In re Corpus

Citation274 Cal.Rptr.3d 292,479 P.3d 782,10 Cal.5th 959
Decision Date28 January 2021
Docket NumberS256149
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties IN RE William M. PALMER II on Habeas Corpus.

O'Melveny & Myers, Geoffrey Yost, Anna Pletcher, San Francisco, Melody Drummond Hansen, Menlo Park, Megan Havstad, San Francisco, Cara L. Gagliano, Micah Chavin, Sacramento, Michael J. Pierce, San Francisco, Anna Schneider, Torrance, and Mehwish Shaukat, San Francisco, for Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Marisol Orihuela, Los Angeles, and Miriam Gohara for The Prison Law Office, Vincent Schiraldi and David Muhammad as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Keker, Van Nest & Peters, Sharif E. Jacob, and Taylor Reeves, San Francisco, for Professor Vincent Schiraldi, Columbia University School of Social Work, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, William D. Temko, Sara A. McDermott and Michele C. Nielsen, Los Angeles, for Human Rights Watch and The Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Kristen Bell for The Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

William Vogel, Tarzana, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Elbert Lee Vaught IV as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner William M. Palmer II.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Amanda J. Murray and Denise A. Yates, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent Board of Parole Hearings.

Mark Zahner, Sacramento, and Richard J. Sachs, San Diego, for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondents Board of Parole Hearings and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

Judgments about the proper punishment for a crime are generally entrusted to the people's democratically elected representatives (see Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 175–176, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (plur. opn. of Stewart, J.)) — and, in California, to the people themselves. (See, e.g., Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, pp. 70–74; see generally Cal. Const., art. II, § 8.) Yet neither the Legislature nor the people have the final word. Both the state and federal Constitutions bar the infliction of punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offender's individual culpability. ( U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) So when a claim of constitutionally excessive punishment is properly presented, it is for the courts, "as coequal guardian[s] of the Constitution, to condemn any violation of that prohibition." ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 ( Lynch ).) How courts should fulfill that responsibility when an inmate claims a sentence is excessive because of one or more parole denials is the question at the heart of this case.

William M. Palmer II first sought release on parole from the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) in 1995. The Board denied parole, but Palmer persisted. Following the Board's 10th denial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. His petition alleged that the 30 years he had already served on a life sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was a juvenile was constitutionally excessive. Before the Court of Appeal could adjudicate the habeas petition, the Board found him suitable for parole and ordered him released. ( In re Palmer (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1202–1203, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 ( Palmer ).) The Court of Appeal subsequently agreed with Palmer that his now-completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional. ( Id . at pp. 1207–1222, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) Because that term had already been served, however, the Court of Appeal focused its order of relief on a different target. The court reasoned that Palmer was "entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole supervision." ( Id . at p. 1224, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.)

We agree with the Court of Appeal that habeas corpus relief is available to inmates whose continued incarceration has become constitutionally excessive, but who have been denied release by the Board. To the extent Palmer's continued incarceration at some point became constitutionally excessive, though, that alone did not justify ending his parole under the current statutory scheme. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I.
A.

In 1988, when Palmer was 17 years old, he pleaded guilty to kidnapping for robbery. ( Pen. Code, § 209, former subd. (b); all undesignated statutory references are to this code.) For this offense Palmer was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, consecutive to a two-year term for use of a firearm (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)). ( Palmer , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1202, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.)

His offense began in a parking garage at a Riverside apartment complex. Wearing a ski mask, Palmer waited there, intending to find someone to rob. He picked that location because he had previously burglarized homes in the same area. When off-duty police officer Randy Compton exited his car, Palmer confronted him with an unloaded gun stolen in a previous burglary. Palmer demanded Compton's wallet. Compton claimed not to have one. Palmer asked Compton if he had a bank card; Compton said he did. Palmer then ordered Compton to drive to an automated teller machine (ATM) and withdraw $200. While Compton drove, Palmer sat in the backseat, pointing the unloaded gun at Compton. When they arrived at the ATM, Compton retrieved his service weapon from his backpack and fired 15 rounds at Palmer, hitting him in the knee. Palmer fled but was soon apprehended by the police. Shortly thereafter, he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. ( Palmer , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1207–1208, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 ; see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.)

Palmer's juvenile record included driving without a license as well as lewd acts with three younger minors. While on probation for the latter offense, Palmer admitted committing several burglaries.

B.

Palmer filed the current habeas petition in the Court of Appeal. ( Palmer , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) This petition asserted that his continued incarceration for a crime committed in 1988 when he was 17 years old had become grossly disproportionate under the state and federal Constitutions. (See U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) Palmer complained that although there were 10 parole suitability hearings between 1996 and 2015, the Board denied him parole each time. Before the Court of Appeal could adjudicate the current habeas corpus petition, however, the Board found Palmer suitable for release on parole — and then released him on parole for a five-year period. ( Palmer , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1202–1203, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 ; see Pen. Code, former § 3000, subd. (b).)

The Court of Appeal retained the petition for adjudication and granted habeas corpus relief.1 The court determined first that because Palmer remained constructively in custody while on parole, the petition was not moot. ( Palmer , supra , 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1203, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708, citing In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 265, 113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97.) The court then concluded that "in light of Palmer's age at the time of the offense and attendant diminishment of his culpability," the Board's repeated denials of parole rendered the 30 years he had served "so disproportionate to his individual culpability as to be ‘constitutionally excessive’ " within the meaning of the state and federal Constitutions. ( Palmer , at p. 1214, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 ; see id . at p. 1221, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) Because Palmer's prison sentence "had become constitutionally excessive" before his release on parole, the court reasoned, he was " ‘entitled to be freed from all custody, actual or constructive.’ " ( Id . at p. 1223, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) The court therefore ordered Palmer released from parole supervision. ( Id . at p. 1224, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.)

On our own motion, we granted review to decide whether inmates may challenge their continued incarceration as constitutionally excessive when the Board repeatedly denies parole, and what remedy is available when continued incarceration becomes constitutionally excessive.

II.

In general, fixing appropriate penalties for crimes is a distinctly legislative determination (e.g., People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 218, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717 ; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 ( Dillon )), implicating sensitive questions of policy and values that "are in the first instance for the judgment of the Legislature [or the people] alone." ( Lynch , supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 414, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) But the legislative power to craft punishments is subject to constraints rooted in both the state and federal Constitutions. In limited circumstances, one or both provisions may relieve a defendant from a sentence that was otherwise lawfully imposed. (See Hutto v. Davis (1982) 454 U.S. 370, 374, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (per curiam ); In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783 ( Dannenberg ).)

Palmer contends he has properly presented a claim that his punishment was cruel or unusual within the meaning of the state Constitution.2 His habeas corpus petition alleges that his continued incarceration for more than 30 years — based on a crime he committed as a juvenile, in which no victim suffered injury — became "shocking and offensive."

Amicus curiae California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) disagrees. In CDAA's view, inmates should not be allowed to argue their continued incarceration has become constitutionally excessive...

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  • In re Palmer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • January 28, 2021
    ... 10 Cal.5th 959 479 P.3d 782 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 IN RE William M. PALMER II on Habeas Corpus. S256149 Supreme Court of California. January 28, 2021 O'Melveny & Myers, Geoffrey Yost, Anna Pletcher, San Francisco, Melody Drummond Hansen, Menlo Park, Megan Havstad, San Francisco, Cara L. Gagliano, Micah Chavin, Sacramento, Michael J. Pierce, San Francisco, Anna Schneider, Torrance, and ......

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