In re Cook's Motors

Decision Date26 April 1944
Docket NumberNo. 3972.,3972.
Citation142 F.2d 369
PartiesIn re COOK'S MOTORS, Inc. BERKSHIRE TRUST CO. et al. v. GAR WOOD INDUSTRIES, Inc.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Frederick M. Myers, of Pittsfield, Mass. (Philip R. White and Hutchins & Wheeler, all of Boston, Mass., of counsel), for appellant Berkshire Trust Co.

Lincoln S. Cain, of Pittsfield, Mass. (Cain & Chesney, of Pittsfield, Mass., of counsel), for appellee.

Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The Berkshire Trust Company, appellant, and Gar Wood Industries, Inc., appellee, are both creditors of Cook's Motors, Inc., a bankrupt. Before bankruptcy, the bankrupt had transferred $2,563.30 to the said Trust Company. Gar Wood repeatedly requested the trustee in bankruptcy to take steps to recover these funds, but to no avail. The Trust Company filed a motion before the referee as a step toward being allowed to keep these funds as a set-off. Gar Wood, through its attorney, appeared before the referee and successfully opposed that motion, with the result that the Berkshire Trust Company subsequently turned over to the trustee the sum of $2,563.30.

Gar Wood then filed with the referee a sworn proof of priority claim under § 64, sub. a(1), of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 874, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104, sub. a(1), in the amount of $813.09, as the reasonable costs and expenses of the recovery, for the benefit of the estate, of property of the bankrupt transferred or concealed by him either before or after the filing of the petition. The claim listed $750 expenses for the services of attorneys and $63.09 for stenographic and sheriffs' fees and for telephones. The referee ordered that this claim of $813.09 be allowed in full and be given priority.

On petition to review this order of the referee, the District Court ruled, over objection of the Trust Company, that the priority claim fell within § 64, sub. a(1), of the Bankruptcy Act; but set aside the referee's order and recommitted the matter to the referee to find the subsidiary facts as to what services were rendered and also to find the ultimate fact as to what were the "reasonable costs and expenses" of such services. In ruling that Gar Wood had a valid claim for priority under § 64, sub. a(1), for the reasonable costs of its services in recovering the property for the benefit of the bankrupt estate, the District Court took note of the rule that a creditor is ordinarily not entitled to compensation under such subsection where he went ahead without having first secured authorization from the referee to incur the expenses for the benefit of the estate. In re Eureka Upholstering Co., 2 Cir., 1931, 48 F.2d 95; In re New York Investors, Inc., 2 Cir., 1942, 130 F.2d 90. This rule, the court said, ought not to be applied where the trustee in bankruptcy, or his counsel, is involved in a conflict of interest and has refused to proceed, and where the volunteered services of the creditor have benefited the estate. Such a conflict of interest the court found to exist, for on the face of the papers it appeared that the same lawyer was acting as counsel for the trustee and for the Trust Company. On this assumption of fact the District Court ruled that Gar Wood was entitled to a priority claim under § 64, sub. a(1), and entered the interlocutory order recommitting the case to the referee for further findings as to the extent and value of the services rendered.

From this interlocutory order of the court below a notice of appeal was filed in which the appellants were named as the Berkshire Trust Company and Stephen B. Hibbard, trustee, the same attorney appearing as counsel for each appellant.

Shortly after the notice of appeal was filed, the Trust Company, Gar Wood, and the trustee joined in a stipulation which was filed, to become part of the record on appeal, which stipulation contains the following recital:

"Counsel for The Berkshire Trust Company was never appointed general counsel for Stephen B. Hibbard, trustee in bankruptcy herein. He was appointed counsel for one special matter only, which matter in no way had to do with the general...

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11 cases
  • United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • November 2, 1959
    ...was not properly before it, a court of appeals, which regularly reviews judgments of the district courts, cannot. Cf. In re Cook's Motors, 1 Cir., 1947, 142 F.2d 369. To be sure, the court will do this only when the jurisdictional problem "had not been fully settled," Rorick v. Board of Com......
  • Official Committee ex rel. Cybergenics v. Chinery
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • May 29, 2003
    ...party that "acts in the place of the trustee in bankruptcy and not merely for his individual interest"), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.1944) (granting a creditor compensation under Section 64(a)(1) for justifiably and successfully acting in the place of the trustee in bankru......
  • Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • December 29, 1959
    ...246, 254, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800; Rorick v. Board of Commissioners, 307 U.S. 208, 213, 59 S.Ct. 808, 83 L.Ed. 1242; In re Cook's Motors, 1 Cir., 142 F.2d 369, 370. It is so ordered. 1 Steiner v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 9 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 105; Nettles v. General Accident Fire an......
  • In re Tyne
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 5, 1959
    ...in the name of the trustee. In re Huntingdon & Broad Top Mountain R. R. & Coal Co., 3 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 411, 414; In re Cook's Motors, Inc., 1 Cir., 1944, 142 F.2d 369; In re Honesdale Union Stamp Shoe Co., Inc., 3 Cir., 1939, 102 F.2d 372; 2 Collier, Bankruptcy 914 (14th Ed.). This prin......
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