In re Commitment of Sandry

Citation306 Ill.Dec. 202,857 N.E.2d 295
Decision Date19 October 2006
Docket NumberNo. 2-04-0870.,2-04-0870.
PartiesIn re COMMITMENT OF Jacob SANDRY (The People of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee v. Jacob Sandry, Petitioner-Appellant).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Paul J. Glaser (Court-appointed), Office of State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Jacob Sandry.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, J. Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorney General, Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for the People.

Presiding Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Jacob Sandry (petitioner) filed a petition in the circuit court of Jo Daviess County seeking conditional release pursuant to section 60 of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/60 (West 2002)). The trial court found that the State had carried its burden of demonstrating that petitioner had not made progress sufficient to warrant relief. Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of a psychologist presented by the State and that the trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Before proceeding further, we must address one preliminary issue. This cause comes to us consolidated with another case, In re Detention of Elvis Reed, No. 2-04-0907, which we resolve today in a written order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill.2d R. 23). Though they share a common issue—whether penile plethysmography passes the Frye test—the ultimate resolutions of the two cases rest on factual matter unique to each. Accordingly, we will sever them for the purpose of decision. However, the following discussion addressing plethysmography is applicable to our resolution of the Reed appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 25, 1996, the State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate petitioner a delinquent minor in that he committed the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16 (West 1996)). Petitioner was 14 years old at the time. Petitioner was to be released on February 21, 2001. However, on February 16, 2001, the State filed a petition to have petitioner committed under the Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2000)). On January 31, 2002, the trial court found petitioner to be a sexually violent person. On June 17, 2003, petitioner filed the petition that led to this appeal. Petitioner currently is a resident at the Department of Human Services Treatment Detention Facility in Joliet. He had been at that facility for approximately three years at the time of the hearing on his petition. At the hearing on that petition, the following evidence was adduced.

Dr. Paul Heaton, a clinical psychologist, first testified for the State. Petitioner stipulated that Heaton is an expert in his field. He evaluated petitioner when petitioner was first committed and also conducted a six-month evaluation in April 2003. At no time was Heaton involved in the treatment of petitioner. Heaton updated his evaluation in May 2004 and June 2004. Heaton updated the May 2004 report after only a month because that was the first time petitioner had agreed to undergo testing and a clinical interview. In the course of conducting an evaluation, Heaton stated that he reviews all records pertaining to the subject as well as any test results. He also seeks to interview treatment providers who have treated the subject.

The State questioned Heaton as to the requirements for conditional release set forth in the Act. See 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 2002). Heaton first explained that he was aware of the circumstances of the offense of which petitioner was originally convicted. He then related that petitioner was also responsible for numerous rule violations and "sexual misconduct tickets" during his stays at various treatment centers and places of incarceration over the following few years. While at the Joliet treatment facility, petitioner was found responsible for one major offense of sexual misconduct that involved inappropriate contact with another resident. Heaton acknowledged that these incidents were rule violations rather than criminal offenses. Heaton explained that such a continuing pattern indicates that petitioner has not learned from his past failures.

During the evaluation, Heaton learned that the victim of the offense of which petitioner was convicted was not his only victim. Petitioner had admitted that he had abused numerous others. Within the last year of treatment, Heaton reported, petitioner admitted that he verbally intimidated his victims and used his pet dog to frighten them into submission. Additionally, during the year preceding the hearing, petitioner admitted that he had abused certain victims more frequently than he had initially disclosed. During this period, petitioner also acknowledged that another victim existed.

Heaton further testified that he had diagnosed petitioner with two mental disorders. First, he diagnosed petitioner with paraphilia, not otherwise specified, and antisocial personality disorder. The former diagnosis means that petitioner is sexually attracted to nonconsenting males and females. The latter disorder concerns "a pervasive pattern of disregard and then the violation of the rights of others." Additionally, Heaton ruled out two diagnoses, depressive disorder and adjustment disorder, from which he originally believed that petitioner possibly suffered.

Heaton relied on a number of actuarial assessment tools in evaluating petitioner. These tools indicated that there was anywhere from a moderate-to-high risk to a high risk that petitioner would reoffend. Heaton explained that petitioner shares many characteristics with others who have gone on to reoffend. Dynamic factors—as opposed to static factors, which do not change—include: anger difficulties, relationship issues, an antisocial lifestyle, antisocial attitudes, and resistance to personal change. The results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, a test that Heaton administered but did not score, showed petitioner to be guarded and suspicious; to view others as not appreciating him and as trying to take advantage of him; to involve himself in unproductive relationships; to be resentful and angry; and to exhibit narcissistic, self-defeating, and avoidant personality traits. The test also suggested that petitioner might suffer from generalized anxiety disorder; however, Heaton testified that other information available to him was insufficient to support such a diagnosis. Another test, the Multiaxial Sexual Inventory, which Heaton also administered but did not score, revealed mixed results. According to Heaton, this test showed that petitioner was able and willing to talk about his past offenses; that he recognizes what he did was wrong; that he takes some responsibility for his actions and that he was not attempting to lie on the test. However, it also showed that he tended to minimize his past sexual obsession and that he has not taken full responsibility for his conduct. Heaton then opined that, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, petitioner "presents a significant and high risk to reoffend and that his treatment should be continued within a secure facility."

Heaton next addressed possibilities for petitioner's life after release. Heaton stated that, though there are some issues that would need to be addressed, ultimately, if released, petitioner could be returned to his home community following discharge. He stated that petitioner had informed him that his long-term goals are to get a good job, marry, raise a family, and leave Illinois. Although petitioner does not have a job waiting for him, he increased his job skills and demonstrated a willingness to work while within the Joliet facility. Petitioner also acquired a painting certification. Further, if conditionally released, employment would be found for him. As for outpatient treatment, Heaton noted that petitioner had previously received some that was unsuccessful in that petitioner continued to reoffend. Despite completing one program, petitioner continued to act out sexually, which Heaton regarded as problematic in that it showed he did not benefit substantially from that program. Heaton stated that no facilities in Jo Daviess County were sufficient to meet the needs of petitioner.

At the time of the hearing, petitioner was in phase two of the program at the Joliet treatment facility. The program consists of five phases. Heaton noted that petitioner had completed some of the objectives for the third phase. Specifically, of the objectives for the third phase, petitioner had completed all of the cognitive restructuring objectives and one of the objectives for the journaling group, but none for relapse prevention. In phase two, petitioner has completed all of the objectives for cognitive restructuring and journaling as well as several, but not all, for relapse prevention. Heaton later testified that, in his opinion, an individual should complete phase four prior to release. However, he acknowledged that some individuals have been released in phase three, and he believed that, pursuant to a court order, one individual had been released in phase two.

A polygraph is used during phase two to help determine whether an individual is taking full responsibility for past offenses. Heaton explained that, though passing a polygraph is not required for conditional release, it is "generally necessary" to advance to the third phase. Heaton stated that he had recommended an individual be placed on conditional release even though the individual had not passed a polygraph. Petitioner was initially resistant to taking a polygraph examination; however, he eventually took one. Prior to an examination, the polygrapher interviews the subject. At this time, petitioner...

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  • People v. Walker (In re Commitment of Walker), 2–13–0372.
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    • 26 Septiembre 2014
    ...that a significant subset of experts reasonably relies upon the methodology. In re Commitment of Sandry, 367 Ill.App.3d 949, 965, 306 Ill.Dec. 202, 857 N.E.2d 295 (2006).¶ 70 The State's contention that a diagnosis (as opposed to a methodology) is outside the scope of Frye has been rejected......
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