In re Collicott

• Decision Date: 04 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-171.,00-171.
• Parties: In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Myron J. COLLICOTT, an Employee of Rocky Mountain Fiber. Myron J. Collicott, Appellant (Petitioner), v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Appellee (Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

20 P.3d 1077

2001 WY 35

In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Myron J. COLLICOTT, an Employee of Rocky Mountain Fiber.

Myron J. Collicott, Appellant (Petitioner), v. State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Appellee (Respondent).

No. 00-171.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 4, 2001.

Representing Appellant: Mark E. Macy of Macy Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.

Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Myron J. Collicott was denied worker's compensation benefits after the hearing examiner found he had filed an untimely report of injury. Specifically, the hearing examiner determined Mr. Collicott failed to prove the statute of limitations for filing a claim for worker's compensation benefits pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-505 (LEXIS 1999) should be tolled due to mental incompetence. We hold the hearing examiner did not properly utilize the applicable law to determine mental incompetence. We reverse the Order Denying Benefits and remand for reconsideration.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Mr. Collicott presented the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings ruling that the Appellant was not mentally incompetent for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations as provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-505 (1986) was unsupported by substantial evidence and arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the Division) restated the issue as follows:

Did the Hearing Examiner correctly determine that Appellant failed to prove mental incompetence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-505?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On July 7, 1999, Mr. Collicott filed a report of injury with the Division reporting a work-related shoulder injury that occurred almost ten years earlier on October 7, 1989. The Division denied benefits on July 16, 1999, as untimely. On July 19, 1999, Mr. Collicott objected to the Division's determination and requested a hearing in writing. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(k)(v) (LEXIS 1999). Mr. Collicott stipulated that the report of injury was not timely filed but claimed the limitation period was tolled because he was mentally incompetent pursuant to § 27-14-505. A hearing was held on January 13, 2000. The record firmly establishes that Mr. Collicott has long suffered from schizophrenia, initially diagnosed at age thirteen, and has been continually treated for the mental disorder since the initial diagnosis. Mr. Collicott testified that he had received a psychological discharge from the army. He has also been on social security disability since the early 1980s on the basis of his mental disorder. The Social Security Administration considered Mr. Collicott disabled and therefore eligible for social security income after applying the applicable standard which was whether he had the ability to understand, carry out, and remember instructions and to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work pressures in a work setting. However, Mr. Collicott testified he did not have a guardian or a conservator appointed for him and most of the time he was in control of his own finances. The hearing examiner issued the Order Denying Benefits on February 10, 2000, and concluded Mr. Collicott had not met his burden of proving mental incompetence pursuant to § 27-14-505. A petition for review was filed which the district court certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4] An administrative agency's decision certified directly to this court is reviewed under the same appellate standards applicable to the reviewing court of the first instance. Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 8, 19 P.3d 500, at ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001). Our judicial review is limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) which provides in pertinent part:

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

...

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

...

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

The interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are a question of law over which our review authority is plenary. Wesaw, ¶ 8. Conclusions of law made by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo.1996). We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or applying the law. DeLauter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 994 P.2d 934, 936 (Wyo.2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶ 5] Section 27-14-505 is silent as to what comprises mental incompetency sufficient to toll the timely filing requirements. Section 27-14-505 provides:

If an injured employee is mentally in-competent or a minor, or where death results from the injury and any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when any right or privilege accrues under this act, no limitation of time provided for in this act shall run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor has no guardian.

The hearing examiner noted there was no definition of "mentally incompetent" in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act nor were there any cases which interpreted this term. Therefore, this case presents an issue of first impression. As a result of the lack of statutory guidance, the hearing examiner applied the term of a "mentally incompetent person" as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-101(a)(xii) (LEXIS 1999) which is a statute that deals with guardianship and states in pertinent part: "`Mentally incompetent person' means an individual who is unable unassisted to properly manage and take care of himself or his property as the result of mental illness, mental deficiency or mental retardation." The hearing examiner stated that § 3-1-101(a)(xii) "appears to be a reasonable example of what the legislature meant when `mentally incompetent' was used in the worker's compensation statutes." The hearing examiner determined Mr. Collicott failed to establish that he was a person who is "mentally incompetent" pursuant to the definition provided in the guardianship statute. Specifically, the hearing examiner reasoned:

The evidence establishes that Collicott does suffer from schizophrenia, a mental illness which has been diagnosed by Dr. Merrell and other competent professionals. He has been treated for this illness for a number of years and has periodically been hospitalized for the condition. However, there have been extensive periods of time, after the alleged injury date, when Collicott was capable of properly managing and taking care of himself and his property without assistance. Collicott has his own apartment, buys his own food, seeks medical treatment, timely prepared paperwork to retain his SSD benefits and sought various benefits through the VA. Additionally, Collicott went to the workers' compensation office seeking benefits in 1997 and asked about filing a report, but did nothing further. Benefits are, therefore, denied.

[¶ 6] Mr. Collicott claims the legislature did not intend the definition of "mentally incompetent" provided in the guardianship statute to apply in the context of a worker's compensation case or such definition would be explicitly set forth in the definitions in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 (LEXIS 1999). Rather, Mr. Collicott contends the definition of "mentally incompetent" was intended to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. He maintains the adoption of the definition from the guardianship statute in this case was improper and presumes that an incompetent person must be appointed a guardian to manage the person's daily living affairs and finances, unlike the standard used for determining a disability by the Social Security Administration. Consequently, Mr. Collicott contends the hearing examiner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not otherwise in accordance with the law.

[¶ 7] The crux of the issue is whether an individual suffering from a diagnosed mental disorder, and assertedly incapable of following statutory procedures, may claim the statute of limitations is tolled based on his mental incompetence. As a result of the statute's failure to provide a definition of what constitutes mental incompetence, we must discern in what circumstances the legislature intended the filing requirements to be tolled. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo. 1997). Our method of statutory construction has been fully explained:

We read the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole.... If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that construction.

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