In re Complaint of Knox

• Citation: 660 N.W.2d 777,255 Mich. App. 454
• Decision Date: 06 May 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 230755.
• Parties: In re Complaint of KNOX. Lotel, Inc., d/b/a Coordinated Billing Services, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michigan Public Service Commission, Mark Knox, and Sheryl Knox, Defendant-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

660 N.W.2d 777

255 Mich. App. 454

In re Complaint of KNOX.

Lotel, Inc., d/b/a Coordinated Billing Services, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michigan Public Service Commission, Mark Knox, and Sheryl Knox, Defendant-Appellees.

Docket No. 230755.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 9, 2003, at Lansing.

Decided February 21, 2003, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication May 6, 2003.

Early, Lennon, Crocker & Bartosiewicz, P.L.C. (by Lawrence M. Brenton), Kalamazoo, for Lotel, Inc.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and David A. Voges and Michael A. Nickerson, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Michigan Public Service Commission.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and SAWYER and FITZGERALD, JJ.

MURRAY, P.J.

Lotel, Inc., doing business as Coordinated Billing Services, appeals the April 24, 2000, order of the Public Service Commission that found that Lotel had violated the antislamming provisions set forth in the Michigan Telecommunications Act (MTA), M.C.L. § 484.2101 et seq., and commission rules. The threshold issue in this case is whether, under the specific facts of this case, this Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a commission order finding a telecommunications provider to have violated the MTA's "antislamming" provision following a contested-case hearing. We conclude that the Ingham Circuit Court, rather than this Court, has jurisdiction to hear the initial appeal in such a case. Accordingly, we transfer this case to the Ingham Circuit Court. MCL 462.26(3).

I. Public Service Commission Proceedings

On October 27, 1999, Mark and Sheryl Knox filed a complaint with the commission against Lotel, alleging that their toll service had been switched by Lotel without their authorization in violation of the MTA, and in particular its "antislamming" provision, M.C.L. § 484.2505.¹

Less than two months after the filing of the complaint, a contested hearing was held before a commission hearing referee. The referee heard testimony from the Knoxes, two witnesses, and an expert witness from Lotel, admitted into evidence seventeen exhibits and received posthearing briefs from the Knoxes, the commission, and Lotel. The referee subsequently issued his proposal for decision in which he found Lotel to have violated the antislamming provision of the MTA when it switched the Knoxes' toll service without their authorization.² The referee therefore recommended that the commission order Lotel to pay the Knoxes $500 for their time spent on the case and fine Lotel $10,000 for its violation of law.

Timely exceptions to the referee proposal for decision were filed by the commission. After addressing procedural arguments regarding Lotel's untimely filing of exceptions, the commission found that Lotel had "switched the Knox's [sic] toll service without authorization, in violation of Sections 502 and 505 of the Act and the Commission's antislamming procedures adopted in case number U-11900." As a result of this finding, the commission ordered Lotel to pay a $20,000 fine, to pay the Knoxes $1,235.64 as restitution, and to cease and desist from "further violations of the Act and the Commission's antislamming procedures." The commission denied Lotel's motion for rehearing.

Not pleased with the commission's order, Lotel filed an appeal with the Ingham Circuit Court pursuant to M.C.L. § 462.26(7). However, pursuant to M.C.L. § 462.26(3), that court subsequently issued an order transferring the case to this Court, concluding that the appeal should have originally been filed with this Court.

II. Analysis

Lotel first argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to initially hear this appeal. Lotel contends, as it did in the circuit court, that this case in the first instance should be heard by the Ingham Circuit Court. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to act or, stated differently, it provides the authority for a court to hear and determine a case. In re AMB, 248 Mich.App. 144, 166, 640 N.W.2d 262 (2001). Subject-matter jurisdiction pertains to the court's abstract power over a class of cases, not to whether the facts of a particular case present a claim subject to the court's authority. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison, 465 Mich. 185, 204, 631 N.W.2d 733 (2001). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, Lehman v. Lehman, 312 Mich. 102, 106, 19 N.W.2d 502 (1945), and a court must take notice when it lacks jurisdiction regardless of whether the parties raised the issue. In re AMB, supra at 166-167, 640 N.W.2d 262. Whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction under the statutes of our state is a legal question. Lapeer Co. Clerk v. Lapeer Circuit Judges, 465 Mich. 559, 566, 640 N.W.2d 567 (2002).

