In re Collins
| Decision Date | 02 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 591,591 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF BERNARD COLLINS |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT - - RELEASE OF CLAIM - - DEATH BENEFITS.
Bernard Collins suffered a work related occupational disease for which he filed a claim for workers' compensation with the Workers' Compensation Commission. His employer and its insurers contested the claim. Eventually the claim was settled by means of an agreement for immediate payment of disability benefits and long-term payment of certain medical expenses. The agreement included a Release. Peggy Collins, Mr. Collins's wife, was not a party to his claim and did not sign the Release.
Two years later Mr. Collins died of the occupational disease his claim was based on. Before the Commission, Mrs. Collins filed a claim for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Commission ruled that her claim was barred by the Release her husband had signed when he settled his claim. In an action for judicial review, the circuit court upheld the Commission's decision. This appeal followed.
Held: Judgment vacated and claim for death benefits remanded for further proceedings before the Commission. The Release did not bar Mrs. Collins's claim for death benefits.
When a worker who has suffered an accidental injury or occupational disease covered by the Act later dies of that injury or disease, his dependent(s) is entitled to pursue death benefits in conformity with the criteria required by the Act. The worker's claim for disability, medical, and vocational compensation is distinct and separate from his dependent's claim for death benefits. Although both the worker's claim and the dependent's claim arise out of an injury or disease of the worker that is compensable under the Act, they are separate and independent claims. The dependent's claim for death benefits is not derivative of the worker's claim for compensation.
Mrs. Collins's claim for death benefits arose when he died from his occupational disease; his death was the compensable event. Mr. Collins did not have the power to release his wife's death benefits claim, which was inchoate at the time he settled his own workers' compensation claim, only coming into fruition when he died of his occupational disease. Moreover, even if he did have the power to do so, which he did not, the language of the Release did not evidence an intention to do so. Circuit Court for Calvert County
REPORTED
Arthur, Shaw Geter, Eyler, Deborah S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.
*Gould, J., did not participate in the Court's decision to designate this opinion for publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
On June 8, 2017, Bernard Collins, age 72, died of a heart attack brought on by heart disease and hypertension. He had worked for many years for the Huntingtown Volunteer Fire Department ("Huntingtown"), an appellee, as a volunteer firefighter. He had filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission ("the Commission") against Huntingtown and two of its insurers, Chesapeake Employers Insurance Company ("Chesapeake") and Selective Insurance Company of America ("Selective"), also appellees, on the ground that his heart disease and hypertension were an occupational disease. That claim was settled.
The appellant in this case is Peggy Collins, Mr. Collins's widow. After her husband's death, she filed a claim in the Commission against the appellees for death benefits, alleging that his death resulted from his occupational disease. The Commission ruled that Mrs. Collins's claim was barred by the release of claims Mr. Collins had given in settling his own claim. In the Circuit Court for Calvert County, Mrs. Collins petitioned for judicial review of that decision. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and, after a hearing, the circuit court agreed with the Commission and granted summary judgment in favor of Huntingtown and the insurers.
Mrs. Collins noted this appeal, posing one question, which we have rephrased as follows:
Did the release in the settlement agreement between Mr. Collins, Huntingtown, Chesapeake, and Selective operate to bar Mrs. Collins's claim for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act?
For the following reasons, we hold that the release did not bar Mrs. Collins's claim for death benefits. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court withinstructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Collins and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. On February 13, 2012, Mr. Collins, then age 67,1 filed a workers' compensation claim with the Commission, alleging that he had developed heart disease and hypertension caused by his firefighting work for Huntingtown. The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") creates a presumption of compensability for firefighters who develop heart disease and hypertension. See Md. Code , § 9-503(a) of the Labor and Employment Article ("LE"). Mr. Collins claimed that as of May 6, 2011, when Huntingtown was insured by Chesapeake, he became disabled due to his occupational disease.
