In re Complaint of Luhr Bros., Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1:99CV130 RWS.,1:99CV130 RWS.
• Citation: 100 F.Supp.2d 1156
• Parties: In the Matter of the COMPLAINT OF LUHR BROS., INC., as Owner of the M/V CLETUS, Barge L 216, Barge L 230, Barge L 329, Barge L 338, Barge L 339, and Barge L 350; For Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

100 F.Supp.2d 1156

In the Matter of the COMPLAINT OF LUHR BROS., INC., as Owner of the M/V CLETUS, Barge L 216, Barge L 230, Barge L 329, Barge L 338, Barge L 339, and Barge L 350; For Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.

No. 1:99CV130 RWS.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division.

May 22, 2000.

James W. Herron, Christopher C. Swenson, Lewis and Rice, St. Louis, MO, for Luhr Brothers, Inc., petitioner.

Robert L. King, Associate, Carr and Korein, St. Louis, MO, for Shelby Warren, respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SIPPEL, District Judge.

Petitioner Luhr Bros., Inc. filed this Complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability from claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident in which two of its employees were involved. This type of relief is available under admiralty law. Respondent Shelby Warren is the Personal Representative of the Estate of Johnny Dwaine Warren, one of the Luhr Bros. employees. He was fatally injured in the accident. Respondent asserts that because the accident occurred on a highway after the employees debarked from Luhr Bros.' vessel, federal admiralty jurisdiction is lacking and the case should be dismissed.

The Court will dismiss this case because Luhr Bros. has failed to establish sufficient facts to invoke the Court's admiralty jurisdiction.

Background

Luhr Bros. is the owner of the vessel M/V CLETUS. The vessel was proceeding with barges and cargo on a voyage from Mile 304 Lower Mississippi AHP to Luhr Bros.' facility at Alexandria, Louisiana. Johnny D. Warren and William D. Emmons were employed by Luhr Bros. as deckhands assigned to and in the service of the M/V CLETUS. Warren's normal work schedule was thirty-eight days onboard and fourteen days off. On November 17, 1999, Warren and Emmons had finished their shift onboard and debarked from the M/V CLETUS during a crew change. Luhr Bros. alleges that both individuals remained in the service of the M/V CLETUS as they drove from the vessel to Luhr Bros.' office in Cape Girardeau, Missouri in a company crew van. Approximately forty-five minutes after Warren and Emmons left the M/V CLETUS, their vehicle was involved in an accident on Louisiana Highway 15 in Concordia Parish, Louisiana. The van driver had fallen asleep at the wheel. Warren was fatally injured and Emmons sustained bodily injuries. Luhr Bros. alleges that the accident occurred while both individuals were in the course and scope of their employment.

Luhr Bros. filed this Complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability from any claims that might arise out of the accident pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 181-195 inclusive. Respondent represents the estate of Johnny D. Warren. Respondent points out that the accident occurred on a highway approximately forty-five minutes after Warren and Emmons disembarked from the M/V CLETUS. Respondent asserts that federal admiralty jurisdiction is lacking because of the location of the accident and the tenuous connection between the accident and any activity related to admiralty. Respondent argues that the case should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint.

Analysis

Standing

As an initial matter, Luhr Bros. contends that "it is axiomatic that" Respondent does not have standing to move for dismissal because Respondent has not filed a claim. Luhr Bros. does not offer any legal authority which supports this proposition.

By contrast, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that a motion which asserts any of the Rule's enumerated defenses shall be raised before a responsive pleading is filed. The supplemental federal rules which govern admiralty cases do not dictate otherwise.¹ Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent has standing to move for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12.

Jurisdiction

Respondent has moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). To determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is free to review matters outside of the complaint such as affidavits and documents. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729-31 (8th Cir.1990). Unlike a decision based on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court's review of information outside of a complaint does not convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Id. Contrary to Petitioner's position in it brief asserting that the allegations of a complaint are accepted as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal motion, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is distinct in that, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, there is no presumptive truthfulness attached to a plaintiff's allegations. Id. at 730 (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir.1977)).

The traditional test for tort admiralty jurisdiction asked only whether a tort occurred on navigable waters. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if it did not, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 532, 115 S.Ct. 1043. This simple locality test was complicated by the rule that the injury had to be wholly sustained on navigable waters for the tort to be within admiralty. Id. Torts that occurred on dry land fell outside of admiralty jurisdiction even though there was a substantial connection to an activity on navigable waters. For example, if a ship rammed into a dock and damaged it, admiralty jurisdiction did not attach because the dock was viewed as an extension of the land.

This strict application of admiralty jurisdiction was changed in 1948 when Congress enacted the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 740. The Act provided that admiralty jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to a person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 532, 115 S.Ct. 1043. The purpose of the Act was to clear up the sometimes confusing line between land and water, by investing admiralty with jurisdiction over all cases where an injury was caused by a ship or other vessel on navigable water, even if such injury occurred on land. Id.

In Grubart, the Supreme Court further clarified the scope of admiralty jurisdiction which it had previously addressed in other decisions. In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982), the Court was faced with tort claims which arose out of the collision of two pleasure boats in a navigable river estuary. The Court held that admiralty jurisdiction attached even though jurisdiction existed only if "the wrong" had "a significant connection with traditional maritime activity," Id. at 674, 102 S.Ct. 2654. Although pleasure boats themselves had little to do with the maritime commerce which is the heart of the admiralty court's basic work, the Court found that the potential disruptive impact upon maritime commerce of a collision between boats on navigable waters, when coupled with the traditional concern that admiralty law holds for navigation, compelled the Court to find that jurisdiction in admiralty was proper and appropriate. Id. at 675, 102 S.Ct. 2654.

In Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), the Court held that federal admiralty jurisdiction existed in a suit involving tort claims arising when a fire, caused by a defective washer/dryer aboard a pleasure boat docked at a marina, burned the boat, other boats docked nearby, and the marina itself. Id. at 367, 110 S.Ct. 2892. The Court focused on two points to determine the relationship of a claim to the objectives of admiralty jurisdiction. First, the Court noted that the incident causing the harm, the burning of docked boats at a marina on navigable waters, was of a sort likely to disrupt maritime commercial activity. Id. at 363, 110 S.Ct. 2892. Second, the Court found a substantial relationship with a traditional maritime activity based on the kind of activity from which the incident arose, that was, the storage and maintenance of a vessel on navigable waters. Id. at 365-367, 110 S.Ct. 2892.

In Grubart, after reviewing its decisions in Foremost and Sisson, the Supreme Court expressly stated that a party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction under the Limitation of Liability Act over a tort claim must satisfy conditions of both location and a connection with a maritime activity. 513 U.S. at 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043. The location test turns whether the tort occurred on navigable water or, under the rubric of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, whether an injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. Id. The connection test raises two subissues. First a court must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Id. Second, a court must ascertain whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also applied the Supreme Court's two part test for admiralty jurisdiction to cases under the Limitation of Liability Act. See Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 777 (8th Cir.1990) (admiralty jurisdiction as to torts requires locality and nexus; locality is satisfied by a navigable waterway, while nexus is satisfied by a sufficient relationship of the vessel to maritime activities).

Respondent argues that the facts of the present case fail to establish either the locality prong or the connection prong of admiralty jurisdiction. Failure to establish either prong is fatal to an assertion of admiralty jurisdiction. Grubart, 513...