The jurisdiction of this Court is set forth in Const. 1963, art. 6, § 10, which provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law...." Courts are not permitted to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction conferred by statute or the constitution. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich. 426, 433, 505 N.W.2d 834 (1993).

As part of the MTA, the Legislature set forth how Commission orders would be appealed to the judiciary. Specifically, subsection 203(7) of the MTA, M.C.L. § 484.2203(7),³ provided:

An order of the commission shall be subject to review as provided by section 26 of Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1909, being section 462.26 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

MCL 462.26, in turn, provides for initial appeals to either this Court or the Ingham Circuit Court, with the determining factor being what type of order is being appealed:

(1) Except as otherwise provided [by statutory provisions not applicable here],... and except as otherwise provided in this section, any common carrier or other party in interest, being dissatisfied with any order of the Commission fixing any rate or rates, fares, charges, classifications, joint rate or rates, or any order fixing any regulations, practices, or services, may within 30 days from the issuance and notice of that order file an appeal as of right in the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall not have jurisdiction over any appeal that is filed later than the 30-day appeal period provided for in this subsection.

* * *

(7) An appeal from a commission order pertaining to the application of existing commission rules, tariffs, or rate schedules to an individual customer in a contested case shall be filed in the circuit court for the county of Ingham within 30 days of the issuance and notice of an order. [Emphasis added.]

Lotel argues that this Court lacks initial jurisdiction over this appeal because this is a contested case involving application of an existing commission rule to an individual customer and, therefore, should have been heard by the Ingham Circuit Court. MCL 462.26(7). The commission, on the other hand, argues that this Court has initial appellate jurisdiction under M.C.L. § 462.26(1) because the commission order "involved the application of the provisions of the MTA to the practices and services of a telecommunication service provider." Resolution of this issue necessitates a determination whether this case falls under M.C.L. § 462.26(1), as an order "fixing" any rate, charge, classification, regulation, practice, or service, or under M.C.L. § 462.26(7), as an order applying an existing commission rule to an individual customer. In Macomb Co. Prosecutor v. Murphy, 464 Mich. 149, 158, 627 N.W.2d 247 (2001), our Supreme Court set forth the rules governing the important function of interpreting a statute:

In considering a question of statutory construction, this Court begins by examining the language of the statute. We read the statutory language in context to determine whether ambiguity exists. If the language is unambiguous, judicial construction is precluded. We enforce an unambiguous statute as written. Where ambiguity exists, however, this Court seeks to effectuate the Legislature's intent through a reasonable construction, considering the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. [Citations omitted.]

The answer to the question presented is determined by how the statutory term "fixing" is defined. MCL 462.26(1). Although the answer would likely be quite clear if the statute contained a definition of "fixing," it does not. Thus, rather than being left to our own devices to determine the intended meaning, we may consider the dictionary definition, People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 563, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001), citing People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999), while also taking into account the context in which the word is used. Phillips v. Jordan, 241 Mich.App. 17, 22 n. 1, 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000), citing Western Michigan Univ. Bd. of Control v. Michigan, 455 Mich. 531, 539, 565 N.W.2d 828 (1997).

We previously interpreted this same word in In re Motor Carrier Act, 223 Mich.App. 288, 296-299, 566 N.W.2d 299 (1997). In that case, the commission issued an order giving guidance to motor carriers on any effect the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 USC 14501, had on the Motor Carrier Act, M.C.L. § 475.1 et seq. In re Motor Carrier Act, supra at 292, 296, 566 N.W.2d 299. One issue on appeal was whether these orders constituted the "fixing" of rates, fares, practices, and services for purposes of M.C.L. § 462.26(7). In re Motor Carrier Act, supra at 296-297, 566 N.W.2d 299. Resorting to the dictionary, we concluded that one of several definitions of "fixed" was to "adjust or regulate." Id. at 297, 566 N.W.2d 299. We held in that case that the commission orders constituted the "fixing" of many practices of motor carriers because, through the orders, the commission was declining to enforce numerous provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. Id. Indeed, we noted that the commission orders created a "sweeping change in the PSC's enforcement practices" and "substantially changed the regulatory framework for the trucking industry in Michigan." I...