In re Count De Toulouse Lautrec

• Decision Date: 14 June 1900
• Docket Number: 699.
• Citation: 102 F. 878
• Parties: In re COUNT DE TOULOUSE LAUTREC.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

102 F. 878

In re COUNT DE TOULOUSE LAUTREC.

No. 699.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

June 14, 1900

Newton Wyeth, for appellant.

William Brace, for appellee.

Before WOODS and GROSSCUP, Circuit Judges, and SEAMAN, District Judge.

SEAMAN District Judge.

Under the designation of Count Toulouse de Lautrec, alias Castano the petitioner is imprisoned for the purpose of extradition pursuant to section 5270 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, under a mittimus issued by a United States commissioner for the Northern district of Illinois; and this appeal is from an order of the district court for such district whereby his petition thereupon for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari was dismissed for insufficiency, and the petitioner was remanded to the custody of the marshal. The petition is voluminous in the recital of proceedings and matters which are wholly irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue involved, but singularly deficient in allegations of fact respecting that issue. It shows the fact of the hearing of testimony before the commissioner, presumably material for his decision, but does not purport to state even its substance; and in respect of the portion of the evidence which appears in the petition, and is made the basis of the argument for setting aside the action of the commissioner the reference purports to be a mere summary or interpretation by counsel of the testimony upon a single branch of the inquiry as stated by way of a motion in the course of the proceedings before the commissioner, and thus brought into the petition by general averments only of its truth. The rule is well settled that the decision of the committing magistrate in extradition proceedings cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus if he has jurisdiction of the accused and of the subject-matter,-- the offense charged being within the terms of the treaty of extradition,-- 'and the magistrate, in arriving at a decision to hold the accused, has before him competent legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment. ' Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 508, 16 Sup.Ct. 689, 40 L.Ed. 787; Bryant v. U.S., 167 U.S. 104, 105, 17 Sup.Ct. 744, 42 L.Ed. 94. The petition in the case at bar shows that the accused was before the commissioner on a complaint made by the British consul which charged that the accused feloniously uttered in the dominion of Canada certain forged coupon obligations, well knowing the same to be forged, and 'that he was a fugitive from the justice of the dominion of Canada,' thus charging an extraditable offense under the treaty with Great Britain. Having jurisdiction, therefore, both of the accused and of the subject-matter, the finding by the commissioner of probable cause to believe the accused guilty of such offense is open only, on habeas corpus, to the inquiry whether there was legal evidence of facts before the commissioners on which to exercise his judgment, 'and not whether the legal evidence of facts was sufficient or insufficient to warrant his conclusions. ' Ornelas v. Ruiz, supra; Bryant v. U.S., supra; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462, 8 Sup.Ct. 1240, 32 L.Ed. 234; In re Luis Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 334, 10 Sup.Ct. 1031, 34 L.Ed. 464. With the fact conceded that the commitment was founded upon evidence, the petition for a writ is not entitled to consideration unless it shows either (1) all the evidence which was accepted as material, or (2) allegations of fact respecting such evidence which clearly overcome the presumption that legal evidence was heard in support of the commitment; and, in the case of allegations of the latter class, mere general conclusions on the part of the pleader of their legal effect, standing alone, are not sufficient. It is questionable, to say the least, whether this petition so states the evidence which was before the commissioner that an issue is presented, within the authorities referred to. Assuming, however, for the purposes of the case, that the evidence upon the question of forgery, as thus stated in the petition, is well averred and in accord with the fact, it is clearly legal evidence to establish the fact that the instruments of which felonious utterance is charged were not the genuine obligations of the purported promisors, but were, instead, false instruments. The assumed facts are substantially as follows: The instruments in question purported to be interest coupons issued in connection with corporate bonds, respectively, by (1) the city of Gloucester; Massachusetts; (2) the Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Company, a corporation of Massachusetts; and (3) the Hyde Park Electric Light Company, a corporation of the same state. The original bonds and coupons in each instance were lithographed and printed by Francis Doane & Co., printers, of Boston, upon orders of the corporations, respectively; and the printers innocently retained printed copies of each set, 'as samples or proof sheets or otherwise,' after delivering to the several corporations the printed sheets which were ordered. The printers from...