In re Crawford's Estate

• Decision Date: 09 May 1942
• Docket Number: 35492.
• Citation: 125 P.2d 354,155 Kan. 388
• Parties: In re CRAWFORD'S ESTATE. v. RUCKER. CRAWFORD
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

125 P.2d 354

155 Kan. 388

In re CRAWFORD'S ESTATE.

CRAWFORD v. RUCKER.

No. 35492.

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 9, 1942

Syllabus by the Court.

The existence of a marriage relationship does not constitute a "legal disability" and does not as to wife toll the running of applicable statute of limitations. Gen.St.1935 23-201 to 23-207, 60-307; Const. art. 15, § 6.

The existence of marriage relationship does not suspend running of statute of limitations on a claim of wife against her husband. Gen.St.1935, 60-301 et seq.

Where petition of wife, presenting claims against deceased husband's estate, alleged that money and property of wife were used for husband's personal benefit, but did not allege that there was any agreement between husband and wife that husband would hold property or money received in trust for her, the petition did not allege facts which would create a "trust", and therefore the three-year statute of limitations was applicable. Gen.St.1935, 60-306, subd. second.

A petition of wife presenting claims against deceased husband's estate based on bank checks which wife wrote on her own account and alleging that amounts thereof were advanced to husband to cover expenditures which he was legally obligated to make for her support, but not indicating the nature or purpose of the expenditures or alleging that there was any agreement that husband was to reimburse her for money advanced, or that there was any breach of faith on part of husband, did not state a cause of action.

1. The existence of a marriage relationship does not constitute a "legal disability" within the meaning of G.S.1935 60-307, which tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations.

2. The existence of the marriage relationship does not suspend the running of the statutes of limitation, ch. 60, art. 3 G.S.1935, as between husband and wife.

3. The record examined, in an action to which a widow sought to establish certain claims against the estate of her deceased husband, and held, that the trial court properly ruled that certain claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the petition did not state a cause of action.

Appeal from District Court, Pawnee County; Lorin T. Peters, Judge.

Vincent G. Fleming, of Larned (R. L. Young, of LaCrosse, and W. H Vernon, of Larned, on the brief), for appellant.

Roscoe E. Peterson, of Larned, for appellee.

HOCH Justice.

Appellant sought to establish claims against the estate of her deceased husband. A motion to strike certain parts of the petition, a demurrer, and a motion to dismiss were sustained and she appeals. Two principal questions are presented-- whether the statute of limitations runs as between husband and wife, and whether the petition stated a cause of action.

C. A. Crawford, a resident of Pawnee county, died intestate on September 10, 1939, leaving as his heirs at law the widow, Annis L. Crawford, and Mildred Grace Rucker, a daughter by an earlier marriage. The widow and daughter were named jointly as administratrices, and on January 3, 1940 inventory and appraisement were filed showing personal property valued at $2,014.91 and farm land valued at $12,999. The only claims presented were the funeral bill and that of the widow, here involved. The regularity of the procedure is not questioned.

Appellant's amended petition alleged in substance that at the time of his death her husband was indebted to her in the sum of $10,350.63 "for money and property of her separate estate which he had taken, held, used, sold, invested commingled with his own property and spent," and that such money and property "were not acquired by decedent from petitioner's separate estate by gift or purchase." The alleged indebtedness was itemized under four general classes. In "Item I" were listed, by date and amount, one hundred and three checks, covering a period from December 1, 1914 to November 19, 1928, which, it was alleged, constituted "Money of petitioner's separate estate taken by decedent's drawing checks upon petitioner's bank account and all used for his own personal use, benefit, business and affairs." These items totaled $4,980.67. In "Item II" were likewise listed one hundred and eleven checks, written by petitioner, covering a period from August 25, 1914 to September 11, 1939, and totaling $935.46, which it was alleged, constituted "Money of petitioner's separate estate necessarily advanced for the use and benefit of decedent by petitioner's payment thereof for necessities of life which decedent was legally obligated to provide for petitioner, thus creating by implication of law a trust relationship whereby decedent was and is obligated to repay petitioner for her said advancements for his use and benefit." In Item III were listed certain livestock and seed wheat which petitioner alleged either belonged to her separate estate at the time of her marriage in 1914, or was inherited from her father's estate in 1919, or taken and used by her husband in 1920, and all of which, of an alleged value of $4,309.50, "was taken by decedent and used for his own personal use and benefit." Item IV consisted of two alleged loans to decedent in 1915, for "purchase of a suit of clothes" and "payment of wages of a farm laborer," and one in 1924 "for travel expenses of decedent on a trip to Illinois," the three alleged loans totaling $125.

Decedent's daughter, Mildred Grace Rucker, was appointed sole administratrix for the purpose of hearing the widow's demand. At the hearing in the probate court the administratrix moved to strike from the petition all of Items I, III and IV and all of the separate items in Item II up to and including the check written by claimant on July 28, 1937, on the ground that it appeared on the face of the petition that all such claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. G.S.1935, 60-306 Second. The administratrix also moved to strike out the words heretofore indicated by italics in Item II, on the ground that such allegations constituted a mere conclusion of law. The administratrix also demurred to the petition on the ground that no cause of action was stated against the estate and also moved to dismiss the petition. The motions and demurrer having been overruled in probate court, appeal was taken to the district court, where, after hearing, the motions and the demurrer were sustained.

The question whether statutes of limitation run as between husband and wife has not been passed upon directly by this court. The decisions in other jurisdictions must, of course be viewed in the light of the provisions of law upon which they are based. While an apparent conflict in such decisions disappears, in many cases, upon critical examination of the divergent statutes underlying them a wide and irreconcilable conflict of authority still remains. 34 Am. Jur. 292, § 377; 121 A.L.R. 1384-1396; 30 C.J. 991; 37 C.J. § 408. Appellant recognizes this conflict but urges that the majority rule is that the statutes do not begin to run until the marriage relationship ceases and cites generalizations of textbook writers which support that contention. We need not attempt here to balance these conflicting holdings...