  • McWhorter, Matter of
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1979
    ...of an attorney's acts prior to and in connection therewith". 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 25(c), p. 767. Cf. In re Coburn, 207 Mich. 350, 361, 174 N.W. 134 (1919). Expansive application of the Jackson rationale also tends to undermine the purpose of investigating occurrences of profession......
  • People v. Chin Sing
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 4, 1926
    ...of his interpretation. People v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 87 N. E. 112;Guan Lee v. U. S., 198 F. 596, 117 C. C. A. 304;Matter of Coburn, 207 Mich. 350, 174 N. W. 134;Commonwealth v. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, 58 N. E. 1021;State v. Noyes, 36 Conn. 80, 4 Am. Rep. 37; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 1......
  • Partch v. Baird
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1925
    ...examine the evidence only to determine whether it justifies the finding of the court as a legitimate inference therefrom.’ In re Coburn, 207 Mich. 350, 174 N. W. 134. The respondent did not allege in her answer nor prove any facts on the hearing from which a legitimate inference could be dr......

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