In re Condemnation of Certain Land for New State House

• Decision Date: 23 November 1895
• Citation: 19 R.I. 326,33 A. 448
• Parties: In re CONDEMNATION OF CERTAIN LAND FOR NEW STATE HOUSE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

33 A. 448

19 R.I. 326

In re CONDEMNATION OF CERTAIN LAND FOR NEW STATE HOUSE.¹

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 23, 1895.

Proceeding by the board of state house commissioners to condemn land for a state house. A claim by petitioners for a jury trial was dismissed on motions of Warren R. Perce and others, landowners, and the commissioners' petition for a new trial of said motions. Dismissed and remanded.

Edward C. Dubois, Atty. Gen., and Arnold Green, for the State.

Warren R. Perce, pro se, and for Abby F. Sessions and others. James M. Ripley, for Anne B. F. Woods and others.

James, William R. & Theodore F. Tillinghast, for Elizabeth Francis and others.

Amasa M. Eaton, for Richmond Viall.

ROGERS, J. This is a petition by the board of state house commissioners, for and in behalf of the state, for a new trial of motions to dismiss the state's claims for jury trials upon damages awarded the owners of land by appraisal commissioners in certain condemnation proceedings.

A tract of land in the city of Providence was condemned as a site for the proposed new state house, under the provisions of Pub. Laws R. I. c. 1201, passed May 24, 1893, entitled "An act to provide for the creation of a board of state house commissioners, to define their duties and to provide for the issuance of the bonds of the state to an amount not exceeding $1,500,000." Section 1 of said chapter provided that certain persons therein named "are," in the language of the act, "hereby constituted a board of state house commissioners, who shall perform the duties specified in this act; they shall hold office for a sufficient time to accomplish the purposes of this act, and shall serve without compensation. Any vacancies in said board shall be filled by the governor, with the consent of the senate. Five members of the commission shall constitute a quorum." Section 2 of said chapter is as follows: "Said board shall at once proceed to select and acquire a site for a new state house, either under the provisions of chapter 913 of the Public Laws or by purchase or by condemnation, as said board may determine, and to erect thereon a new state house substantially in accordance with the plan accompanying the report of the state house commission made to the general assembly at its January session, 1892, and recommended by said commission. The said site shall be acquired in the name of the state of Rhode Island, and for the purpose of acquiring land by condemnation for said site said board is hereby given all the powers of condemnation conferred upon towns in certain cases for the purpose of taking land and property for a water supply by chapter 285 of the Public Laws; and in case said board shall so take any land for the purposes of this act, it shall proceed in all matters in relation to such land as provided in said chapter 285 in the case of land taken under its provisions; and owners of land so taken shall have the same rights of appeal from the awards of said board, and rights of jury trial thereon, as are secured to owners of land taken under the provisions of said chapter 285 by its provisions." The subsequent provisions of said chapter 1201 authorized the board of state house commissioners to make, on behalf of the state, all contracts for the construction of said state house, and the furnishing thereof, and for grading and putting into suitable condition the grounds surrounding the same, and provided how it should be done, and how the money to meet the expenses incurred under said chapter 1201 should be raised, and how the bills audited by said board of state house commissioners were to be paid. Said chapter 285 provided when and under what circumstances certain towns, persons, or corporations, for the purpose of supplying towns with water, may take, condemn, hold, use, and permanently appropriate any land, water, rights of water and of way, necessary and proper to be used in furnishing or enlarging any such water supply; and it also provided for the methods of procedure therefor, which included the filing, in the clerk's office of the common pleas division of the supreme court in the county where the land to be taken was located, of a certificate of taking the property, estate, or right of property described therein, with a list of the owners thereof, and the appointment by said common pleas division, after due notice, of three suitable persons to be commissioners to appraise the damages sustained by any person whose property, estate, or rights of property shall have been taken, and how said commissioners were to proceed, and for the payment for the land so taken. Section 6 of chapter 285, as amended by section 4, subc. 2, c. 1224, Pub. Laws R. L, reads as follows: "Upon the payment of the fees provided in the preceding section, the clerk of the said common pleas division of the supreme court shall open the report of the said commissioners, and the same may be examined by any person interested therein, and any person or party aggrieved by any award of damages by the said commissioners may claim a jury trial upon any item of damages thereby awarded, and may file his claim for such trial at any time within three months from the opening of such report; and such claim shall stand for trial by jury upon a proper issue based upon such claim, as other cases upon the docket of such court, and shall be tried therein in every respect as other cases are there tried, including the right to except to rulings and to apply for new trials for cause; and execution may be awarded thereon as in other cases; but if the party claiming the jury trial shall not therein obtain an award for damages more favorable to him than that given by the commissioners, he shall pay costs to the adverse party."

