In re Coots' Estate

• Decision Date: 07 January 1931
• Docket Number: No. 47.,47.
• Citation: 234 N.W. 141,253 Mich. 208
• Parties: In re COOTS' ESTATE. Appeal of OLDFIELD et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

253 Mich. 208

234 N.W. 141

In re COOTS' ESTATE. Appeal of OLDFIELD et al.

No. 47.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 7, 1931.

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Joseph A. Moynihan, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Walter H. Coots, deceased. The Union Trust Company, which had been trustee under the will of Walter H. Coots, deceased, filed its petition in the probate court asking that the residue of the estate be assigned under the will. To review judgment affirming an order of the probate court assigning the residue, Arthur J. Oldfield and others bring error.

Order of assignment reversed, and decree rendered in accordance with opinion.

Argued before the Entire Bench. John W. Gilmore, of Detroit, for appellant Arthur J. oldfield.

Lucking, Van Auken & Sprague, of Detroit, for appellant George C. Oldfield.

Hobart B. Hoyt, of Detroit, for appellant Gertrude Oldfield Day.

Corliss, Leete & Moody, of Detroit (Alexander P. Leete, of Detroit, of counsel), for Detroit Young Men's Christian Ass'n et al.

Trowbridge, Lewis & Watkins, of Detroit (James K. Watkins, and Frederick W. Seitz, both of Detroit, of counsel), for John W. Coots.

Charles F. Delbridge, of Detroit (W. Leo Cahalan, of Detroit, David Mackay and Roger B. Hull, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellees.

Charles W. Kurth and Frederick C. Kurth, both of Detroit (Howard F. Cline, of Detroit, of counsel), for St. John's Episcopal Church of Detroit, and Susie R. Coots.

FEAD, J.

This is review of an order of probate court, affirmed by the circuit court, assigning residue of the estate of Walter H. Coots, deceased. The will was executed in 1901, devised a life estate in trust to testator's wife and son William, and to the survivor of them, the son being then 44 years of age, and provided:

‘Ninth. Upon the decease of both my said wife and son, I give and bequeath the estate and property held in trust as aforesaid during their lives, in manner following:

‘(a) To the widow of my said son, Elizabeth Compton Coots, the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as above provided.

‘(b) To the child or children of my said son, or their heirs by right of representation, all of the rest, residue and remainder of said property and estate, in equal shares.

‘(c) In case my said son shall die without leaving issue or lineal heirs, I direct that all of the rest, residue and remainder of said property and estate, after the payment of said sum of ten thousand dollars, ($10,000) to the widow of my said son, shall be divided equally among William J. Coots, son of my brother John, Nellie L. Coots Daly, daughter of my brother John; Walter H. Coots, son of my deceased brother Charles; Arthur J. Oldfield, George C. Oldfield, Walter J. Oldfield and Gertie Oldfield, children of my sister Hannah, in equal shares.’

The will elsewhere contained a like bequest to Elizabeth Coots on her husband's death, if his mother survived him. William survived his mother, and died in 1927, aged 70 years, without issue or lineal heirs. Testator's brother and sister and the three Coots children survived the wife but predeceased William. The four Oldfields survived him. The order appealed from assigned the residue to the seven nephews and nieces and their legal representatives. Appellees take through the deceased Coots children. Appellants are surviving Oldfields and representatives of heirs of testator. With the exception of a few shares of corporate stock, the estate was in real property and the will contemplated that most of it be held intact until final division on death of the wife and son. The question is whether the shares of the residue devised to the deceased Coots' niece and nephews passed to their respective heirs, devisees, and assigns, became intestate property going to testator's heirs, or devolved upon the four Oldfields as survivors of a class or as residuary legatees.

The will bears the stamp of professional craftsmanship, and probably was drafted by the able lawyer who witnessed it. We must assume that it expresses testator's whole intention. It is a natural instrument, and we would defeat testator's intention by reading into it esoteric purposes. The distribution of estate was upon the basis of family justice. Testator's first concern was to provide a life income to his wife and son, with remainder to the direct line of blood. He recognized an obligation to his son's wife by substantial bequest to her on the son's death. Realizing that the direct line might fail, the lack of devise to testator's brother and sister, which would have resulted in inequality as among the nephews and nieces, who were most likely of the relatives to survive the wife and son, and the devise directly to the younger generation in equal shares, demonstrate testator's intention to equitably distribute his estate among the natural objects of his bounty, giving each a separate part. Testator intended the distribution as set out to be the last expression of his will, upon the hypothesis or hope that all remaindermen would take personally, as no provision was made for the contingency of any of them failing to survive the wife and son. By failing to provide for such contingency, testator must be deemed to have intended that future eventualities which would change the plan as written should be taken care of by the law. The contention that testator intended to keep to property within the group of remaindermen and that the survivors of them would take the whole estate is not supported by the language or scheme of the will and is contrary to the plainly intended equality and finality of division. The will evidences no intention to treat the nephews and nieces as a class, with rights of survivorship, and, as they were named and described specifically and no open end was left to eject any of those designated or to admit others, they did not take as a class. In re Ives' Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 148 N. W. 727;Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556, 162 N. W. 102, L. R. A. 1918E, 1074;In re Hunter's Estate, 212 Mich. 380, 180 N. W. 364.

Concededly, the estate given to the nephews and nieces was a contingent remainder. Comp. Laws 1915, § 11531. The estate of each was descendible, devisable, and alienable. Comp. Laws 1915, § 11553. The latter statute, however, did not enlarge the estate given, but merely established some of its incidents. Each remainderman ‘could grant or devise no better or greater estate than he himself held; and any alienation or devise made by him would be defeated and destroyed by the same contingency which would have defeated his interest had he not disposed of it.’ Fitzhugh v. Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 436, 27 N. W. 561. 564.

The essential question is whether, in their lifetimes, the deceased remaindermen took a vested interest in the contingent remainder, which passed to their heirs, legatees, or assigns and ripened into a fee in possession on happening of the contingency of the death of testator's son without lineal heirs; or, to express it another way, whether their survival of testator's son was a condition precedent to the remainder vesting in them.

The rule in Massachusetts is that, in similar circumstances, the remainder vests in the remaindermen at the death of the testator, subject to being divested by the happening of the contingency. Trumbull v. Trumbull, 149 Mass. 200, 21 N. E. 366,4...