In re Cupples' Estate

• Decision Date: 03 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 19776.,No. 19775.,No. 19777.,19775.,19776.,19777.
• Citation: 199 S.W. 556,272 Mo. 465
• Parties: In re CUPPLES' ESTATE. SCUDDER et al. v. KOELN, Revenue Collector.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

199 S.W. 556

272 Mo. 465

In re CUPPLES' ESTATE.

SCUDDER et al. v. KOELN, Revenue Collector.

No. 19775.

No. 19776.

No. 19777.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 3, 1917.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Thomas L. Anderson, Judge.

Proceeding by Edmond Koeln, collector of the revenue, against Maude Cupples Scudder and others to determine inheritance tax. From order granting a new trial after judgment for the collector, he appeals. Affirmed.

This is a proceeding begun in the probate court for the city of St. Louis for the assessment of the collateral inheritance tax against the interest of the three respondents in the estate devised and bequeathed to them by Samuel Cupples, deceased. The amount of the interest of each was found to be $172,253.96, and the tax demanded against each was $8,612.70. The probate court held these testamentary interests to be exempt from such taxation. The matter was appealed by the respondents to the circuit court for the city of St. Louis, where the action of the probate court was reversed, and judgment entered accordingly. A motion for a new trial was sustained, and the collector has appealed to this court from that order.

The facts are that in 1871 Samuel Cupples and wife adopted, by deed made in accordance with the statute of this state in such cases, Amelia Ross Lowman (who had come to them as a child in 1868), with the consent of her parents evidenced by their joining in the deed. The child's name was changed from Lowman to Cupples, and she grew up in the Cupples family, was married in 1885 to William H. Scudder, Jr., and became the mother of the three respondents, who lived in the Cupples family. Mr. Cupples characterized Mrs. Scudder in his will as my beloved daughter, and made an affidavit in which he stated that she had "always been our dutiful, obedient, and affectionate daughter."

The income of the trust property only was to be paid to the beneficiaries during the first four years of the trust, and then one-fourth of the principal each year until all should be paid. All payments of principal and interest was to be contingent upon the beneficiary being alive at the time of the distribution; otherwise the share to go elsewhere.

Orville M. Barnett, of Columbia, and Ernest A. Green, of St. Louis, for appellant. John H. Overall, of St. Louis (Frederick N. Judson, of St. Louis, of counsel), for respondents.

BROWN, C. (after stating the facts as above).

The question presented is whether or not the children of an adopted child of the testator are required to pay the collateral inheritance tax imposed by section 309 of the Revised Statutes of 1909 upon their respective legacies. The provisions of that section applicable are the following:

"All property which shall pass by will, or by the intestate laws of this state * * * other than to or for the use of the father, mother, husband, wife, legally adopted children, or direct lineal descendant of the testator * * * shall be and is subject to the payment of a collateral inheritance tax of five dollars for each and every one hundred dollars of the clear market value of such property, and at and after the same rate for every less amount, to be paid to the collector of revenue of the proper county, and for the purpose of this article, the city of St. Louis shall be affected through its corresponding officers as if it were a county."

The question depends entirely upon the legislative purpose in using the words "legally adopted children" in the provision quoted. If they were used for the purpose of making plain the intention that legally adopted children were to be classified with natural children of the testator or intestate in respect of their rights under the statutes of descents and distributions, then it is plain, as we shall presently see more clearly, that their descendants would come within the description of descendants of their adopted parent. If, on the other hand, these words were used as words of limitation, for the purpose of excluding them from that description by the mention of their adopted parent, a contrary result would follow. In the consideration of that question we will be aided by certain general principles, too well settled to be open to discussion.

The collateral inheritance tax statute is not a general revenue law founded upon the provision of the state Constitution requiring that taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, but "is a bonus or duty levied upon the right or privilege of the devisee, heir, or distributee, of receiving his share." State ex rel. v. Henderson, 160 Mo. 190, loc. cit. 215, 60 S. W. 1093, loc. cit. 1097; State ex rel. v. Switzler, 143 Mo. loc. cit. 329, 45 S. W. 245, 40 L. R. A. 280, 65 Am. St. Rep. 653; In re Remme's Estate, 196 S. W. loc. cit. 739. Such taxation must be imposed in clear and unambiguous terms, and exceptions will be liberally construed in connection with the whole body of the law upon the subject of which it treats. Blakemore & Bancroft on Inheritance Taxes, § 241; 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 340; Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515, 46 L. Ed. 697; Matter of Enston, 113 N. Y. 174, 21 N. E. 87, 3 L. R. A. 464. In re Starbuck's Estate, 63 Misc. Rep. 156, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1030. This leads us to an examination of the statutes relating to the adoption of children, as well as to those regulating descents and distributions of the estates of decedents upon which it depends largely for its operation, and is, to that extent, a part.

The statute authorizing the adoption of children rests upon an element in the human character which manifests itself in the desire for children—for some one to nurture and cherish as one's own flesh and blood, and to make return for such offices by bringing affection and comfort to one's old age. This is well illustrated in the case at bar. The three children by birth of the testator died in childhood, and the adopted child took their place and filled it so well that nearly 40 years afterward he wrote of her in his will as his beloved daughter, and took occasion in an affidavit, made for that purpose, to testify to her filial virtues. It is plain that such benefits are ill requited by a system which would make no provision for her children and would leave them at the mercy of an accident of intestacy.

The first section of the statute under which she was adopted (R. S. 1909, § 1671) is as follows:

"If any person in this state shall desire to adopt any child or children as his or her heir, it shall be lawful for such person to do the same by deed, which deed shall be executed and acknowledged by the person adopting such child or children and recorded in the county of the residence of the person executing the same, as in the case of conveyance of real estate."

It is to be noted that under this section he adopted the "child" as his own "heir." These words have a broad meaning, and include, under the statute of descents and distributions then and now in force, the transmission of the faculty of inheritance by her death. That this is true has become the settled doctrine of this court. Williams v. Rollins, 195 S. W. 1009; Bernero v. Goodwin, 267 Mo. 427, 184 S. W. 74. The next section imposes upon the adopting parent the duty and upon the child the right to the nurture, treatment, and protection of a daughter by birth. The statute of descents and distributions made no distinction between her and a child by birth, but included her in the general designation of children, and her descendants in the general designation of the descendants of children. R. S. 1909, § 332.

As this court said in State v. Henderson, supra, "the right of the Legislature to prescribe the right of descent and inheritance cannot be doubted. It is not a natural right."...