Huntingtown and Chesapeake contested the claim. Chesapeake disputed the May 6, 2011 date of disablement, contending the correct date was December 12, 1998, when Mr. Collins underwent surgery for an aortic dissection. It successfully interpleaded Selective, which insured Huntingtown in 1998.
On March 19, 2014, following an evidentiary hearing, the Commission found that Mr. Collins had sustained an occupational disease (heart disease and hypertension), arising out of and in the course of his employment as a firefighter; that his last injuriousexposure was with Huntingtown; and that he was temporarily totally disabled as of May 6, 2011, for one day, and from July 7, 2011 through July 24, 2011. Later, the Commission found that Mr. Collins's average weekly wage was $152.50.2
In the Circuit Court for Calvert County, Huntingtown and Chesapeake filed petitions for judicial review of the Commission's decision. They both contested compensability generally and Chesapeake contested the Commission's finding that the date of last injurious exposure occurred in 2011. In a cross-petition, Mr. Collins disputed the calculation of his average weekly wage.
While the petitions were pending, Mr. Collins and the appellees agreed to settle the claim and filed a stipulation of dismissal in the circuit court, which on March 13, 2015, dismissed the case and remanded the matter to the Commission.
On May 14, 2015, Mr. Collins entered into an "Agreement of Final Compromise and Settlement" ("the Agreement") with Huntingtown, as employer, Chesapeake, as the insurer for Huntingtown, and Selective, as the "alleged insurer" of Huntingtown. After reciting the procedural background of Mr. Collins's claim, the Agreement provided that, as part of the settlement, the parties agreed that Mr. Collins's average weekly wage as of his date of disablement was $526.87; that Selective would pay him the lump sum of $100,000; and that Chesapeake would pay him the lump sum of $50,000 and fund a "Medicare Set Aside" annuity in the total amount of $47,192. The annuity would befunded with an initial lump sum payment of $9,438.08, followed by annual payments of $4,194.88 for nine years during Mr. Collins's lifetime. Huntingtown and Chesapeake further agreed to pay Mr. Collins's "causally related medical expenses" for "up to 45 days after the date [the Agreement was approved by the Commission], or until the initial [payment funding the Medicare Set-Aside was made], whichever date [came] first[.]" Mr. Collins otherwise released Huntingtown, Chesapeake, and Selective from any responsibility for medical expenses incurred beyond 45-days from the date the Agreement was approved by the Commission.
At Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, Mr. Collins, as "the Claimant," agreed to the following language of release ("the Release"):
The Claimant hereby accepts this Agreement and the aforesaid payment(s) in final compromise and settlement of any and all Claims which the Claimant, his personal representative, dependents, spouse and children or any other parties who might become beneficiaries under the Workers' Compensation Law, might now or could hereafter have under the provision of the said Law, arising out of the aforesaid injury or disablement or the disability resulting therefrom, and does hereby, on behalf of himself and all of said other parties, release and forever discharge the Employer [Huntingtown], Chesapeake and Selective, their personal representative, heirs, successors and assigns, from all other claims of whatsoever kind which might or could hereafter arise under the Law from the said injury, disablement or disability.
The Agreement was signed by Mr. Collins, his attorney, and representatives of Huntingtown, Chesapeake, and Selective. It was filed with the Commission on May 19, 2015, along with a "Settlement Worksheet," a "Claimant's Affidavit in Support of Settlement," a "Medicare Set-Aside Allocation Recommendation" prepared by a third-party firm, a letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services approving theMedicare Set-Aside, and copies of medical bills for treatment Mr. Collins already had received. In the "Claimant's Affidavit," which must be submitted with a settlement agreement, Mr. Collins asked the Commission "to approve the settlement of [his] claim" and stated that he was "voluntarily settling [his] claim." He acknowledged that by doing so, he was giving up the right to future hearings before the Commission; to "vocational rehabilitation services and to payment during [his] lifetime for any medical treatment related to [his] claim, except as provided [in the Agreement]"; to compensation from the Subsequent Injury Fund, except as provided in the Agreement; to seek to reopen...
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