In re Cockrum, 6:93cv230.
Decision Date | 05 August 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 6:93cv230.,6:93cv230. |
Citation | 867 F. Supp. 484 |
Parties | In re John COCKRUM, Applicant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Alan Bernard Rich and Lawrence Ray Lassiter, Dallas, TX, Jeffrey Dworkin, Austin, TX, for applicant.
John Jacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atty. Gen.'s Office, Austin, TX, for state.
JUSTICE, District Judge.
John Cockrum, the applicant, presents to this court a troubling and unusual, although not unique, case. Cockrum was convicted of capital murder in a Texas court and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction and filed an unsuccessful application for the writ of habeas corpus in the state system. He then filed an application for the Great Writ before this court. Soon after filing that application, however, he decided that he no longer wanted to challenge his conviction and sentence. In the first of many letters to the court, the applicant requested that his application be withdrawn, that he be permitted to dismiss his attorneys, and that the death penalty be imposed swiftly. On July 16, 1993, this court held a hearing to determine how to proceed under these unusual facts, and determined that a full evidentiary hearing should be held to determine the applicant's competency to waive further review of his conviction and sentence. The competency hearing was held on April 11-12, 1994, and continued on July 5-6, 1994. At every stage of the proceedings, the applicant himself was given a full opportunity to question the witnesses and present evidence and testimony on his own behalf, independent of his attorneys.
The appropriate standard for determining competency in this situation requires answering the following questions:
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 398 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 919, 105 S.Ct. 3544, 87 L.Ed.2d 668 (1985); see also Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 1506-07, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam). For the reasons set out below, it is found that Cockrum is not competent to waive further review of his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the merits of his application for the writ of habeas corpus shall be reviewed.
The experts who testified at trial regarding the applicant's competency, under the standard set forth above, based their evaluations on the applicant's history, as well as personal interviews of varying lengths. The applicant's tragic personal history was universally viewed as critical to a determination of his current competency to waive further review. Although some of the details are disputed, the basic outline of his traumatic life is well established. His father was an alcoholic police officer who became violent when intoxicated, physically abusing the applicant, his sisters, and his mother. At a very early age — nine or ten years old — the applicant began using illegal drugs and continued to do so until he was arrested on the charges for which he was ultimately sentenced to death. At the age of fifteen, he allegedly set fire to his school and was confined to a state correctional facility for boys. His family situation did not improve when he returned home at the age of sixteen. When the applicant was seventeen, he shot his father during one of his father's drunken, abusive episodes. A few weeks later, his father died of his wounds. Before he died, the applicant's father told authorities that the shooting was an accident; therefore, the applicant never faced criminal charges arising from the shooting. However, it is clear that the shooting had a profound impact on the applicant. His drug abuse escalated, and he attempted suicide at least twice. He married and had one daughter, but his marriage failed. Eventually, he became addicted to methamphetamines. During one episode of acute methamphetamine intoxication, he allegedly murdered a convenience store clerk during a robbery — the crimes for which he has been sentenced to death.
A total of four mental health experts testified regarding the applicant's competency to waive further review of his conviction and sentence. The first to testify was Richard Pesikoff, M.D., a psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine the applicant and determine the applicant's competency. Dr. Pesikoff diagnosed the applicant as suffering from dysthymia, a persistent, mild depression lasting more than two years. He also stated that the applicant had in the past suffered from drug abuse and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Pesikoff noted that the applicant did not suffer from any additional psychological disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), and has no current suicidal thoughts. George Leventon, M.D., Dr. Pesikoff's associate and fellow psychiatrist, testified to conclusions similar to Dr. Pesikoff's, as embodied in their joint report. Drs. Pesikoff and Leventon also concluded that the applicant's mental condition did not prevent him from understanding his current legal position and options, nor did it prevent him from making a rational choice with respect to whether to waive further review of his conviction and sentence.
The applicant's counsel called two experts regarding the applicant's competency. Faye Sultan, Ph.D. a clinical psychologist, diagnosed the applicant as suffering from dysthymia, post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), and some, but not all, of the symptoms of a delusional thought disorder. Although Dr. Sultan agreed that the applicant was able to understand his position and options, she concluded that he was not able to make a rational choice among those options. Stuart Grassian, M.D., a psychiatrist, also diagnosed Cockrum as suffering from PTSD, and concluded that he is incompetent to terminate his pursuit of legal remedies.
The court also had significant opportunity to directly observe the applicant. The applicant questioned almost every witness presented during the hearings, and also testified twice in his own behalf. He was composed, coherent, courteous, and intelligent. He behaved appropriately in the courtroom, although he displayed almost no emotion throughout the proceedings. While he did not appear extremely alert, his questions and statements showed that he paid close attention to the proceedings.
Regardless of the differing conclusions of the experts respecting the applicant's competency to waive further review under the Rumbaugh standard, they agreed on a wide range of points. First, there was universal agreement that the applicant suffers from at least one mental disease or disorder, namely dysthymia, a chronic mild depression. Although there is much superficial disagreement over whether the applicant suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), the actual area of controversy is a narrow one. All experts agreed that the applicant's fatal shooting of his father was a stressor significant enough to cause PTSD.2 It is undisputed that up until at least the late 1980s, the applicant displayed many of the symptoms of PTSD. Dr. Leventon agreed that the applicant could very well have suffered from PTSD in the past, but disagreed with the other experts' opinions that he suffers from it currently.3 Dr. Pesikoff found no symptoms of PTSD in his interview with the applicant in December of 1993 and, when questioned about possible PTSD in the past, noted that most PTSD patients are cured.4 In contrast, Dr. Sultan noted that the applicant displayed many symptoms of PTSD during her interviews with the applicant in early 1992. In addition, Dr. Grassian expressed a view contrary to that of Dr. Pesikoff, to the effect that PTSD, although treatable, is a lifelong illness, at least for the applicant.5
Resolving such disputes is always difficult for the court, which is not an expert in such matters. However, several factors point to the conclusion that the applicant currently suffers from PTSD. The record clearly reflects ample symptoms before 1990 upon which a diagnosis of PTSD could have been made. The applicant was amnesic about the events, had recurring nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and flashbacks. The applicant reported such symptoms to Dr. Sultan as late as 1992, when she also personally observed other symptoms such as hypervigilance, avoiding thought about the trauma, and restricted affect, e.g., lack of outward signs of a range of emotions.6 One of the symptoms of PTSD — restricted affect — was displayed by the applicant throughout these hearings.7 Other symptoms, such as a strong desire to avoid having his father's life and death discussed, are obvious in the applicant's letters to this court and others.8 Finally, having concluded that the applicant suffered from PTSD in the past, it is highly unlikely that he is now cured, even if such a cure were common, since he has received minimal psychological and no medical/psychiatric treatment for his condition.9 Thus it was proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant suffers from depression and PTSD resulting from his killing of his father.
The experts agree that, despite whatever mental difficulties the applicant has, he is able to understand his situation and the consequences of his actions. These observations comport with the court's observations as well. The applicant understands that failure to pursue habeas corpus relief will result directly in his death; indeed, it is obvious that this is the ultimate...
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