In re Cox

Decision Date03 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-21407.,07-21407.
Citation393 B.R. 681
PartiesIn re Lonnie Dale COX and Dena Gay Cox, Debtors.
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Missouri

Harry D. Boul, Shelley L. Forrest, Boul & Associates, P.C., Columbia, MO, for Debtors.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENNIS R. DOW, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion of the Chapter 13 Trustee to deny confirmation of the Debtors' Chapter 13 plan. The trustee has objected to the plan on the grounds that it fails to comply with § 1325(b) in that Debtors' plan does not propose to pay to unsecured creditors the amount required by § 1325(b) as reflected on Debtors' Form 22C. Debtors respond that they are proposing to pay to their unsecured creditors as much as they can afford, as reflected by their schedules of income and expenses, and denial of plan confirmation under the circumstances would violate the equal protection requirement of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is a core proceeding, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a) and (b)(1). The following constitutes my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accordance with Rules 7052 and 9014(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules the Debtors' objection to the trustee's motion and sustains the trustee's objection to confirmation.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Debtors originally filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 13, 2007. On November 20, 2007, the United States Trustee filed a statement suggesting that the filing was an abuse of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and on November 29, 2007, filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). Thereafter, the Debtors filed a motion to convert the case to a proceeding under Chapter 13, which this Court granted on January 25, 2008. The Debtors then filed a Chapter 13 plan and conversion schedules. On their Schedule I, Debtors show income of $4,774.30. Schedule J lists expenses of $4,652.07, leaving net monthly income of $122.23. Debtors have filed a plan in which they propose to pay that sum to the trustee for a period of 55 months. According to the plan, unsecured creditors will receive whatever is left over after the required payments to secured creditors and priority claimants. Debtors also filed a Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income, Official Form 22C. According to that form, their current monthly income is $7,500.90. Because, when annualized, that figure equates to an income of $90,010.80, which is in excess of the $72,800.00 median income in the state of Missouri for a family of similar size, Debtors completed the remaining portion of Form 22C showing deductions of $6,597.98. Debtors' disposable income is thus $902.92.

On March 15, 2008, the trustee filed a motion to deny confirmation of the plan alleging among other things that: the Debtors' plan failed to meet the requirements of § 1325(b) in that the plan did not propose to pay to the Debtors' unsecured creditors the entire amount of their disposable income of $902.92 as shown on Form 22C; the plan was not filed in good faith in contravention of § 1325(a)(3) because Debtors, although above median and with disposable income, proposed to pay little to their unsecured creditors under the plan; the treatment of certain secured creditors was unclear because they were listed on Schedule D as secured, but not so treated in the plan; and one creditor, alleging to be secured, American General Services, had objected to confirmation. Debtors responded by alleging that: the objection to confirmation had been resolved; they did not purport to treat certain creditors shown on Schedule D as secured because their liens were subject to avoidance and motions to that effect had been filed; and they proposed to pay all they could afford, as shown on Schedules I and J for the appropriate period, were unable to pay the amount shown on Form 22C and that requiring them to do so under the circumstances would violate the equal protection provision of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. An amended motion to dismiss was subsequently filed in which the trustee claimed that Debtors failed to provide sufficient payment advices. Debtors' response to that motion alleged that the required income information had been subsequently provided. At this point, the only remaining issue for the Court is the Debtors' constitutional challenge to the trustee's objection to the plan on § 1325(b) grounds.

II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Projected Disposable Income

Perhaps the most significant and difficult changes made to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") are those relating to the determination of disposable income for Chapter 13 debtors. Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, the Court determined the debtor's projected disposable income by deducting from the income shown on Schedule I, the expenses shown on Schedule J, subject to the court's review for the necessity and reasonableness of those expenses. The resulting number constituted the amount to be paid to the Chapter 13 trustee pursuant to the plan. Upon objection by the holder of an unsecured claim or the Chapter 13 trustee, the debtor could obtain confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan only by demonstrating either that the unsecured claims were being paid in full or the debtor was committing all disposable income to make payments into the plan for a period of no less than 36 months. Plan payments could not extend beyond five years. BAPCPA made changes to many of these provisions and has ushered in an entirely different world.

Under BAPCPA, upon objection, if the debtor is not paying all unsecured creditors in full, the plan must provide that all projected disposable income received in the applicable commitment period be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan. § 1325(b)(1)(B). The applicable commitment period for debtors with incomes above the applicable median for similar household sizes is five years. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii). Projected disposable income is not defined, but BAPCPA contains a new definition of the phrase "disposable income." In § 1325(b)(2) the phrase is defined as current monthly income received by the debtor (minus certain designated payments) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. § 1325(b)(2)(A). The concept of "current monthly income" is itself a defined phrase meaning essentially, the average monthly income the debtor received from all sources during the six-month period prior to the date of the filing of the petition, with certain exclusions. § 101(10A). In addition, the Code now specifies that the reasonable and necessary expenses to be deducted from current monthly income to determine disposable income are, for debtors above the applicable median, to be determined in accordance with § 707(b)(2). § 1325(b)(3). The expense allowances identified in § 707(b)(2) are the National and Local Standards employed by the Internal Revenue Service in assessing offers in compromise made by delinquent taxpayers. The standards are designed to create objective allowances or limitations on categories of recurring expenses in order to assess what surplus might exist for application to the delinquent tax debt.

As this Court has observed previously, these changes have generated a tremendous amount of litigation as courts have attempted to interpret their meaning. While several different schools of thought have developed, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in its recent decision in Coop v. Frederickson, 375 B.R. 829 (8th Cir. BAP 2007) adopted the position that the calculation resulting from the completion of Form 22C is dispositive for above-median debtors. In Frederickson, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel adopted what it called the "plain meaning" approach holding that Form 22C controls the determination of projected disposable income. In so doing, it rejected the notion that the court should look at the actual or anticipated (rather than historical) income or the actual (rather than objective) expenses of the debtor. The Frederickson case involved debtors who had the capacity to pay more than Form 22C required, but who were, according to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's determination, not required to do so in order to confirm their plan. The converse situation was considered by Judge Federman in In re Riding, 377 B.R. 239 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2007). In that case, the debtor's Form 22C calculation required them to make a payment to unsecured creditors pursuant to the plan that their Schedules I and J indicated that they could not afford to make. The court held that the Frederickson holding was nonetheless applicable, the Form 22C calculation was dispositive and that if debtors were unable to make that payment, the plan was unconfirmable. As this Court has indicated before, the result in Riding is the logical consequence of the holding in Frederickson, applied to a different factual situation. It is this application of the interpretation of the disposable income requirement in Frederickson to which the Debtors in this case object.

B. Projected Disposable Income and Equal Protection
1. Debtors' Constitutional Argument

Debtors contend that the disposable income requirement contained in § 1325(b) as interpreted by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Frederickson and applied in Riding results in impermissible discrimination in violation of the equal protection requirement of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Debtors' argument is premised first upon the assertion that the statutory...

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