Within three months from the opening of the report made by the commissioners of appraisal duly appointed in the proceedings to condemn the state house site, the board of state house commissioners for and in behalf of the state claimed jury trials upon various items of damage thereby awarded, whereupon, upon motion of the persons that at the time of the condemnation had owned the land so taken, and to whom the awards for damages appealed from by the state had been made, the claims of the state for jury trials were dismissed by the common pleas division; and the matter comes before us on the state's petition for a new trial of that motion, the question involved being whether the state, under said acts, is entitled to jury trials as claimed.

The state, through its board of state house commissioners, contends that it is a party aggrieved by the award of the appraisal commissioners, and that said chapter 285, § 6, and every part of said section 6, applies to the proceedings to condemn land for a state house site, and, therefore, that the state by express legislation has the light to claim jury trials. The landowners deny, on various grounds, such right, and, among others, contend that the words "said board," when last used in chapter 1201, § 2, refer to the appraisal commissioners provided for in chapter 285, and not to the board of state house commissioners; and that the right to claim a jury trial is given only to the owners of land taken, and not to the state. We think the words "any person or party aggrieved," contained in chapter 285, § 6, are broad enough to include the state, and that the board of state house commissioners would have power to act for and in behalf of the state in claiming a jury trial if the legislation relating to condemning land for a state house site intended to confer upon the state the right of trial by jury, and that intent can be ascertained by legal construction. We see no inherent difficulty or impropriety in the lawmaking power granting a jury trial to the state in condemnation proceedings if dissatisfied with an award of the appraisal commissioners. A state may sue in its own courts, but it cannot be sued therein unless there is some statute giving the court jurisdiction in express terms. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 80, note 1, and cases cited. The state is continually suing in its own courts, and recognizances running to the state are being constantly sued there in the name and for the benefit of the state. The official bonds required of certain officers, such as general treasurer, state auditor, warden of state prison, etc., are made to the state, and would be suable in its name in the state courts. Though persons, to be eligible as jurors, must be taxpayers, and therefore, in a sense, having an interest in the state, yet such interest would not incapacitate jurors from sitting on a case in which the state was a party, even before May 25, 1895, the date of the passage of Pub. Laws R. I. c. 1389. The state is the government. Courts are created by it, and judges and jurors hold their positions under it, and receive pay from it for their services. A judge or a juror receiving pay for his services from an ordinary party would be unfitted to sit where such party was interested. Not so, however, in the case of the state, for the relations of citizens to it, be they judges or jurors, are fundamental; and, notwithstanding such relations, the state, as we have seen, can sue in its own courts. To hold otherwise would be to paralyze courts, and to disintegrate government. The contention of the landowners that the state could not have been granted the right to claim a jury trial in condemnation proceedings seems to us utterly untenable.

But, while the right to a jury trial might have been granted to the state by the lawmaking power, the crucial question in this case is: Was such right actually granted in the legislation referred to? Was it the intention of the statute to grant such right? For the great object of the maxims of interpretation is to discover the true intention of the law. The intention of the makers of a statute is sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of making a statute, and at other times from the circumstances....