In re Commitment of Benjamin Hernandez ( People of State

• Decision Date: 18 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 108824.,108824.
• Parties: In re COMMITMENT OF Benjamin HERNANDEZ (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Benjamin Hernandez, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

239 Ill.2d 195
940 N.E.2d 1082
346 Ill.Dec. 478

In re COMMITMENT OF Benjamin HERNANDEZ (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Benjamin Hernandez, Appellee).

No. 108824.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 18, 2010.

[940 N.E.2d 1084]

Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., of Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor Gen., Michael M. Glick, Garson S. Fischer, Asst. Attorneys Gen., of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.Jerold S. Solovy, Michael T. Brody and Douglas F. McMeyer, of Jenner & Block LLO, of Chicago, for appellee.

[239 Ill.2d 197] OPINION Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[346 Ill.Dec. 480] At issue is whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over the State's appeal in a sexually violent persons case when the State filed its notice of appeal after the circuit court of Boone County approved respondent for conditional release but before the court approved a conditional release plan. This appeal was rendered moot when respondent violated the terms of his conditional release plan and was returned to the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS). The appeal before the appellate court was also moot, as respondent had been returned to custody before that court filed its opinion. Finding no exceptions to the mootness doctrine present, we vacate the appellate court's judgment and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person in 2004. Following a dispositional hearing in 2005, the court ordered ResCare, an outpatient facility, to prepare a conditional release plan that met the minimum requirements of DHS. In April 2007, the State informed the court that it had not received a conditional release plan. Defense counsel agreed that if the court's intention was to place respondent on conditional release, then the Sexually[239 Ill.2d 198] Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) required DHS to provide the court with a conditional release plan. The case was continued.

On July 3, 2007, the court stated: “I am convinced at this time that I would take the step of ordering conditional release, and I believe the statute requires that the department provide a conditional release plan.” On that same date, the court entered a written order that stated: “Respondent is to be placed on conditional release as disposition.” The order further provided that a conditional release plan be presented to the court on September 21, 2007. The State moved to reconsider the order, and the motion was denied on July 20, 2007. The State then filed a notice of appeal on August 20, 2007. On September 21, 2007, the court approved DHS's 13–page conditional release plan. The docket sheet for September 21, 2007, reads: “The DHS plan is accepted by the Court and [respondent] is advised of the plan. [Respondent] agrees to the plan and is to be released.” The court also entered a written order stating: “Conditional release plan is approved and accepted by the

[346 Ill.Dec. 481 , 940 N.E.2d 1085]

court.” The State did not file a new notice of appeal.

The appellate court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing addressing the appellate court's jurisdiction. The State filed a supplemental brief, but respondent declined to do so. The appellate court considered and rejected the State's arguments and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 392 Ill.App.3d 527, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235.

The appellate court relied on the familiar rule that a final judgment is one that “ ‘ “fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit” ’ ” and “ ‘ “determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.” ’ ” 392 Ill.App.3d at 530, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235, quoting In re M.M., 337 Ill.App.3d 764, 771, 272 Ill.Dec. 115, 786 N.E.2d 654 (2003), quoting In re [239 Ill.2d 199] Adoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill.App.3d 789, 793, 250 Ill.Dec. 117, 737 N.E.2d 1094 (2000). The court explained that an order may be final for purposes of review when any matters left for future determination are merely incidental to the ultimate rights adjudicated; however, an order is not final where jurisdiction is retained for matters of substantial controversy. 392 Ill.App.3d at 530, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235. Applying these rules, the appellate court concluded that the July 3 order could not have been final because it did not fully and finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Rather, it left substantial matters-the details under which respondent would be released-to be determined at a later date. These details were later set forth in a 13–page plan that the court approved. The July 3 order could not have been enforced because respondent could not have been released until the court approved a conditional release plan. 392 Ill.App.3d at 531, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235.

The appellate court explained that the approval of the conditional release plan could not be considered “incidental” to the ultimate rights adjudicated, because the matters left for future determination were essential to the case. 392 Ill.App.3d at 531, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235. Pursuant to statute, the plan must identify any treatment or services the respondent will receive, address any need for “supervision, counseling, medication, community support services, residential services, vocational services, and alcohol or other drug abuse treatment.” 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(3) (West 2008). The plan also has to specify who will be responsible for providing any services required by the plan. 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(3) (West 2008). The plan must be presented to the court for its approval within 60 days after the finding that the respondent is to be conditionally released. 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(3) (West 2008). As noted, in respondent's case, these matters were addressed in great detail in a 13–page plan. The appellate court held that, given the breadth of areas to be covered by the plan and the specificity of the plan's conditions, an order [239 Ill.2d 200] entered before the plan was approved could not have been final. 392 Ill.App.3d at 532, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235.

The appellate court also rejected the State's contention that jurisdiction was established by Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1). This rule was amended in 2007 to provide, in part, as follows:

“A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment or order.” Ill. S.Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. May 1, 2007).

The appellate court held that this rule was intended to cover the situation in which a court orally pronounces a final judgment but the written order is entered at a later

[346 Ill.Dec. 482 , 940 N.E.2d 1086]

date. Here, the July 3 order was not a final judgment, and the September 21 order was not merely a memorialization of the July 3 order. 392 Ill.App.3d at 534, 332 Ill.Dec. 49, 912 N.E.2d 235.

The...